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ABSTRACT 
Due to the political aspects of international law and the political nature of the problems 
involved in international relations, appreciation of the legal nature of United Nations 
Security Council arms embargoes is lacking. Based upon a review of the practice of the 
Council, this thesis explores the operation of arms embargoes within the overall scheme 
of international law and highlights how these measures provide an interface between the 
laws of collective security, armed conflict, human rights and arms control. The author 
outlines existing arms control regimes and the law applicable to the study of arms 
embargoes; examines the law relating to the powers of the United Nations Security 
Council under Chapter VI I of the Charter of the United Nations and the legal limits 
thereto; identifies the patterns in practice by expounding the nature, scope and functions 
of arms embargoes and comments on the possible existence of a normative framework; 
explores the specific legal mandate for arms embargoes and considers possible 
alternative legal bases; and finally, investigates other issues of international law arising 
from the use of arms embargoes. The powers of the Security Council exist for the 
pursuit of one central outcome - the maintenance of international peace and security. 
This thesis argues that the logical way to achieve this outcome in situations of armed 
conflict is to remove the tools with which those types of threats are created and 
sustained. Conventional weapons (in particular, small arms and light weapons) are the 
principal, although not the exclusive, tools of armed conflict. Arms embargoes imposed 
in the context of an armed conflict can be legally justified with the simple objective of 
suppressing conflict by means of arms control. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Problem in General 
It stands to reason that in dealing with legal questions the elimination of the political 
issues involved is always relative, never absolute) 
Weapons provide a means of attack as well as defence. Today the manufacture and sale 
of armaments and related materiel can both destroy and sustain economies and the 
availability of weapons can create both insecurity and security. The existence and 
proliferation of a variety of armaments is clearly of international concern^ and poses a 
number of interrelated legal problems and political dilemmas. Some overarching legal 
problems relevant to this study are the deficiencies in and the general lack of 
enforceable international legal regulation of conventional armaments. The specific 
legal problem for this thesis is to understand the operation of United Nations Security 
Council ('Council') arms embargoes within the overall scheme of international law and 
to assess the legal implications thereto, including in to which legal sphere or spheres 
they are or could be placed. 
McClelland'' explains that the two existing conventional arms control approaches taken 
in international humanitarian law ( 'IHL') have expanded since attention has been 
focused on post-conflict situations, from those that prohibited particular weapons'* and 
those that restricted 'the use of weapons by reference to their wounding effects' to 
including also, restrictions on 'those weapons that fail to function as intended' and 
' Kelsen, H. Preface to The Law of the United Nations - A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental 
Problems ('Law of the UN') (1950) Stevens and Sons Limited (Lxjndon) at p.xiii. 
^ As is the 'regulation of armaments' in general - see, e.g. Articles 26 and 47 of the Charter of the 
United Nations ('Charter') (Signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945; entry into force 24 October 
1945. (All future references to an 'Article' refer to provisions of the Charter unless otherwise 
stated.) 
See also the Council's earliest considerations of the issue: S/RES/18 of 1947; S/RES/68 of 1949; 
S/RES/77 of 1949; S/RES/78 of 1949; S/RES/79 of 1950 and S/RES/97 of 1952. 
^ McClelland, J. Conventional Weapons: A Cluster of Developments (2005) 54 ICLQ 755 at pp.755-
6 and his note 1 (omitted). 
°* However, few types of conventional weapons are actually prohibited and illegal per se. 
Prohibitions on types of weapons are more common for Weapons of Mass Destruction 'WMD', (i.e. 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons) ballistic missiles and radiological weapons. 
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regulations designed to ensure 'the clearance of explosive remnants of war afterwards.'^ 
Another important area of arms control is that which aims to restrict trafficking of 
weapons by reference to their end-users and end-uses. Within municipal legal systems, 
export controls and the use of end-use assurances and end-user certificates aim to 
prevent the export of weapons to 'undesirable' recipients based on policies specific to 
that state. Some national policies^ and parts of primary legislation^ on export controls 
are guided by international practice^ and standards, and secondary legal instruments^ are 
used as a method of implementation by UN Member states of UN sanctions in general. 
The reported breaches'° of multilateral arms embargoes indicate, that national policies 
are not adequately implemented and in many states such policies simply do not exist." 
These national controls, while noteworthy, are still inadequate for the task of managing 
the global problem of unregulated arms trafficking.'^ 
The only international legal approach'^ which currently exists to restrict trafficking of 
^ McClelland op.cir. at p.767. 
^ For the most recent official position of the UK, see its 'Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 
2005' available at-
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FCO-Annual%20Report%202005.LR.pdf especially at §2.3 
'Embargoed destinations' p. 12 (April-2007). 
^ See e.g., the UK's Export Controls Act 2002 & Schedule thereto 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020028.htm (April-2007). 
The function of UK statutory instruments regarding arms embargoes is 'to give effect to decisions 
of [the] Council'. 
^ See Appendix A, p.225 in Cortright and Lopez (eds.) Smart Sanctions - Targeting Economic 
Statecraft ('Statecraft') (2002) Rowman and Littlefield. 
' See Table 3.7 in A Project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms 
Survey 2002 Counting the Human Cost ('SAS-2002') (2002) OUP at p. 132. 
'' ' [I]t is a reality that many countries have no export control mechanisms, or have systems that are 
weak and easily abused. This situation allows irresponsible arms traders overseas to make sales with 
little regard for how the arms will be used.' Ibid, note 6 at §2.1 (p.10). 
E.g. End-use assurances are easily forged - See Chapter 3 of 'SAS-2002' op.cit. 
For suggested improvements, see Hagelin, B. International Armament Embargoes and the Need for 
End-Use Documents in Wallensteen, P and Staibano, C (eds.) International Sanctions - Between 
Words and Wars in the Global System ('International Sanctions') (2005) Frank Cass at pp.75-91. 
Note the existence of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime ('Firearms Protocol') which places restrictions on weapons by 
reference to a factual quality of the weapon's status in law. See further infra, Chapter One. 
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weapons by reference to their end-users and their ultimate destinations is the use of 
mandatory multilateral arms embargoes by the Council under Chapter VI I of the 
Charter. However, a difficulty arises immediately because although arms embargoes 
represent one method of existing international regulation for conventional weapons, this 
function transpires as a side-effect of their primary function which, in international law, 
is as a demonstration of collective security rather than an approach to arms control. 
Arms embargoes impose legally binding obligations on all states to prevent the sale, 
supply or transfer of conventional weapons to certain places or to certain entities or 
individuals, as decided by the Council on behalf of the UN. These temporary 
restrictions are motivated by reference to unacceptable situations or acts which threaten 
or have breached international peace and which are created and/or prolonged by those 
end-users and/or are occurring within those destinations. The UN system for imposing 
arms embargoes, unlike the approaches described by McClelland, does not necessarily 
operate under the auspices of IHL.^"* The application of arms embargoes is not 
restricted to the control of conventional weapons alone and such application only 
endures for as long as such threats or the effects of a breach persist.'^ In theory, arms 
embargoes can prevent or halt conflict'^ by removing the flow of weapons and related 
materiel to the targeted area, thus contributing significantly to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security (TPS'). In addition, some of the 
objectives ascribed to the multifaceted UN arms embargoes correspond to those of the 
'non-collective security' arms control approaches.'^ These include, ambitions to limit 
or suppress conflict (by controlHng either the type or number of new weapons permitted 
to enter the conflict zone); and ambitions to maintain the security and development 
However, this legal sphere is relevant to the vast majority of arms embargoes. 
This has an effect on the legal status of the measures which 'inight.-.be regarded as analogous to 
executive regulations rather than to true legislation.' Frowein, J.A. and Krisch, N. in Simma, B. 
(ed.) The Charter of the United Nations: a Commentaiy ('Simma') (Vol.1) 2"" ed. (2002) OUP at 
p.708-9. 
And in practice it is possible that arms embargoes have contributed to immobilising conflict: 'In 
December 1996, during a flare-up of renewed fighting in Mogadishu, the militia factions ran out of 
ammunition, and as a result the battle ended'. Cortright, D. & Lopez, G.A. et al. The Sanctions 
Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s ('Sanctions Decade') A Project of the International 
Peace Academy (2000) Rienner at p. 186 (their footnote omitted). 
I.e. those outlined by McClelland. 
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prospects of the post-conflict situation (by removing munitions and old weapons from 
the conflict zone and continuing to restrict transfers of new weapons into the zone). 
The deficiencies of arms embargoes have been expounded on many occasions by a 
variety of authors including academics,^ ^ non-governmental organisations (NGOs),'^ the 
media,^^ the UN^' and combinations of these.^ ^ Current criticism tends to focus not on 
failings in the design^ "* of these measures, but in their implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement,^ "* however it is submitted that all aspects require further analysis in order 
for arms embargoes to be better understood and therefore used in a more efficacious 
manner. This includes acknowledging the appropriate legal spheres within which arms 
embargoes operate. According to the Small Arms Survey '[a]rms embargoes represent 
a unique combination of Realpolitik, carrot-and-stick diplomacy and ethical foreign 
policy motivated above all by the hope of ending conflict or ending oppression.'^'' This 
description emphasises the perception of arms embargoes as political tools, while 
ignoring appreciation of their legal functions and status. This omission supports the 
See e.g. Cortright and Lopez at p.l4; Bondi, L. at pp.109-123; Brzoska, M. at pp.125-143; and 
Elliot, K.A. at pp. 174-5 all in 'Statecraft' op.cit note 9. 
''^  See e.g. Control Arms 2006 UN arms embargoes: an overview of the last ten years available at: 
http://www.controlarms.org/fmd out more/reports/UN-arms-embargoes-fmal-l3306.pdf (April-
2007). 
See e.g. Anns traders 'dodging embargoes' (BBC) http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/5398424.stm: 
and DR Congo arms embargo failing' (BBC) http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/6055864.stm 
(October-2006). 
'^ See e.g. Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms S/2003/1217. (Although a more recent 
report (S/2005/69) notes progress in the areas of monitoring and enforcement.) 
"^ See e.g. the Bonn-Berlin process in Germany, 21-23 November 1999 (First Expert Seminar -
Smart Sanctions, The Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions). 
- final documents available at http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc (April-2007). 
Individual conference papers on arms embargoes included: Anthony, I. Improving the Cooperation 
of Major Arms Suppliers; Bondi, L. Arms Embargoes: A View from a concerned NGO; hoy, M. 
Proper and Prompt National Implementation of Arms Embargoes: The German Case; Luck, E.C. 
Choosing Words Carefully: Arms Embargoes and the UN Security Council; Nathan, L. The Absent 
Sentry - Sanctions and the Problem of Weak Border Control; and Rydell, R. Monitoring United 
Nations Arms Embargoes. Available at http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc/1999/papers.php (April-
2007). 
Although see Bondi, L. Anns Embargoes: In name only? in 'Statecraft' op.cit pp.109-123 at 
p.ll5. 
See Cortright and Lopez 'Statecraft' op.cit. p. 14. 
'SAS-2002' op.cit. note 10 at p. 131 (Italics in original). 
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need for a thorough legal analysis of an area largely controlled by politics and 
humanitarian ideals. 
Conventional Weapons and the Unique Problem of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons 
It is trite to note that conventional weapons happen to be the standard types of weapons 
used during armed conflicts. They are considered to be an acceptable means of warfare 
under existing DHL because they have not yet been prohibited. The notable exception to 
this assertion is the use of antipersonnel landmines^^ and in the near future may include 
indiscriminate cluster munitions.^^ There are relatively few multilateral legal regimes^^ 
in operation to prohibit, restrict or regulate the use of conventional weapons and 
certainly not to the degree that exists for nuclear,^^ chemical and biological weapons^^ 
and missiles.^' There is a wealth of opinion^" that asserts, inter alia, the lethal and 
See the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines and on their Destruction. ('Ottawa Convention') 
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban trty.htm (February-2007). 
See, http://www. un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21670&Cr=cluster&Crl=munitions 
(February-2007) and http://www.regieringen.no/en/ministries/ud/Selected-topics/Humanitarian-
efforts/The-Norwegian-Govemments-initiative-for/Cluster-Munitions—Norwegian-
Initiative.html?id=449312 (March-2007). 
See also an announcement by the MoD (UK) on 20 March 2007 that in the future only 'smart' 
cluster munitions will be used by the UK-
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceIntemet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/UkBecomesFirstMaiorP 
owerToScrapdumbClusterMunitions.htm (March-2007) See also issue No. 158 of 'Preview' (April 
2007) (MoD magazine) at p.20: "Use of Britain's remaining cluster munitions will continue to be 
regulated by rules of engagement and intemal scrutiny procedures designed to adhere to 
international law and reflect humanitarian values." (My emphasis). 
For example the CCWC (1981); the CFE 1990; However there are a number politically binding 
arrangements and regional regimes in place (see below, Chapter One). 
Treaties: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (1968); CTBT (1996)(not 
yet in force); plus several nuclear weapons free zone treaties. Monitoring: the IAEA; the NSG and 
the SC Committee pursuant to Resolution 1540. 
Treaties: CWC (1993); BWC (1972), 1925 Geneva Protocol. Monitoring: OPCW; the Australia 
Group. See also, S/RES/620 of 1988 condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq 
conflict. 
'^ HCOC (launched 2002) - supplement to the MTCR. 
'^ See e.g. the published studies list of the WMDC at p.217 of Weapons of Terror - Freeing the 
World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Anns and available at http://www.wmdcommission.org 
(April-2007). 
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undesirable nature of WMD. The threat posed by nuclear weapons in particular, 
however variable in its urgency and likelihood of reaching fruition, is real and the 
consequences thereof are potentially devastating. The past"*^  and potential^ "* uses of 
nuclear weapons embody a 'shock factor' which helps to maintain its status as an 
international priority for many states. With the difficult issue of national security 
interests in mind, there is not a notable legitimate interstate trade in nuclear weapons 
technology and weapons or their delivery systems, precisely because international 
regulation has been developed. 
Throughout history, considerations regarding to whom and to where weapons should be 
sold have often been based on the strategic (both military and political) significance of 
the country of destination,^^ rather than for what purposes and by whom the weapons 
would eventually be used. States tend to be willing to trade their technologies and 
resources with their allies, especially those who are geographically close to their 
enemies. The fact that the arms trade is a global business does not detract from the 
issue of arms control. Controlling the proliferation of conventional arms does not entail 
or aspire to the end of the trade absolutely. It simply means in certain circumstances a 
control is placed upon where and to whom the arms can legally reach. 
By imposing a unilateral arms embargo, a state makes a decision that, for a particular 
reason, a certain recipient state or entity should not have particular armaments. By 
imposing a multilateral arms embargo, the international community of states (as 
represented^^ in the Council) makes the same decision and judgement. The particular 
reasons will of course vary, not only between unilateral and multilateral decision-
makers, but also from case to case. What should interest international lawyers are the 
implied or given reasons for multilateral action because such action gives rise to 
international legal obligations. In order not to be arbitrary decisions (which are 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. 
'^^  An example of a current major nuclear threat is that of Iran - a frequent item on the agenda of the 
Council. 
E.g. Kuwait is a key ally for the UK in the Middle East. 
For discussion on the composition of the Council, see infra Chapter Two. 
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undesirable in law) these reasons must bear relevance to international norms. 
A further important distinction is that there is a fundamental understanding that control 
over the proliferation of WMD, (nuclear weapons in particular) is desirable, irrespective 
of the final recipient. The opening preambular section of Resolution 1540" pays due 
regard to this: "Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to [IPS]...". 
One aim of the NPT was to ensure that only the nuclear weapons states would keep 
nuclear weapons and gradually try to disarm and all others would not try to acquire 
them, thus supporting non-proliferation. With regard to conventional weapons, 
proliferation per se is not considered to be a threat to EPS; however, there is a growing 
understanding that proliferation based upon the identity of the end-user or end-use can 
modify this default p o s i t i o n . I t is suggested that improved comprehension of arms 
embargoes could advance the aforementioned growing understanding and could also 
contribute to the development of an Arms Trade Treaty ('ATT').'*'^ 
See Article 1 of the NPT: 'Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to 
transfer to any recipient whatsoever...' (My emphasis). 
S/RES/1540 (That the Council also stated its concern about the risk posed by non-state actors 
vis-a-vis WMD proliferation does not detract from the inherent threat which emanates from the 
weapons themselves.) 
"^^ Concerns have been voiced about the need to ensure that conventional weapons, in particular illicit 
SALW, are not in 'the wrong hands'. 
See e.g. statement of 27 June by New Zealand during the High Level Segment of the UN Conference 
to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat 
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in S A L W in All Its Aspects, 2006: 'New Zealand remains fully 
committed to the Programme of Action and to the advancement of initiatives which are designed to 
prevent small arms and light weapons falling into the wrong hands, or being used illegally.' 
Available at: http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060627newzealand-eng.pdf (April-
2007) ('UN Review Conference'). 
Part of the motivation for an A T T is to minimise the risk of diversion by controlling the legal 
trade, thereby helping to isolate the illicit trade and its brokers. 
See e.g. http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/proiects/arms trade treaty proiect.php: 
http://www.controlarms.org: http://www.armstradetreatv.com: 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/ATT%20-%20UK%20contribution%20to%20the%20UN%20-
%20final,l.pdf (April-2007). 
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The current disparity between the levels of international regulation of WMD and 
conventional weapons is exacerbated by the lack of binding national and international 
standards regarding the most prevalent type of conventional weapons used in armed 
conflict - small arms and light weapons ( 'SALW'). This is compounded by setbacks in 
political processes which could further the necessary political will for action.'*' US 
foreign policy makers lack faith"*^ in the multilateral process undertaken at the UN, and 
although this does not detract from the operation of arms embargoes, it does detract 
from the potential to increase levels of international regulation. Although the US was 
'pleased to join the consensus... in the adoption of the Firearms Protocol"*^ it has neither 
signed nor ratified this legal instrument.'*'* In some ways however, the US position 
complements the operation of arms embargoes, because its stance on the political 
processes where SALW are under discussion, views such weapons strictly as military 
weapons,'*^ i.e. those designed for use and those being used during armed conflict 
Such as the eventual collapse of the UN Review Conference where the final document of the 
Conference could not be adopted due to the failure to achieve consensus within the allotted time. 
See A/CONF. 192/2006/RC/9 at ^30. 
''^  This can be implied by its negative vote in the GA on the recent ATT resolution (Towards an arms 
trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of 
conventional arms - A/RES/61/89 of 18 December 2006 - Meeting record: A/61/PV.67 of 6 
December 2006 (pp.29-31) Voting record: 153-1-24 (USA against)) and its opposition to follow up 
processes to the UN Review Conference: 
('...the United States will not commit to another Review Conference. We will only consider 
proposals regarding follow-on actions that are focused, practical, and intended to strengthen the 
implementation of the Programme of Action.' - US Statement during the High Level Segment 
Tuesday 27 June 2006. (Available - http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060627usa-
eng.pdf)). 
Indeed, in its statement at the 2001 Conference the US explained it would 'not support a mandatory 
Review Conference...which serves only to institutionalize and bureaucratize this process.' 
Available at: http://www.un.int/usa/01 104.htm (April-2007). 
"^^ A/55/PV.101 at p. 11 - note the non-binding nature of GA resolutions. 
'" http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime cicp signatures firearms.html (April-2007). 
'*•*' See the statement by the US at the first UN SALW Conference in 2001 (Ibid, note 42): 
"Small arms and light weapons, in our understanding, are the strictly military arms - automatic rifles, 
machine guns, shoulder-fired missile and rocket systems, light mortars - that are contributing to 
continued violence and suffering in regions of conflict around the world." Note also: "Our focus is 
on addressing the problem where it is most acute and the risks are highest: regions of conflict and 
instability." 
However, the US perspective may detract from UN Programme of Action (Section IV of the Report 
of the 2001 Conference - A/CONF.192/15) which considers the illicit trade in all its aspects, i.e. its 
consideration is broader than that of the world's regions of conflict. 
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situations. SALW have overwhelmingly become the combatant's conventional 
weapons of choice. SALW are now so commonplace that the world appears to have 
become desensitised to their lethal nature and their capacity for mass destruction'*^ (of, 
inter alia, life, social structures and regional stability). These factors do not represent 
the root cause of the problem of the lack of regulation, but they exacerbate it by 
detracting from the necessary political wil l . 
As the focus of this thesis is on Security Council action in relation to arms embargoes, 
the UN's own description of SALW and ammunition'*^ is the most convenient starting 
point: 
Small arms include: 
Revolvers and self-loading pistols; Rifles and carbines; Sub-machine-guns; 
Assault rifles and Light machine-guns. 
Light weapons include: 
Heavy machine-guns; Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; 
Portable anti-aircraft guns;** Portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles;** Portable 
launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems;** Portable launchers of anti-
aircraft missile systems and Mortars of calibres of less than 100mm. 
'^ ^ 'The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems—and in most years 
greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of 
the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as "weapons of mass 
destruction". Yet there is still no global non-proliferation regime to limit their spread, as there is for 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.' We, the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
21" Century - Millennium Report of the Secretary General (UN Doc. [ST/]DPI/2103DPI/2103) at 
p.52. 
'^^  UNGA - Report of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298, 1997 at p.l 1-12 f26. 
**These weapons are sometimes mounted. Although explosives and landmines were also included 
in the 1997 report, they will be excluded from the focus of this work because progress is evident in 
these areas, see e.g. notes 26 and 27 supra. This definition was confirmed in A/CONF. 192/2 -
Report of the G G E established pursuant to A/RES/54/54 V of 15 December 1999, entitled 'Small 
arms'. 
See Pezard, S. and Anders, H. (eds) Targeting Ammunition - A Primer (2006) Small Arms 
Survey. 
Also note the US' opposition to discussion of this issue in the multilateral arena - see ibid, note 42 -
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Ammunition'*^ includes: 
Cartridges (rounds) for small arms; Shells and missiles for light weapons; and 
Mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-
tank systems. 
For the purposes of this essay, the phrase 'arms and related materiel' in Council arms 
embargoes on conventional weapons shall be assumed to include, but not be limited to, 
all of the above.'*^ However, it should be noted that these definitions were not 
'generally accepted' in 2002.^" 
Difficulties of control particular to ^ A L W ; their nature and abundance 
The problem of controlling SALW is compounded by their physical nature, for 
example, they are small and therefore easy to conceal, and so illicit transfers (including 
across borders into embargoed destinations) are more difficult to detect than might be 
the case for larger conventional weapons. Indeed, the so-called 'Ant Trade'"''' shows 
how single weapons can and will cross borders illegally. Military assault rifles are the 
most prevalent weapon in armed conflict today and of particular concern is 
Kalashnikov's assault rifle, the AK-47, due to its durability, longevity and simple 
design. It can be manufactured cheaply and on a grand scale and will be operational for 
many years. It can also be used by almost anyone, including children, as a single shot 
rifle (semi-automatic) and a fully automatic machine gun and it can be fired one-
handed. Even if ammunition runs out, it can be fitted with a bayonet and the butt of the 
gun can be used as an improvised club-type weapon. However coincidental it may have 
been, the AK-47 is well-suited to the type of short-range battles, terrain and combatants 
that are most commonly using it in the internal conflicts on the African continent. 
US Statement during UN Review Conference. 
In most cases all large conventional weapons will also be prohibited by an embargo. Cases that 
explicitly exclude the possibility of SALW by naming only large conventional weapons (e.g. 
S/RES/1718 on the DPRK) shall be excluded from this study. See also ^4 of S/RES/591 of 1986 
from which it could be implied that 'arms and related materiel' means 'all nuclear, strategic and 
conventional weapons'. 
'° Goldblat, J. Arms control: the new guide to negotiations and agreements (2002) Sage Publications 
at p.249. 
'^ 'SAS-2002'op.dratp.l35. 
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Direct and Indirect Consequences of Small Arms Proliferation 
When speaking of SALW's, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said '...no 
one can deny the global scope of the human tragedy that has arisen from their illicit 
acquisition and use.'^ ^ Although this thesis will not concentrate on the humanitarian 
impact of small arms,^ ^ it is a feature which must be brought to and remain within the 
reader's attention. The first Small Arms Survey publication states that 'the gross 
estimate of global deaths from all forms of homicide, war and suicide in 1998 stood at 
2,272,000...from war, the number totalled 588,000' and then estimates 'that at least 50 
per cent of these conflict-related deaths can be attributed to the intentional use of small 
arms and light weapons.'^ '* However, the problems do not end where the physical 
effects^ "^ of small arms end and so it not simply the use (or rather misuse) of small arms 
that is at issue. Small arms are used as tools of fear and manipulation and in their 
possession alone, there is a great threat. This is especially relevant to post conflict 
situations where civilians and ex-combatants are highly vulnerable, where small arms 
are abundant and where the rule of law is least effective. Small arms have been used to 
force the displacement of individuals''^ and the recruitment of child soldiers.^^ The 
58 
threat they pose can facilitate sexual violence and disrupt development programmes 
designed to assist children in conflict and post conflict situations, to name but a few of 
their negative impacts. Other authors^^ have divided these issues into direct and indirect 
Foreword - March 2002 in 'SAS-2002' op.cit 
The International Action Network on Small Anns (lANSA) website (http://www.iansa.org) for 
example, displays a counter of the number of gun deaths since the 1^ ' of January of each year. As of 
25 November 2005 the figure for 2005 stood at 278800. As of 07 March 2007 the figure for 2007 
stood at 65000. In addition, the 'Control Arms Campaign' presented the 'Million Faces' petition in 
demand of an international treaty for the arms trade to Kofi Annan at the opening to the UN Review 
Conference. 
A Project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Survey 2001 
Profiling the Problem (2001) OUP at p.236. 
i.e. fatal and non-fatal injuries. 
'SAS-2002' Op.cit. p. 167-70. 
^'^ Ibid. p. 171-2. 
'^^Ibid. p. 172-3. 
''^  Godnick, W., Laurance, E .J . , Stohl, R., and Small Anns Survey - Small Arms and Light Weapons: 
A Call for Research H F G Review pp. 10-20 Spring 2005. 
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effects of small arms misuse. 
The use of small arms in the commission of 'direct' crimes^^ can include death by 
unlawful killing, bodily or psychiatric injury, terror, rape and intimidation.^' Most 
states have municipal legal mechanisms in place to deal with such offences. In lawless 
environments, as is not unusual in countries suffering from armed conflict, these crimes 
often escape punishment as the identification and apprehension of offenders is an 
arduous task in itself and because of the lack of a functioning criminal justice system. 
In addition, there are many equally devastating indirect effects^^ of SALW proliferation 
such as the prolongation of conflicts and increased numbers of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and the effects that these factors have on instability and 
insecurity in the particular regions. These subsidiary effects create additional 
hindrances to economic and social development thus causing enormous numbers of 
indirect deaths out of the conflicts. These deaths can be caused by famine, strains on 
medical resources and interruptions of international relief programmes. As attempts to 
lessen the need for emergency relief are hampered, the longer-term effects of the 
disruption of international development programmes could impede, for example, 
fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals,^ ^ and other international pursuits. 
Although these indirect effects are more obscure and harder to identify, they represent 
problems that can be partially alleviated by humanitarian efforts. This unfortunately 
presents somewhat of a paradox as to achieve suitable conditions in which aid work can 
be applied (as is essential to this alleviation) security needs to be improved, which 
almost always includes the provision of armed protection. 
°^ Of course, S A L W can also cause death without the commission of direct or indirect crimes -
cominonly by accidental shootings and suicide. 
As expounded by Godnick et al. {Ibid, note 59) at pp.10-15, the direct effects list included: 
Deaths, injuries and disabilities; Costs of treating injuries and disabilities; Terror; Intimidation; 
Other psychological effects; Particular vulnerability of women and children; Increased potential for 
violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law. Threats to humanitarian 
intervention; and Outbreak of intergroup violence. (My emphasis). 
Ibid, pp.15 etseq. 
http://www.un.ore/millenniumgoals (April-2007). 
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The Aims of this Thesis 
This thesis will first outline existing arms control regimes and the law applicable to the 
study of arms embargoes (Chapter One); it wil l examine the law relating to the powers 
of the Security Council under Chapter V I I of the Charter of the United Nations and 
legal limits thereto (Chapter Two); it will identify patterns in practice to thereby show 
whether or not past and current practice has contributed to the existence of a normative 
framework for the use of arms embargoes. To do this it will be necessary to expound 
the nature, scope and functions of mandatory, multilateral arms embargoes (Chapter 
Three) based upon the review and classification of the practice of the Security Council 
in the imposition, termination, implementation and enforcement of arms embargoes on 
conventional armaments^ "* (Annexed Tables); it will explore the specific legal mandate 
for such arms embargoes and will consider possible alternative legal bases (Chapter 
Four); and finally, it will investigate other issues of international law arising from the 
use of arms embargoes (Chapter Five). Through these considerafions, this thesis aims 
to portray the strengths and weaknesses of using these legal tools to achieve primarily 
political goals, including the goal of collective security. 
^ The issue of international terrorism will be considered only in so far as it relates to the targets of 
arms embargoes, as the scope of this thesis is not wide enough to give the issue due consideration. 
C H A P T E R O N E 
R E L E V A N T L E G A L SPHERES AND E X I S T I N G A R M S C O N T R O L R E G I M E S 
1. Introduction 
Mandatory, multilateral arms embargoes are complex measures. Like all Chapter VII* 
measures, they embody legal as well as political commitments and carry the potential to 
amalgamate reactive and preventative action. They require international law for their 
imposition; national law for their implementation; and a combination of both for their 
enforcement and monitoring. Unlike all Chapter V I I measures, the use of arms 
embargoes reveals a unique interface between collective security law, arms control law, 
IHL and international human rights law. This creates a number of legal spheres under 
which international regulation based upon the end-user and end-use could be placed. 
Although these factors are potentially applicable to arms embargoes on any types of 
weapons, the necessity of understanding and improving regulations for conventional 
weapons (in particular, SALW) was outlined in the introduction. 
There is a need to understand existing regulation in order to understand where arms 
embargoes might best fi t into the intemational legal system. Is it solely within the 
collective security system under the Charter as it currently operates? Or is there scope 
in intemational law to include Council arms embargoes within part of a potentially 
emerging global arms control approach which regulates particular instances of arms 
trafficking by reference to an objectionable end-user or end-use of the weapons? Could 
this potential approach be justified under customary intemational law ( 'CIL') due to the 
absence of the explicit consent of states as would be evident in a treaty? In the absence 
of an active regime of collective security, individual states are free to choose^ to where 
and whom to sell^ legal weapons. But when states act collectively through the UN 
Security Council against another sovereign state, thereby impeding these freedoms, can 
' Chapter VII of the Charter - this will be detailed in Chapter Two. 
^ Although as will be outlined later in this chapter, there are several regional arrangements designed 
to guide conduct on this matter. 
^ Indeed, states are also able to choose from where and whom to buy conventional weapons. 
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this be justified under any international law other than the law of collective security? 
Do states have an obligation to intervene if breaches of peremptory norms of 
international law are taking or haven taken place?'' Is the existence of enforcement 
measures the only legal rule which supersedes the principle of non-intervention?^ 
The Ottawa Convention demonstrates an interface between some of the areas noted 
above as it is 'an arms control treaty...that fulfils humanitarian purposes.'^ Not only 
does it prohibit the use, development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, 
retention or transfer^ of a type of conventional weapon based on its (superfluous) 
wounding effects,^ it also provides for the ultimate elimination of the weapon.^ Must 
the approaches of collective security and arms control operate independently or can 
arms embargoes legitimately safisfy both needs simultaneously? Is it within the 
purview of the Council to openly incorporate an element of arms control into its 
responsibilities under the Charter? 
2. The (lack of) arms control law - existing initiatives, arrangements 
and instruments regarding conventional arms, in particular SALW 
2.1. The work of the General Assembly 
2.1.1. Mandate 
The General Assembly (GA) has a role in the maintenance of IPS supplementary to that 
of the Council. Under Article 12, the GA is not permitted to make recommendations 
relating to any matter on the Council's agenda, except at the request of the Council. 
However, in response to an impasse in Council discussions, the GA did pass a 
However, intervention in the form of an arms embargo may not always prove to be appropriate in 
the circumstances, as has been argued regarding the Bosnian Genocide at Srebrenica. For 
confirmation of the genocide see the recent ruling in the ICJ - Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro) Judgment of 26 February 2007 at ^ 297 ('Genocide Judgment 2007'). 
' See Art 2(7) Charter. 
^ White, N.D. The Future of Arms Control Law: An Overview of the Workshop ('Future of Arms 
Control') (2004) 9(3) J C S L 299 at p.299. 
Article 1 (a) and (b) of the Ottawa Convention. 
^ Preamble ibid. 
Article 2 ibid. 
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resolution in 1950"^ to assert its power to consider matters relating to IPS, 
' . . . in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression...with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case 
of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when 
necessary, to maintain or restore [IPS]. '" 
It has been argued that this resolution could be ultra vires. The references to threats to 
and breaches of peace and acts of aggression in the resolution, match the specific 
threshold events, understood to be the necessary process the Council will undertake, in 
exercising its Chapter V I I powers.'^ However, the resolution constitutes only a 
recommendation of the GA and is therefore not legally binding.'^ Despite this, it should 
be noted that GA resolutions still carry potential legal weight as they could have a role 
in the formafion of CIL.''* In addition to this GA resolutions can be instrumental in 
ascertaining the status of political will in respect of an issue. Indeed, in relation to illicit 
SALW the GA has adopted a substantial number of resolutions.'^ 
Article 12 in is effect, a qualification of Article 11, which gives the GA the power to 
'...consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of [IPS]...'. '^ In 
addition, '[t]he GA may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of [IPS]...' '^ 
18 
and it may bring situations likely to endanger IPS to the attention of the Council. 
'° 'Uniting For Peace' A/RES/377 (V) of 3 November 1950. 
Ibid, at HI. 
See Chapter Two. 
The Council itself appears to have endorsed the resolution, see e.g. S/RES/119 of 1956 on the 
Suez Crisis. Here, it decided to call an emergency special session of the GA in order for appropriate 
recommendation to be made, '...as provided in the General Assembly's resolution 377A(V)...'. 
Relevant state practice could be ascertained from the decisions of the G A as they are taken on a 
two-thirds majority voting basis (Article 18). This would comprise the approval of at least 128 
Member states, assuming all 192 members are present and do not abstain from voting. See, in 
general, Higgins, R. The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations (1963) OUP. 
'•^  http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw-gares.htm 
"^Article 11(1). 
'"'Article 11(2). 
'Article 11(3). 
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2.1.2. Resolutions and initiatives 
The only legally binding instrument relating to a category of SALW is the Protocol 
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized C r i m e . T h e adoption of the ATT resolution in 2006^" was 
highly significant, not only in terms of the step towards a codification of existing 
obligations regarding conventional arms trafficking, but also in its display^' of the 
current state of political will in respect of this matter. 
The largest multilateral initiative has been the United Nations General Assembly 
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in Al l Its Aspects in 
July 2001^^ which resulted in the adoption of a Programme of Action (PoA).^^ The 
implementation of the PoA was discussed at the First '^* and Second '^' Biennial Meetings 
of States and the state of progress made in the implementation of the PoA was assessed 
at Review Conference in 2006.^ ^ The PoA contains references to arms embargoes in 
preambular paragraph 12^ ^ and section two at paragraphs 15^ ^ and 32.^ ^ 
The illicit trade is relevant to arms embargoes, not simply because weapons trafficked in 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime cicp signatures convention.html It was adopted by the GA 
without vote in 2001 (A/RES/55/255) and entered into force on 3 July 2005. 
See supra Introduction note 42. 
'^ 178 states participated in the voting and almost 86% of those states voted in the affirmative. The 
percentage in respect of all 192 Member states is almost 80%. 
"^ Report of the Conference available at A/CONF. 192/15; see also 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/ 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html 
"'' http://disarmament. un.org/cab/salw-2003.html 
"^^  http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2005 
http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006 and note the work of its Preparatory Committee -
http://w w w .un. org/e vents/smallarms2006/prepcom/index. html 
'Recalling the obligations of St 
in accordance with the [Charter]'. 
'To take appropriate measure; 
against any activity that violates a [Council] arms embargo in accordance with the [Charter].' 
'To cooperate [at global level] with the [UN] system to ensure the effe 
arms embargoes decided by the [Council] in accordance with the [Charter].' 
ates to fully comply with arms embargoes decided by the [Council] 
s [at national level], including all legal or administrative means, 
;  
ctive implementation of 
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violation of an embargo (and therefore intemational law) would be categorised as 
'illicit ' weapons, but also because many of the targets of Council arms embargoes 
(especially the non-state entities) are likely to procure their weapons from the illicit 
trade or 'grey' market,even before intemational measures are taken. The following is 
a list of current initiatives in operation under the auspices of the UN Secretariat: the 
Group of Govemment Experts (GGE) on tracing;"" the Open-Ended Working Group 
(OEWG) on tracing;^^ and the GGE on brokering.^^ In addition, for the purposes of 
transparency in armaments, there is a UN Register for Conventional Arms '^* which was 
designed to be 'universal and non-discriminatory' and to contain 'data on intemational 
arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, 
procurement through national production and relevant policies'. It now includes an 
optional standardised reporting mechanism for transfers of SALW.^^ 
2.2. UN initiatives 
Conflict zones are not the sole focus for UN action on SALW, especially as the UN's 
advocacy on this matter is focused on the illicit trade and irrespective of the existence or 
type of conflict, the trade in conventional weapons is not illegal per se. The effects of 
Grey markets 'comprise the following types of transactions in [SALW]-related ammunition and/or 
explosives: Re-export of materials previously purchased legitimately; Triangulation of materials in 
contravention of end-user certificates (diversion of goods from the authorized destination to a third 
country); Commercialization by a broker who coordinates the operation between a supplier and a 
recipient (be it a State or a sub-national/transnational group).' Annex 1 at p.25 of A/CONF. 192/2 
11/05/2001. 
The G G E was created to consider feasibility of developing an intemational instrument to enable 
States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons. 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-tracingexperts.html 
The O E W G was created to negotiate an intemational instruinent to enable States to identify and 
trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons and adopted a draft 
intemational instrument at its third substantive session in 2005. http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-
oewg.html 
The G G E was created to consider further steps to enhance intemational cooperation in preventing, 
combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons and was working on the 
first draft report in January 2007. http://disarmament.un.org/cab/GGE%20brokering.htm 
http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html 
See press release from August 2006 - http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/dc3040.doc.htm 
This milestone came fifteen years after the UN Commission on Human Rights first recommended 
such an extension in Resolution 1992/39 at | 5 , adopted 28 August 1992 without a vote. See 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/] 992/58 at p.92. 
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the illicit trade in SALW is a problem in all countries where low intensity conflicts 
exist^^ and where there are no armed conflicts at all: "The SALW problem in the 
Americas is largely characterised by illicit arms trafficking and urban violence 
involving organised crime, drug traffickers and increasing numbers of youth gangs."^^ 
Any criminal act of armed violence (or other related i l l effects) perpetrated through the 
•JO 
use of illicit weapons within a state during peacetime is a matter to be handled within 
the jurisdiction of that state, unless the situafion was judged by the Council to be a 
threat to IPS. Although the boundaries between legal and illicit weapons sales, supplies 
or transfers are blurred in the realm of arms embargoes (because such trade would be 
legal but for the embargo), the focus of this thesis is on only one of the two branches^^ 
to the problem of illicit SALW and the lack of regulation for the conventional weapons: 
the branch related to areas of conflict'^^ and international terrorism. 
2.2.1. UN and UN-related bodies 
Support for disarmament and arms control matters in the Secretariat comes from the 
new"*' Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA)."*^ Its role includes technical and 
Colombia is one example where there are major drug trafficking problems alongside an internal 
armed conflict. This 'guerrilla warfare' has been in operation since the mid-1960's with varying 
levels of intensity. See Uppsala Conflict Database ('UCDB'): 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummarv.php?bcID= 148 (April-2007) 
Biting the Bullet project of International Alert - implementation briefings assessing progress 
against the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on: 
The Americas: http://www.intemational-alert.org/pdfs/BtB Americas.pdf at p.2 
See also briefings on Africa: http://www.intemational-alert.org/pdfs/BtB Africa.pdf: Europe: 
http://www.intemational-alert.org/pdfs/BtB Europe.pdf; and Asia: http://www.intemational-
alert.org/pdfs/BtB South Asia.pdf (April-2007) 
i.e. neither a state not suffering nor having recently suffered an armed conflict. 
One factor common to both branches is the role of organised crime in facilitating and perpetuating 
the 'black market'. Indeed, one unintended consequence of placing a prohibition on arms is the 
increase of traffic via the illicit market. There is also a connection between illicit arms trafficking, 
organised crime and terrorism, however due consideration of this relationship is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
'''^ Although, as noted by UNODC (Office on Dmgs and Crime): SALW have 'contribut[ed] to 
approximately 300,000 direct deaths each year, of which about 100,000 occur in armed conflict and 
200,000 in non-conflict situations...', http://www.unodc.org/newsletter/en/200504/page005.html 
(April-2007) 
A/RES/61/257 - the head of ODA, once appointed, will report directly to the Secretary General. 
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substantive support;'*'* serving conferences and expert panels; monitoring and 
information services;'*'* and the coordination of activities between UN bodies and tools, 
for example the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism.'*'^  The United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)'*^ is an autonomous research 
body which regularly publishes its work to assist with disarmament and security efforts 
and acts as a liaison between researchers and UN Member states. 
2.3. Regional arrangements 
There are a number of regional arrangements in place which are politically binding on 
signatories. These include: the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998);'*^ the 
OAS Model Regulations for the Control of Brokers of Firearms, their Parts, 
Components and Ammunition (2003);'*^ and the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, 
Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 
(2004).'*^ The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies^^ is composed of 40 countries crossing several 
regions of the world. Its fundamental purpose is to prevent 'destabilising 
accumulations' of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies thus 
contributing to regional and international security and stability. Importantly, ' i f the 
situafion in a region or the behaviour of a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious 
''^  Previously the 'Department for Disarmament Affairs' (DDA). Its remit is available at 
http://disarmament.un.org/DDA-activities.htm (April-2007). 
''^  The most recent Report of the Secretary General on small arms (S/2006/109. For other SG 
reports, see http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-sggarep.htm) contains three recommendations 
relating to (numbers 5, 10 and 11) and 11 paragraphs (9, 10, 11, 14, 39, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51 and 63) 
referring to arms embargoes. 
'*'' http://disarmament.un.org/dda-mdi.htm (April-2007). 
http://www.un-casa.org/ (April-2007). 
http://www.unidir.org/ (April-2007). 
Text: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf (April-2007) The E U Code 
replaced 'any previous elaboration of the 1991 and 1992 Common Criteria'. 
*«Text: 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/Desarrollo_Juridico/ENG/Resources/322MRFirearmsBrokersEng.pdf 
(April-2007). 
Text: http://www.grip.org/bdg/g4552.html (April-2007). 
http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (April-2007) 
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concern to the Participating States' the Arrangement is a useful forum to 'enhance co-
operation to prevent the acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for 
military end-uses' relating to those concerns." '^ The ECOWAS Convention on SALW, 
their ammunition and other associated material (2006) is a legally binding treaty, which 
replaced the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture 
of Light Weapons (1998). 
2.4. Customary international law 
2.4.1. For a new arms control approach 
The formation of a new customary rule has two distinct and indispensable requirements: 
First, 'State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, 
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision 
invoked... within the period [of formation] in question' .Second, there must be 
evidence of the genuine conviction of states that the practices they imdertake (relating to 
the issue under consideration) are required by law - the opinio juris. It is unlikely that a 
new customary rule in respect of the control of conventional arms, in particular SALW, 
by reference to the end-user or end-use has formed thus far. Nevertheless, several 
aspects of the practice and statements of the UN and by states (either unilaterally, or in 
regional groups) with regard to arms control issues and of the Council and Member 
states with regard to arms embargoes could indicate that such a customary rule might 
emerge in the future. The main difficulty here would be to ascertain the precise content 
of the rule. 
2.4.2. Regional Custom^^ 
Regional customs can develop and be formed in the absence of a general customary 
rule. Once formed, the custom will bind the states in that region. However, 'the 
All excerpts taken from the 'Purposes, Guidelines and Procedures, including the Initial Elements': 
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/Guidelines.doc (April-2007). 
52 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICS Rep. 1969, p. 3 at p.43. 
5:1 See e.g. the Colombian-Peruvian asylum case Judgment of November 20th 1950 ICJ Rep. 1950, 
p.266, where no regional custom was found; and the Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian 
Ten-itorv (Merits) Judgment of 12 April 1960 ICJ Rep. 1960, p. 6, where it found the C I L 
requirements were satisfied as between the parties and had 'given rise to a right and a conelative 
obligation' which comprised a local custom, (at p.40). 
International Law, Arms Embargoes and the United Nations Security Council 32 
standard of proof required...is higher than in cases where an ordinary or general custom 
is alleged.'^'* The EU Code is an example of a regional arrangement which contains a 
number of criteria^'' which aim to guide export policy based upon characteristics of the 
end-user and end-use. These principles could have the potential to develop into regional 
custom for arms exports licensing in Europe. However, i f the mle did not extend to 
brokers within the region that arranged sales or transfers that physically by-passed the 
region and/or i f those individuals that breach arms embargoes sourced their arms and 
related matdriel from outside the region, the practical effect of such a rule may be 
undermined. 
3. International humanitarian law 
3.1. Context 
Some legal regimes are applicable only when particular factual circumstances exist and 
accordingly context is an important consideration. The background to the imposition of 
Council arms embargoes has been almost uniformly one relating to armed conflict''^ 
thus some or all of IHL is applicable in those cases. The two exceptions to this both 
concemed the problem of international terrorism. There is an unresolved debate on two 
relevant points here. The first poses a question as to which parts of IHL apply in the 
different types of armed conflict (either intemational, intemal, or 'intemationalised'''^). 
Literature on the matter has considered whether the distinction between the types has 
any real value or consequence^^ and whether it is likely to be sustained."^ ^ The second 
concems the question of whether intemational terrorism can be considered to embody 
an armed conflict in any way.^° Separate to the law specific to these contexts, other 
Shaw, M. Intemational Law ('Intemadonal Law') 5'" ed. (2003) CUP at p.87. 
Criteria 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 have particular relevance for future intemational norms. 
Either ongoing or the recent cessation of conflict - See below, Table 1, Annex. 
" See Chapter Three. 
See Stewart, J.G. Towards a single definition ofanned conflict in intemational humanitarian law: 
A critique of internationalized armed conflict (Tntemationahzed') (2003) 85 (850) IRRC 313. 
Boelaert-Suominen, S. Grave Breaches, Universal Jurisdiction and Intemal Aimed Conflict: Is 
Customary Law moving towards a Uniform Enforcement Mechanism for all Armed Conflicts? 
(2000) 5(1) J C S L 63. 
For the US legal perspective, see e.g. note 1 of Sassoli, M. Possible Legal Mechanisms to Improve 
Compliance by Anned Groups with Intemational Humanitarian Law and International Human 
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areas of general international law continue to be applicable to the use of arms 
embargoes, as wil l be seen throughout this thesis. The four contextual bases evident in 
the use of arms embargoes by the Council are: 
1) The absence of an armed conflict^' 
2) The existence of an armed conflict primarily international in character^^ 
3) The existence of an armed conflict primarily internal in character^ "* 
4) The existence of an armed conflict with a mix of internal and international 
characteristics. '^* 
To classify each of the arms embargoes into one of these four bases, guidance on the 
meaning of the term 'armed conflict' must be explored. Even before classification and 
definitions take place,^ ^ arguments can be put forward about the law that, in addition to 
general international law, will apply in each situation. An important point to note is that 
even when armed conflict ceases, the cessation of the threat to IPS is not necessarily 
concurrent, for example, although in the DRC, the arms embargo^ *" was not imposed 
until after the conflict was over, the threat was a continuing one.^ ^ Has M L expanded 
enough to be applicable during post-conflict times of official 'peace' that nonetheless 
still threaten IPS? 
3.2. The scope of the jus in bello 
Traditionally, IHL, as primarily codified in the Geneva Conventions, applies only to 
armed conflicts of an international nature and as such, was designed to regulate armed 
Rights Law - Armed Groups Conference Paper (available at: 
http://www.armedgroups.org/images/stories/pdfs/sassoIi paper.pdf) (April-2007) and references 
cited therein. 
^' See Tables D, Annex. 
See Tables C, Annex. 
See Tables A, Annex. 
^ See Tables B, Annex. 
See Table 1, Annex and Chapter Three. 
^ S/RES/1493. 
The Council had first determined the threat to IPS and had also acted under Chapter VII during the 
conflict - see S/RES/1080 (1996). 
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violence between states. During times of international armed conflict,*^ it limits the 
methods and means of warfare^^ and regulates the conduct of combatants with respect to 
the protection of sick and wounded combatants; the treatment of prisoners of war; and 
the protection of civilians.'"^ There is near universal participation in the Geneva 
Conventions due to the 194 states parties.^' The first exception to the application of the 
Conventions to only international armed conflicts was Article 3 (common to all four 
Conventions) which provides a minimum level of protection^^ in cases 'of armed 
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties'. Common Article 3 also recommends that non-state warring parties 
create 'special agreements' in order to bring into force 'all or part of the other 
provisions of the present Convention', which shows the intention to make the 
Conventions applicable in all instances of armed conflict, so far as is legally possible.^^ 
A safeguard is also included: 'The application of the preceding provisions shall not 
affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.' 
The application of traditional DHL to certain types of non-international armed conflict 
was expanded in 1977 by Article 1(4)^ *^ of the First Additional Protocol to the 
Conventions to include '...armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right 
Regarding scope, see Common Article 2 and note that some provisions also apply in peacetime, 
e.g. torture and the taking of hostages (both considered to be grave breaches under Article 147 
GC(IV)). Note also, Article 1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948). 
Hague Convendons 1899 and 1907. 
See http://www.icrc.Org/ihl.nsf/TOPICS70penView#Methods%20and%20Means%20of%20Warfare 
(April-2007) 
™ Geneva Conventions 1 to IV (12 August 1949) & Protocols I and I I (8 June 1977). 
See 
http://www.icrc.org/lHL.nsf/(SPF)/partv main treaties/$File/IHL and other related Treades.pdf 
(May-2007) and note that applicabihty is subject to any valid reservations or declaradons, as is the 
case for all treaties. 
Common Article 3(l)(a-d) and (2) Geneva Conventions. 
"^^  Non-state parties to internal conflicts cannot accede to the Geneva Conventions because only 
states have the capacity to become parties to a treaty. See Zegveld, L. Accountabiliry of armed 
opposition groups in international law ('Accountability') CUP (2002) at p. 17. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts 1977 (Geneva Protocol I). 
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of self-determination...'^^ i.e. internal armed conflicts only with those designated 
attributes. The 'peoples' in this category do not include armed opposition groups but 
bona fide national liberation movements.^^ It should be noted here, that while 
participation is relatively wide (167 states parties), some important states have not 
ratified Additional Protocols I and II,''^including some states that have been subject to 
Council arms embargoes.^ ^ This raises a question as to the customary nature of Protocol 
I , including the important provision of Article 1(4). 
Geneva Protocol 11^ ^ was designed to develop and supplement Common Article 3. It 
fin 
does not seek to change the legal positions of states, and highlights the non-
intervention principle,^' which could be interpreted as a reminder to states that they may 
not intervene in an internal armed conflict, even indirectly, for example, by providing 
armaments to the warring parties. 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) provides for 
the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of crimes against humanity and Article 7(2)(a) 
explains that the 'widespread and systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population' means 'a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance 
of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack'. This would suggest that 
non-state entities are also intended to be subject to this provision. Article 8(c) provides 
for jurisdiction of the Court in respect of war crimes in cases of armed conflict, not of 
an international character. These provisions, in addition to the expansion of 
international human rights law (below), broaden the applicability of the rules of W L to 
However, this is qualified by Article 96(3) of Protocol I where an authority representing such 
peoples 'may undertake to apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by 
means of a unilateral declaration' - i.e. it is at their discretion whether or not to apply the rules 
relating to international armed conflict. 
''^  See 'Accountability' op.cit. note 73 at p. 18. 
" E.g. the USA. 
E.g. Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq and Somalia. 
™ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Geneva Protocol II), 8 June 1977. There are 163 
states parties. 
Article 3(1), Geneva Protocol I I . 
^' Ibid. Article 3(2). 
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'non-international' or 'internal' armed conflicts. However, once again, participation is 
not universal, as there are currently only 104 states parties. 
4. International human rights law 
Attention to this legal sphere will persist throughout this thesis, being considered as and 
when it is appropriate. Here it is sufficient to note its interaction with M L . 
International human rights law concerns, inter alia, the protection of citizens from 
affronts on personal dignity by the state or its officials. Due to this it is of particular 
relevance to civil wars and other internal armed conflict situations.^^ Such abuses might 
directly contribute to the onset of the armed conflict or they might prolong it. Some of 
its principles however, surpass context, as they are applicable during times of armed 
conflict,*^^ in addition to peacetime (and importanUy, post-conflict^'*) situations. The 
line between internal civil disturbance and internal armed conflict can be so finely 
drawn, that it can be difficult to determine where the minimalist IHL regime for internal 
conflicts would end and the peacetime human rights laws should begin, hence the 
necessary fusion. It may be that during armed conflict some of the human rights 
principles are modified, supplemented or superseded by M L (i.e. the right to life of an 
individual is not violated i f he or she is an active combatant, killed within the 
boundaries of IHL; however, i f these boundaries were violated, the killing would be 
unlawful and the right to life violated.) The international protection of human rights 
Some determinations of a threat to IPS during an internal armed conflict were associated with 
violations of human rights. E.g. preamble S/RES/418 (Rwanda). 
'[I]t is important to recall that the ICCPR applies both in times of peace and in times of armed 
conflict. In its General Coinment No. 31 of 29 March 2004, the Human Rights Committee clarified: 
"The Covenant applies also in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of [IHL] are applicable. 
While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of [IHL] may be especially relevant 
for the purposes of the interpretation of the Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, 
not mutually exclusive.'" de Zayas, A. Human rights and indefinite detention (2005) 87 (857) IRRC 
15 at p. 18 and his note 10 (omitted). 
Also; 'international law has moved beyond recognition of insurgency during armed conflict to a new 
type of recognition for human rights purposes. The obligations of the non-state actor in such 
situations stretch beyond both the duration of armed conflict and the laws of armed conflict.' 
Clapham, A. Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations (2006) 88 (863) 
IRRC 491 atp.493. 
'There is...a necessity for a reasonable cut-off point in the application of the jus in bello, although 
even beyond that point it must be remembered that general human rights norms will continue to 
apply.' McCoubrey, H. and White, N.D. International Law and Armed Conflict ('Armed Conflict') 
(1992) Dartmouth at p. 199. 
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depends on those rights being found in treaties to which the offending state is party, 
being part of customary international law, or for a particular right to constitute a jus 
85 
cogens norm. 
5. The System of Collective Security under the Charter 
According to NinCic,^^ the constituent elements of collective security might be listed as: 
The concept of security; The breach of security; and The reaction to the breach, and the 
fundamental norm of any systern^ of collective security is "Pax est servanda".Under 
the Charter, there is a collective security system and mechanism of coUecfive measures 
through which the system is upheld. 
5.1. The System 
The UN was created in a post-world-war period and so the primary concern of the 
international environment at that time was to prevent and/or respond to interstate 
aggression. The fundamental legal principle embedded in systems of collective security 
is the sovereign equality of those states within it, so that all benefits and burdens are 
spread equally. Another relevant principle concerns the duty not to intervene in matters 
on 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. It is of great importance, however, that 
this principle is qualified by the operation of the collective security system. This was to 
ensure that the system could function in response to any international security problem, 
whether it arose within or outside of the domestic jurisdiction of a state. 
5.2. The Mechanism 
The Charter provides a mechanism for collective security in Chapter VI I and entrusts it 
to the Security Council. The opening Articles of Chapter VI I (Articles 39 to 42 
This category of peremptory norms from which no derogation is possible is comprised of very few 
norms. 
NinCic, D. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the practice of the United Nations 
('Sovereignty') (1970) Martinus Nijhoff at p.81. 
87 
My emphasis. 
go 
This is interpreted to mean the 'peace is respected'. 
See Article 2(7) and its later interpretation in the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations - A/RES/2625 (XXV) (1970). 
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inclusive) detail the powers of the Council to determine 'the existence of any threat to 
OA 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression' and for measures to be taken by 
the Council in response to any such threat, breach or act. Although the Council rarely 
refers to specific articles when taking action under Chapter V I I the provisions most 
relevant to arms embargoes are Articles 39 and 41.^' The Council has discretion 
whether or not to make an Article 39 determination and what action to take, if any, 
under Articles 40, 41 or 42 after such a ( 
discussed further below, in Chapter Two. 
determination is made.^ ^ These issues will be 
The concept behind the use of collective measures was ultimately, the centralisation of 
the use of force, so that any state that acted in a manner which threatened or breached 
IPS or committed an act of aggression against another sovereign nation would expect all 
other states within the system to act collectively in response to such actions. The 
mechanism is legally capable of permitting the use of force to enforce the peace, 
whether it has or has not yet been breached, thus distinguishing it from the mechanism 
of collective defence.^ "* In practice, however, the mechanism is actually decentralised, 
i.e. collective measures are implemented by individual states. The provision designed 
to centralise force via military agreements^ "* has not yet been implemented. Without 
these agreements, the Mihtary Staff Committee (MSC)^^ (designed to advise and assist 
the Council on, inter alia, the military requirements needed and strategic direction of 
armed forces used in pursuit of IPS and advice pertaining to the regulation of 
armaments), has had only a limited role.^^ Instead of creating a 'UN armed force' to 
Article 39. 
^' Article 40 is also considered of relevance (Chapter Four). 
Gill, T.D. Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to 
Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter ('Limitations') (1995) XXVI 
NYBEL 33 at p.46; Frowein/Krisch in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.719: 'Article 39 empowers, but does not 
oblige the [Council] to act.' 
'Armed Conflict' Op.cit. note 84 at p. 125. 
Article 43. 
''^  Article 47. 
See Higgins, R. Problems and Process - International Law and How We Use it ('Problems and 
Process') (1994) OUP at pp.263-266; White, N.D. The United Nations System - Toward 
InternationalJustice (2002) Rienner at pp. 144-5; Bryde/Reinisch in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.770 et seq. 
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respond under the authority of the Council to threats or breaches to or acts of aggression 
against international peace, the Charter only succeeded in recruiting a General^^ with no 
go 
designated troops to command. 
Since 1990, the UN Security Council has made ever-increasing use of the collective 
measures mechanism, but the vast majority of cases comprise non-forcible measures, 
some of which have been supported by the use of force.^ *^ The mechanism has 
expanded to also unify efforts against threats to international peace from states that have 
failed'^" to neutralise threats emanating from situations or entities within their own 
territories. This has not exceeded the mandate of the Charter because the terminology 
does not specify that the threats must come from states. Further, relatively recent, 
expansion has occurred to react directly against non-state entities and individuals that 
have created problems which have affected or could affect the IPS guaranteed to all 
states, by all states, for their mutual benefit. The only case of the operation of the 
collective security system as originally intended'^' was the Council's reaction to the 
annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. 
An effective system of collective security acknowledges that any threat is capable of 
spreading thereby creating the potential to damage the underiying system of values 
which the collective system is designed to protect. As a consequence, every member of 
the system must treat the threat which is actually universal in its potential effects as i f it 
were instead, unilateral. 
5.3. The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
5.3.1. The Rule 
Or, in UK terms, a Field Marshal (or its Naval/Air Force equivalent). See April 2007 update on 
the Chairman of the MSG - http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8991.doc.htm. 
The troops that are used when Member states have been authorised to use force 'remain fully 
under their control, with respect to both their deployment and their actual conduct.' Frowein/Krisch 
in 'Simma' op.cit at p.759. 
E.g. in support of a sanctions regime (S/RES/665 of 1990 on Iraq) or peacekeeping force 
(S/RES/794 of 1992 on Somalia). 
The intent of the state is irrelevant. 
With the exception of Article 43. 
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Under Article 2 (4), 'A l l Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.' 
This provision has normative value independent of the collective security system, which 
'was not expressly designed to safeguard the values...otherwise protect[ed] by means 
of...prohibitive n o r m s . ' T h u s the collective security system relies on observance of 
the other parts of the Charter in order to create an environment where collective 
measures should not need to be used. The primary norm of the Charter is that disputes 
shall be settled peacefully, as supported by the existence of Chapter V I . The Chapter 
VI I mechanism exists as a last resort to this default position. 
5.3.2. The Exception - Self Defence under Article 51 
At this point"^ "* it will suffice to say that this treaty-based right (of states to defend 
against an armed attack) represents a limit to the act of reassignment of sovereignty that 
occurred by accession to the Charter."^'' States commit to a system of collective security 
where by default, no state should use force without the authorisation of the Council, but 
only with the guarantee that they can lawfully fight back if another state violates this 
default position. In order to have the capacity for self defence against an armed attack, 
a state will require armaments. States clearly have a legitimate interest in arming their 
militaries and having defence ministries. If this interest constitutes a right of a state to 
arm its military and once armed, to stay armed, then there must be a correlating duty 
upon governments to ensure the legitimate procurement and responsible possession and 
use of those weapons, i.e. by conforming to the rules of M L . If this interest is merely a 
freedom, (i.e. where there is no law to prohibit a state from arming its own military or 
from possessing weapons), it can be legitimately curtailed for a 'superior' interest. 
The right of self defence in Article 51 exists only until the Council has taken 'measures 
necessary to maintain [IPS]' and after that point it can be lawfully impaired. Moreover, 
"^ ^ 'Sovereignty'op.c/r note 86, at p.87. 
See later. Chapter Five. 
See Cullen, H. The Role of History in Thomas Franck's Faiiness in International Law and 
Institutions (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 927 at p.932 and her note 32: Held, 
D. Models of Democracy 2"" ed. (1996) Cambridge, Polity Press at p.267. 
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the exercise of the right to self defence has no effect on the Council's authority or 
responsibilities under the Charter. The juxtaposition of this inherent right that is also 
quahfied, demonstrates the supremacy of the Council, and also the fundamental nature 
of the Council's responsibility - the maintenance or restoration of EPS. In the interests 
of IPS, all substantive rights, obligations and guarantees within the Charter are subject 
to displacement for the duration of the overriding interest. If it were not so, the 
collective security system could not function as intended. While not unlimited, the 
Council's power is supreme. 
The proliferation of SALW raises a further question: should states be allowed to build 
excessively large arsenals for the purposes of self defence if there is a high risk^°^ of 
those weapons being intercepted by unauthorised groups? As arms control regimes 
suggest, 'accumulations' can be destabilising, and fundamentally, the aims of such 
controls is so that each state possesses only what it needs to fu l f i l its minimum defence 
requirements. 
6. Conclusion 
A number of UN initiatives and regional regimes exist for the control of conventional 
armaments, but few have legally binding force. The majority of arms embargoes have 
the common background of an armed conflict and this highlights the importance of 
considering the rules under IHL and human rights law. The UN system of collective 
security envisaged the need for international cooperation on issues that might threaten 
the IPS they all aim to share. The precise legal nature and scope of that system will be 
considered in the following chapter. 
"^ ^ See Chapter Five, regarding Article 103. 
'"^ See A Project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Small Arms Sur\>ey 2006 
Unfinished Business (2006) OUP at pp.38-63. 
"^ ^ Note that some states defence requirements will be increased by the presence of a peacekeeping 
force. 
CHAPTER TWO 
T H E UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: L E G A L POWERS AND LIMITS 
1. The United Nations Security Council 
1.1. Background 
The United Nations is an international organisation that possesses international legal 
personality.' It 'is a political body, charged with political tasks...[including]...the 
maintenance of [IPS]...'.^ The Council^ is one of the six principal organs'* of the UN 
and its function is to be the tool with which the UN implements the aforementioned 
task. 
1.2. Origin of powers 
1.2.1. The Charter of the United Nations 
Due to the decentralised collective security mechanism, the primary responsibility for 
implementation of Chapter V I I measures, such as arms embargoes, rests with 'all 
states'.^ The preamble of the Charter which begins, 'We the Peoples of the United 
Nations...', reminds all present and future Member states that the convention was 
negotiated by states for the benefit of all peoples. Both the fundamental mandate for 
and legitimacy of Chapter V I I measures, comes from Charter through the will of the 
Member states, as secured by the act of accession. 
2. Legal Powers of the Council 
2.1. Specific powers outside of Chapter V I I 
' Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion of 11 April, 
ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174 at p. 179. 
^ ibid. 
^ For further discussion, see, e.g. Sands, P. and Klein, P. Bowett's Law of International Institutions 
('Institutions') 5"^ ed. (2001) Sweet & Maxwell pp.39-55; Bruha, T. in Wolfrum, R. (ed.) United 
Nations: Law, Policies and Practice Volume I I (1995) Martinus Nijhoff at pp.1147-1161. 
* Article 7. 
This is how the Council addresses those obligated to carry out the measures upon which it has 
decided. 
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The powers of the Council are primarily assigned in Chapter V.^ With the aim of 
ensuring 'prompt and effective action by the United Nations', the responsibility 
conferred primarily on the Security Council by Article 24(1) is to maintain IPS. Kelsen 
rejected the general interpretation of Article 24 (1) that the members (i.e. the states 
parties) confer this responsibility onto the Council. It is the Charter that confers 
responsibilities as only this legal instrument is capable of such action.^ Gill interprets 
Article 24(1) to mean ' [ i ] t is the members who attributed the Council with the powers to 
take necessary and effective measures...to maintain [IPS] by 'conferring' the powers to 
do so upon the Council as a whole'. Gill explains that the 'conferring' of powers 
'implies a superior or hierarchical relationship in as much as the grantor generally has 
the power to determine that the grantee has exceeded his authority and ultimately to 
withdraw the authority which has been granted.'^ It is suggested a compromise between 
these positions can display an acceptable interpretation of Article 24(1); it was a group 
of states that became the founding members who attributed the Council with the powers 
needed to perform its responsibility to maintain IPS and by formulating a treaty and 
acceding to it they created the legal means with which (i.e. the Charter) the Council 
could justify the use of those powers.^ 
The Council is likely to possess a number of other general'^ or implied powers," but 
these wil l be limited and regulated by the specific powers which arise from the 
* Articles 24-26. 
^ 'The formula cannot be justified by stating that the Charter is a treaty concluded by the Members; 
for the Charter is not a treaty concluded by the 'Members,' but by states which became 'Members' 
only through the Charter, after this treaty came into force.' 'Law of the UN' op.cit. (note 1 
Introduction) at p.281. 
^ 'Limitations' op.cit. (note 92 of Chapter One) at p.68. 
' This corresponds to Sarooshi's interpretation that the Charter confers, but the original source of the 
powers, transferred via the Charter, is the Member states acting collectively. Sarooshi, D. The 
United Nations and the Development of Collective Security - The Delegation by the United Nations 
Security Council of its Chapter VII powers ('Delegation') (1999) Oxford at pp.20 et seq. 
'The granting of 'specific' powers logically presupposes that the organ holding such 'specific 
powers' also has 'general powers as well.' Delbriick in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.448. 
" For discussion, see e.g. Blokker, N. Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the 
UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by 'Coalitions of the Able and Willing' (2000) 
11(3) EJIL 541 atp.547-555. 
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responsibility to maintain IPS,'^ which are contained in the provisions of Chapters V I , 
V I I , VI I I and X H . ' ' 
The Chapter V I I powers of the Security Council embody the 'last resort' approach for 
the maintenance of IPS, i f pacific methods under Chapter V I prove to be ineffective. 
However, the Council does not have to exhaust Chapter V I before it can make use of 
Chapter V I I . The Chapter VI I powers are the collective security mechanism mentioned 
earlier, and Articles 41 and 42 are generally considered to be the enforcement measures 
as referred to in Article 2(7). To what exactly the enforcement is referring shall be 
explored in a later chapter. The duty to maintain IPS appears to correlate to the 
preventative, pacific dispute settlement mechanisms in Chapter V I and the duty to 
restore EPS appears to correlate to the reactive, enforcement action mechanisms under 
Chapter VI I . To which set of provisions arms embargoes are best suited is an issue 
which will be discussed later, in Chapter Four. 
The Security Council also has powers under Chapter VI I I , which is concerned with 
regional arrangements regarding the maintenance of IPS. The phrase in Article 52(1), 
'Nothing...precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing 
with such matters relating to the maintenance of [IPS] as are appropriate for regional 
action',''* does not displace'^ any of the Council's powers under Chapter V I I but rather 
supports them; the Security Council '...shall encourage the development of pacific 
setflement of local disputes...''^ as of course such a process should assist in reducing 
the numbers of cases'^  which demand the Council's attention. Furthermore, in Article 
53, '[t]he Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements 
or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.' These provisions also indicate 
the importance of regional stability to the maintenance of IPS and that the perspective of 
See e.g. 'Limitations' op.cit at p.69-72. 
Article 24(2). 
The only qualifications in that provision are that the arrangements must be appropriate for regional 
action, and '...that such arrangements... are consistent with purposes and principles of UN'. 
See Articles 53 and 54. 
Art 52(3). 
" As implied in Art 52(2). 
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the framers of the Charter was for efforts for regional peace to be instaimental in 
minimising the need for enforcement action by the Council. 
2.2. Powers under Chapter VII 
2.2.1. Article 39 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore [IPS].'^ 
2.2.1.1. Procedure and substance 
Article 39 gives the Council the power to determine what constitutes a threat to or 
breach of the peace or act of aggression, 'on behalf of the Organisafion as a whole'. 
Implied in the commanding term 'shall', is the duty to make this determination before 
measures are taken in pursuit of maintaining or restoring IPS.^° However, there is no 
duty upon the Council to make a determination in any particular situation that might 
warrant it. The second imperative in this provision (.. .and shall...decide what measures 
shall be taken...) when read together with Article 24(2),^' suggests that only the Council 
(as no other organ is referenced) is authorised to take Chapter V I I measures under the 
Charter. This does not mean however, that the Council is the only organ that can act in 
pursuit of IPS.^ ^ 
When the Council considers Article 39 issues it acts as an executive organ but when it 
makes decisions after Article 39 determinations it employs its limited 'law-making' 
function as well. References to municipal constitutional mechanisms such as the 
separation of powers doctrine add little to this discussion because the power the Council 
Article 39. For further discussion, see e.g. Frowein/Krisch 'Article 39' and references therein, in 
'Simma' op.cit. at pp.717-729; De Wet, E. The Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Security 
Council ('Powers') (2004) Oxford: Hart at pp. 133-177. 
''^  'Instinations' op.cit. (note 3) at p.46. 
'^^  Frowein/Krisch op.cit. at p.726. 
^' 'The specific powers granted...'. 
'Law of the UN' op.cit. at p.283; Goodrich, L.M. and Simons, A.P. The United Nations and the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security (1955) The Brookings Institute, Washington D.C. 
at p. 15. 
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possesses to make decisions that impose legally binding obligations are ultimately, ad 
hoc, and only available i f the 'situation' conforms to the rule, that is, i f it threatens or 
breaches IPS. There is a wide margin of appreciation in determining what any 
particular situation might involve,^^ as indicated by the word 'any' in Article 39. 
Indeed, '[t]here is nothing in the language of Article 39 to suggest that the requirement 
that the Council determine "a[ny] threat to the peace" refers only [to] a threat that is 
specific rather than one that is general, [sic]'^'^ It might be a specific act that breached 
international peace, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; or the escalation of an internal 
armed conflict might have been judged to be a sufficient threat to motivate a collective 
response. Resolution 1540 could be classified as a 'general' Article 39 determination, 
because although the determination referred to proliferation of specific types of 
weapons (WMD) and their means of delivery, to certain actors, it was a supplement for 
its grave concern regarding the threat of terrorism, rather than any specific occurrence 
or situation. 
In all other circumstances, the Council has no power to create new law. Of course, its 
role is not to interpret the law either, but it must, to some degree, consider the current 
state of the law when embarking on a decision-making process in order to remain within 
its mandate. 
2.2.1.2. Mandates for action 
Article 39 also indicates the relevant provisions upon which the Council may base its 
action when required by its primary duty under the Charter. Discretion exists both to 
'The Committee therefore decided to adhere to the text drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks and to leave 
to the Council the entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an 
act of aggression.' (The United Nations Conference on International Organization, vol. XII ( 
'UNCIO vol.XII'), Commission II I (Security Council), ConnuTiittee 3 (Enforcement Arrangements) at 
Section C, p.505. (p.4 of original document - 'Doc.881, III/3/46, June 10, 1945') (1945) New York; 
London: United Nations Information Organizations. 
Wood, M. (KCMG) "The UN Security Council and International Law " Lecture One - The Legal 
Framework of the Security Council 7th November 2006 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures 
at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law - University of Cambridge at ^25. Available at 
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/2006 hersch lecture l.pdf (April-2007) (NB: 'These 
papers are subject to editorial revision'). 
See the reference to Frowein/Krisch's observation regarding 'executive regulations' (ibid. 
Introduction at note 15). 
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recommend a voluntary course of action and to decide upon a mandatory course of 
action. If the Council wants to give legal weight to its determination, it must make 
decisions over the measures to be applied from those available in Articles 41 or 42. The 
language of Article 39 retains a level of ambiguity with regard to Article 40. It suggests 
that decisions (and therefore legally binding action) can only be taken under Articles 41 
and 42. However, the position of Article 40 in Chapter V I I rather than Chapter V I 
suggests action taken therein could be legally binding and practice has shown that 
Article 39 determinafions were made where it was intended to create binding effects for 
the parties.^^ The absence of a reference to Article 40 in Article 39 might imply that no 
Article 39 determination would be required for measures to be taken under Article 40. 
The fact that Article 40 describes provisional measures as a precursor to only the second 
part of Article 39, i.e. 'recommendations or...measures provided for in Article 39' 
reveals two points: first, that the determination process of Article 39 (the first part) is 
not excluded from the purview of Article 40, which suggests that Article 40 would 
require an Article 39 determinadon as a condition of its use; and second, it shows that 
Article 40 is not intended to be part of the recommendatory nor mandatory action used 
to maintain or restore IPS. Instead it exists to 'prevent an aggravation of the situation'. 
The Article 39 recommendations belong to Article 39 alone, and as has been 
suggested,^ ^ Article 39 is the basis from which non-binding measures, such as voluntary 
arms embargoes, find their legal basis. This allows for prompt involvement by the 
Council, before the finer details of provisional or enforcement measures are debated 
with a view to action, which also implies that like Articles 41 and 42, Article 40 
measures may also be binding. However, voluntary arms embargoes have been 
recommended without any determination or reference to Chapter VII.^^ 
The duty to maintain peace in a specific case could be partially omitted if there is a 
breach of peace or an act of aggression, there is no peace to be maintained. However 
Frowein/Krisch in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.731 and their note 12. 
" Ibid at p.727. 
See e.g. ^4 of S/RES/1076 of 1996 on Afghanistan. Similarly, the voluntary arms embargo on 
South Africa (S/RES/181 of 1963) stated: 'Being convinced that the situation in South Africa is 
seriously disturbing [IPS],' prior to imposition - but this is not a clear Article 39 determination of a 
threat to international peace. 
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the threat to peace creates a middle ground between the maintenance of peace^ ^ and the 
restoration of peace. A threat to peace is a moment embedded with a risk including 
both the positive potential for the prevention of destruction of IPS as well as the 
negative potential to fail to prevent such an occurrence. 
2.2.1.3. 'Any threat to the peace' 
The phrases 'threat to the peace', 'breach of the peace'^ *^  and 'act of aggression'^ ^ 
clearly show an ' . . .escalation of intensity... '^ ^ however it is sufficient to find any one of 
the three in order to take Chapter V I I measures. The level of gravity relative to IPS is 
irrelevant to the ability of the Council to pass the required threshold for invoking 
enforcement action under Article 41 or 42 (or other action under Chapter VII) . For the 
purposes of this thesis, the most important of the three is the least intense - a threat to 
the peace. The first 'threshold event' is almost universally employed in practice as only 
one^ "* of the arms embargo cases made reference to a different threshold event. The case 
of Kosovo "^* is an anomaly to this practice as no Article 39 determination was used in 
the text of this resolution, although the representative from the UK, Mr Richmond, 
made an explicit reference during the Council meeting, 'that the situation in Kosovo 
constitutes a threat to [IPS] in the Balkans region'.^'' 
This is entirely coherent as an arms embargo is less serious and less grave a measure 
than the use of military force, which may be the more appropriate response for breaches 
of the peace or acts of aggression.^^ 
More appropriately considered under Chapter VI. 
See 'Powers' op.cit. note 18 at §2.2, p. 144. 
^' Ibid, at §2.3, p. 145. 
^^Ibid. at §2.1, p. 138. 
S/RES/661 of 1990 ('breach of the peace'). 
^"S/RES/lieOof 1998. 
Provisional Verbatim meeting record of the Council - S/PV.3868. 
'Aggression' has never been used as part of an Article 39 determination ('Limitations' op.cit at 
p.49). However, the Council has determined an act of aggression without invoking Chapter VII; see 
S/RES/573 of 1985 at Kl : 'Condemns vigorously die act of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel 
against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law 
and norms of conduct'. In addition, the definition of aggression has been the subject of continuous 
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2.2.1.4. Interpreting 'peace' 
According to De Wet,^ ^ a threat to the peace is a situation or a set of conditions which 
holds the potential to result in international (i.e. two or more states involved) armed 
conflict, although in actuality, no such conflict need endure to provide the legitimacy 
for such a determination by the Council because ' . . .the term 'threat' [has] an element of 
flexibility...inherently at tached' . Is it necessary that international peace is referred to 
by the Council when making a determination under Article 39? The language of the 
Article 39 determination is simply 'the peace' not 'international peace', although 
international peace is what is at stake. Although international peace is mentioned at the 
end with reference to the goal of the measures, the word 'international' was not present 
in the travaux preparatoires^^ regarding this article, in all likelihood because it would 
have been superfluous at the time. As shall be seen in Chapter Three, the Council is 
fairly liberal with terminology relating to this point. 
De Wet reasons that 'peace' in Article 39 is defined negatively, although not to such a 
narrow extent as to match Martenzcuk's perspective that '...[IPS] within the meaning of 
Article 39 only refers to the absence of armed violence in international relations.'''*^ The 
importance of this detour from a narrow perspective is evident in the relatively novel'*' 
situations of internal armed conflict with which the international environment is now 
troubled. The mandate for collective action under the Charter was originally conceived 
for dealing with international armed conflicts. However, this modem, broad 
interpretation of Article 39 shows that any situation involving armed violence and 
interests of any actors in the international community (e.g. the rights of civilians 
debate, but this shall not be considered here. See e.g. Muller-Schieke, I.K. Defining the Crime of 
Aggression Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court (2001) 14(2) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 409. 
" 'Powers' op.cit. at §2.1 and §3, pp. 138-144 and 149-174 respectively. 
^^Ibid. at p. 138. 
See 'UNCIO vol. X I F op.cit. at Section D, p, 506. (p.5 of original document). 
""^  Martenczuk, B. The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: what lessons 
from Lockerbie? (1999) 10(3) E J I L 517 at p.543 (his note 140 omitted). 
Certainly novel in terms of the history of international 'relations'. 
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affected by the violence) may trigger a response by the Council under Chapter VI I . 
2.2.1.5. 'Peace' in practice'*^  
Indeed in reality, the original mandate has not changed substantively; it must still be at 
least a threat to international, not domestic, peace and security that instigates Council 
action. However, without needing a formal amendment to the Charter, the Council has 
reacted to otherwise internal affairs by reference to Article 39, by interpreting it to mean 
the potential or realised consequences of the internal situation will amount to a threat to 
international peace and security.'*^ De Wet uses the term 'double strategy"*'* to describe 
this process. The most common explanation for this is where the Council refers to the 
effect on the 'region' and where there is a fear that the internal conflict could spread 
beyond its own borders."*^ This was certainly the case in the Former Yugoslavia'*^ and 
bears relevance to almost every other arms embargo case. It may be that 'allowing' 
47 mass human rights violations to occur within a state threatens the fabric of 
international law and thus all states have an interest in attempts'*^ to resolve the 
situation. A common interest of all states is the combating international terrorism and is 
Extensive discussion is available via the UN's Repertoire: Eleventh Supplement (1989-1992)-
Chapter XI , especially at p. 16 ff of part 1. (Cases l-7)Available at: 
http;//www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertoire/index.html (October-2006). 
See e.g. preambular f of S/RES/1343 on Liberia - "Determining that the active support provided 
by the Government of Liberia for armed rebel groups in neighbouring countries, and in particular its 
support for the R U F in Sierra Leone, constitutes a threat to [IPS] in the region.' See also 'Legal 
Mandate' in Tables 3A-D, Annex. 
'[T]he SC has frequently made use of a double strategy whereby it utilised the impact of a 
situation within a country on international relations to address the internal situation itself under 
Chapter VII of the Charter.' 'Powers' op.cit. §3.1, p.l50. 
This has been extended even further with arguments that the causes of the internal problem does 
not necessarily need to be militarily based but must nevertheless carry a risk of resulting in 
international armed conflict - 'Powers' op.cit at p. 140-142 and note 47 therein citing: Lailach, M. 
Die Wahning des Weltfriedens und der intemationalen Sicherheit als Aufgabe des Sicherheitsrates 
der Vereinten Nationen (1998) Berlin, Duncker & Hamblot at 181 and 186. 
'^^ 'Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which is causing a heavy loss of human life and 
material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the border 
areas of neighbouring countries. Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat 
to [IPS]. . . ' Preamble SC/RES/713. 
I.e. the situation that would ensue, should nothing be done by the UN. 
'^ ^ Note the Council's collective security action is not required to settle the disputes on behalf of the 
parties - that remains their responsibility. 
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an area in which the Council is currently involved."*^ This problem threatens IPS per 
se'^ and so the political will to deter and ultimately remove state involvement in 
terrorism is, in general, forthcoming. However it should be noted that international 
conventions regarding international terrorism have been in operation since the 1960's,^' 
which shows that, although there are deficiencies therein, the involvement of the 
Security Council under Chapter VI I is not the primary source of legally binding 
obligations for the issue, unlike the current situation for the principal issues under 
consideration here. 
Another explanation for this 'double strategy' behaviour could be the pressure exerted 
by the General Assembly. On several occasions the GA, through its resolutions has 
'pre-empt[ed] and pre-judge[d] the work of the Council' and has even made 
determinations of threats to the peace.^ ^ So while the Council has looked 'for some sign 
of danger to international peace arising from something more than the internal situation' 
in order for it to have 'international repercussions'^^ the GA has pursued its agenda of 
calling attention to internal situations deemed unacceptable to the majority of states as 
represented in that larger forum. 
2.2.1.6. An interpretation of Article 39 designed for arms embargoes? 
Although the Article 39 determinations for arms embargoes were based on a variety of 
interpretations of a threat to the peace,^ "* and only one was explicitly related to 
''^  Although not involving arms embargoes, see e.g. SC/RES/1373; SC/RES/1456; SC/RES/1535; 
SC/RES/1566. 
'Reaffirming further that acts of international terrorism constitute a threat to [IPS]. . . ' (Preamble 
S/RES/1390). See also the implication in Annex to A/RES/51/210 of 1997 - Declaration to 
Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism at ^1. 
'^ See e.g. the Tokyo Convention (1963), the Hague Convention (1970) and the Montreal 
Convention (1971) on Civil Aviation; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973); Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1998). 
White, N.D. Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace 
and Security ('Keeping the Peace') 2"'' ed. (1997) Manchester University Press at p. 170. 
^^Ibid at p. 171. 
See Chapter Three and for general discussion see e.g. Osterdahl, I. Threat to the Peace - The 
Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of the UN Charter ('Interpretation') Volume 13 
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armaments, the next section considers the ways in which armaments can be related to a 
threat to the peace. 
When discussing the use of this double strategy, De Wet makes an important point 
related to arms embargoes. In relation to the enforcement action against South Africa in 
1977, she states: 'Even though the resolution was motivated by the apartheid policies, 
the threat to peace was explicitly connected to the arms build-up in South Africa.'^^ 
Can it be implied here that the actual threat was the use of the arms build up for 
enforcing the policy of apartheid? Or did the arms build up create a separate threat 
because, perhaps, it simply strengthened the illegal regime, which might have made 
future attempts to quell it more difficult? It should be noted, however, that '[t]he 
internal sources of a threat to peace...can include behaviour which is not illegal in 
itself.'^^ 
It may be an inference too great to postulate that any build-up of arms within a state 
constitutes a threat to IPS per se. Could the inference be supported by the increased 
likelihood of an armed conflict occurring?''^ One important consideration is the timing: 
When does a build up or increase in the supply of arms become a threat to IPS? The 
default position for states should be recalled at this point. States may legitimately 
acquire most types of conventional weapons. 'Accumulations' may become a threat 
based on the situation in a region or the behaviour of a state, as shown by the Wassenaar 
Arrangement. Do these considerations extend to non-state entities increasing their arms 
stockpiles or is that a matter within the jurisdiction of a state? I f a state is 'the host' to 
an internal armed conflict it will not necessarily have effective control over certain 
matters within its jurisdiction, such as civilian possession of weapons. Moreover, in 
failed state situations such as Somalia, the lawless environment would suggest a 'free-
Uppsala University Swedish Institute of International Law - Studies in International law (1998) 
lustus FOrlag. 
'Powers' op.cit. at §3.1 p.l51 
* Ibid, at p. 140; See further infra Chapter Four. 
" It is suggested that the likelihood of a conflict reaching the requisite 'intensity' threshold is greatly 
reduced by the absence of armaments. 
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for-air where weapons^^ or other 'commodities' are concerned. In failed state 
situations it is difficult to see the sustained relevance of 'domestic jurisdiction' when 
there would appear to be no such thing in operation. Finally, is it only the stockpiling of 
weapons that might cause such threats, or the trafficking itself, which (in states where 
there is no manufacturing capability) necessarily comes beforehand? 
2.2.2. Article 41 
'The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.' 
2.2.2.1. Defining Arms Embargoes on Conventional Weapons 
Like all Chapter V I I measures. Article 41 may only be invoked after an Article 39 
determination has been made. The Security Council appears to regard arms embargoes 
in a number of various ways. Although arms embargoes are currently understood to be 
ad hoc measures, patterns of use have emerged from their frequent use since 1990. 
Security Council arms embargo resolutions usually contain the phrase 'arms and related 
materiel', but have never defined this explicitly. Instead occasionally, examples of 
some general types of weapons are given."^ ^ It is suggested that only conventional 
armaments and their related materiel are prohibited,*'" (as opposed to WMD, 
radiological or missile related weapons and delivery systems thereto) because when 
weapons which fall outside of the broad 'conventional' category are prohibited, they are 
explicitly named in the relevant Council resolutions.^' 
^8 
" Indeed, in these situations, guns equal power. 
See the 'paradigm construction' of the scope of an arms embargo, below in Chapter Three (§4.1 
'nature and scope', especially at note 70 of that chapter). 
^ Unless otherwise stated within the resolutions, e.g. the clarification in ^4 of S/RES/59] of 1986, 
which included the prohibition of nuclear, strategic as well as conventional weapons to South Africa. 
'^ See e.g. S/RES/620 of 1988 (concerning Iraq/Iran's use of chemical weapons); S/RES/1736 of 
2006 (Iran - Nuclear and ballistic missile programme); 1718/06 concerning the DPRK - the 
resolution referred specifically and exclusively to a number of large conventional weapons, but none 
that would constitute SALW. Also note, the Council explicidy referred to Article 41 as its legal 
basis for the measures on DPRK. 
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Schrijver asserts^ ^ that Article 41 measures can only impose negative obligations on 
states, that is, to refrain from certain action, in the case of arms embargoes, refraining 
from selling, supplying or transferring arms and related materiel to state or entity X. 
However, the evolving practice of the Council shows that existence of the arms 
embargo carries an implied obligation which is a positive obligation to amend national 
law or create it where none exists in order to implement the embargo and create a 
method for its national enforcement. This shows how the decentralised collective 
security system operates by relying on Member states to carry out the decisions of the 
Council. However, even as practice has deviated from the original conception of a 
centralised use of force, the effect on non-forcible measures is not as important because 
the terminology of Articles 25 and 48 shows this type of action was in any case, 
expected of Member states. 
Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali drew attention to the modem^^ 
legal framework for the imposition of collective measures under Chapter V I I of the 
Charter when he said: 'Under Article 41 of the Charter, the Security Council may call 
upon Member States to apply measures not involving the use of armed force in order to 
maintain or restore IPS. Such measures are commonly referred to as sanctions.'^'' 
There is a general consensus^^ that arms embargoes are one of an undetermined number 
of options available to the Council under Article 41, as indicated by use of the words 
'may include' in the second sentence. 
Schrijver, N. The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Law 
perspective ('Economic Sanctions') in Post, H. H. G (ed.) International Economic Law and Armed 
Conflict ('International Economic Law') (1994) Martinus Nijhoff pp.123-161 at p.l56. 
The origin of what became Article 41 was the Covenant of League of Nations (1918) Article 16 
and it was originally labelled 'Chapter VIII B, No.3' under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals when the 
Charter was being drafted - See Frowein/Krisch in 'Simma' op.cit. pp. 735-749. 
^ Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of 
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations ('Supplement') - UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 of 3 
January 1995 at^[66. 
Although the Council rarely refers to Article 41, the UN does, and importantly, so do soine of the 
states that implement the measures. For an alternative view, see Chapter Four at §3 on the potential 
legal alternatives to Article 41. 
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The suitability of the term 'sanctions' (as is ubiquitous in the communications of the 
UN and its Member states) has been debated in general^^ but the potential misnomer 
endures. This issue wil l be considered later in Chapter Four. 
2.2.2.2. Other measures available under Article 41 
Sanctions under Article 41 can be either mandatory^^ or voluntary and various examples 
include trade restrictions such as petroleum, timber and diamonds.^^ Restrictions can be 
imposed over the use of air space and the extent of diplomatic missions. Travel bans^ ^ 
and financialsanctions, like arms embargoes, are the other types of 'smart' or 
'targeted' sanctions.^' Individual government members, warlords and their families can 
be targeted to have their freedom of movement between states severely restricted. This 
has begun to be used more frequently in relation to the problem of international 
terrorism. There have been cases where the Council, via a recommendation, has 
expressed its willingness to impose future measures, without necessarily imposing them 
at the time.^" This gives a 'last chance' opportunity to resolve conflicts peacefuUy.^^ 
Furthermore, the Council has the power to establish ad hoc international tribunals and 
examples of this include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
'Law of the UN' op.cit. at p.724 ([I]t is doubtful whether the enforcement measures provided for 
by the Charter may be properly characterised as sanctions.') and p.706 ('Sanctions are the specific 
reactions of the community, constituted by the legal order, against delicts.'). 
'[I]t is the Security Council, which, exclusively, may order coercive action' Certain Expenses of 
the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: ICJ 
Rep. 1962, p. 151 at p. 163. 
See Table 4 - Concurtent measures column (Annex). 
See the Bonn-Berlin Process {Ibid. Introduction at note 22). 
™ See the Interlaken Process - http://www.smartsanctions.ch (September-2006). 
'^ See further the Stockholm process - http://www.smartsanctions.se (September-2006). 
and United Nations Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs Smart Sanctions, the Next 
Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions - Second Expert Seminar, Berlin, December 3-5, 2000 
Available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/background.doc (March-2006) 
-^ E.g. Angola, S/RES/851 of 1993 at f 2 'ReiterateFdl its readiness to consider taking action 
promptly...'. 
E.g. Iraq, S/RES/678 of 1990 '[g]ave Iraq "pause of goodwill" to comply with UN demands' -
'Sanctions Decade' op.cit. (note 16 Introduction) at p.40. 
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('ICTY')^^ and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ('ICTR').^'^ Both of 
these tribunals have considered questions relating to the legality of their creation and 
thus discussed their legal bases.^ ^ In addition to the formation of the ICTR, the Council 
was innovative when (in additional to an existing sanctions committee'^) it established 
the UN International Commission of Inquiry, which had investigative powers which 
proved far more useful in the pursuit of arms embargoes enforcement than any sanctions 
committee had previously been.^ ^ Finally, the Council can also establish interim 
transitional administrations for certain territories*^" under Chapter VI I , however the 
precise legal basis for this may still be a moot point.^' 
2.2.2.3. Relation to other Chapter VII measures 
Article 41, as one of the Council's methods of addressing threats to the maintenance 
IPS, was designed to be the next step taken in (at the very least) bilateral disputes after 
the exercise of Article 40. However, flexibility of the language used shows that the use 
of provisional measures is not a prerequisite for the use of non-forcible measures under 
Article 41. A precautionary stance is taken in Article 40 where, to prevent aggravation 
of a situation, the Security Council is offered the power to '...call upon the parties 
Established by S/RES/827 of 1993. 
" Established by S/RES/955 of 1994. 
I C T Y Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1): Trial Chamber I - Decision on the Defence Motion on 
Jurisdiction 10 August 1995 at ^27: 'Chapter VII confers very wide powers upon the Security 
Council and no good reason has been advanced why Article 41 should be read as excluding the step, 
very appropriate in the circumstances, of creating the International Tribunal to deal with the 
notorious situation existing in the former Yugoslavia.' 
ICTR - Trial Chamber 2 - The Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi (ICTR-96-15-T) Decision on the Defence 
Motion on Jurisdiction (Judgment of 18 June 1997) at|27. 
Created at the same time as the arms embargo (S/RES/918 of 2004). 
'UNICOF - S/RES/1013 of 1995. 
See 'Sanctions Decade' op.cit. at p. 196-198. UNICOI appeared to monitor the situation 
effectively and found numerous violations. See 'Statecraft' op.cit. at p. 14 and note 14 (omitted). 
E.g. Kosovo and East Timor. This matter is also being debated with regard to the situation in Iraq. 
'^ For discussion, see e.g. Ruffert, M. The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor by the 
International Community (2001) 50 ICLQ 613; Wilde, R. From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: 
The Role of International Territorial Administration (2001) 95 AJIL 583; Rothert, M. UN 
Intervention in East Timor (2000-1) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 257; Kondoch, B. 
The United Nations Administration of East Timor (2001) 6(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
245. 
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concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or 
desirable...' before any recommendations are made, or decisions are taken. In addition, 
the Security Council is instructed to take account of any failure to comply with such 
provisional measures. The possibility of arms embargoes finding their legal basis in 
Article 40 will be discussed later, in Chapter Four. 
Article 42 authorises the Security Council to '...take such action by air, sea or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore [IPS].' The authorisation has, as a 
precursor, a soft requirement that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have been proved inadequate for the situation. This makes it possible to 
be used immediately, without the incremental stages, i f such an urgent international 
situation so required. This power is flexible, given its purpose in being a last resort 
method to safeguard IPS and to allow the Security Council to fu l f i l its primary function. 
No armed force is permitted (save in self defence) without first having an Article 39 
determination, followed by an explicit instruction by the Council for the use of force. 
Occasionally action under Article 42 may be threatened or mandated in an effort to 
support measures under Article 41.^^ The threat of a legitimate use of force (and 
therefore one with no remedial recourse) provides a strong incentive to comply with 
non-forcible measures and if non-compliance ensued, an Article 42 measure would 
embody a classical sanction. 
Although the original intention within the Charter was to have a centralised force 
mechanism, the obsolete nature of Article 43 (and related articles) has encouraged the 
evolution of an alternative mechanism**^  for the use of force, namely, a decision of the 
Council to use force and the corresponding obligation on the Member states that are 
addressed to implement the decision through national means. This would appear to be a 
legitimate departure from what was originally intended, because there is nothing within 
8^  
" E.g. Member states were authorised to use 'all necessary means' to enforce the sanctions against 
Iraq. (S/RES/678 of 1990 a t f l ) . S/RES/794 of 1992 authorised (what became) UNITAF to use 'all 
necessary measures to establish...a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.' (flO) In 
the same resolution, the Council, acting under Chapter VII and VIII called upon states to 'use such 
measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation' of the arms embargo (^16). 
See earlier reference to potential implied powers at note 11. 
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Article 43 to actually qualify the application of Article 42. The lack of special 
agreements immobilises Articles 44 and 45 and a number of aspects relating to the 
MSC, but it does not necessarily immobilise Article 42. This was confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice in an advisory opinion: 
[A]n argument which insists that all measures taken for the 
maintenance of [IPS] must be financed through agreements concluded 
under Article 43, would seem to exclude the possibility that the 
Security Council might act under some other Article of the Charter. 
The Court cannot accept so limited a view of the powers of the 
Security Council under the Charter. It cannot be said that the Charter 
has left the Security Council impotent in the face of an emergency 
situation when agreements under Article 43 have not been concluded. '^* 
With regard to the interaction between Article 42 and arms embargoes, a key question is 
whether or not arms embargoes are an adequate alternative to forcible measures in the 
pursuit of quelling threats to and breach of the peace and armed aggression. Logically 
and in principle, arms embargoes are adequate measures for suppressing armed 
aggression (or lesser breaches of or threats to the peace) because they remove the means 
with which such aggression can be perpetrated. In practice, however, details regarding 
their use have presented challenges to their effectiveness and their legality and part of 
this is due to confusion over their objectives. For instance, do arms embargoes seek to 
achieve what is logical and practical (i.e. removing the means of violence) or do they 
possess more complicated motives and means to achieve the overall rationale of 
maintaining or restoring IPS? This issue and others will be considered in later chapters. 
3. Legal Limits to the Council's exercise of the powers contained in 
Chapter VII 
'The Security Council has broad discretion in exercising its authority under Chapter V I I 
and there are few limits on the exercise of that power.'^^ It is worth recalling that the 
Council exercises the powers in Chapter VII on behalf of the Organisation. Any limits 
therefore, will restrict the freedom of the UN to respond to situations which have been 
determined to be threats to IPS and thus of concern to all Member states. Only the most 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations ibid, note 67 at p. 167. 
Tadi^ Jurisdiction (Judgment of 10/08/95) ibid.note 76 a t f l . 
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essential restrictions are likely to be maintained as norms in practice, so as not to 
unduly restrict the aforementioned freedom. It is suggested that it could be possible 
that restrictions customised to a particular situation, may be respected by the Council 
under those particular circumstances, but that it is unlikely to entertain any views of 
setting precedents thereby. 
'[T]he General Assembly has no constitutional authority to countermand Chapter V I I 
decisions of the Security Council'^^ despite the overlap in the area of IPS seen in the 
Uniting for Peace resolution. This comment was made in reference to a vote in the 
GA^ ** on the matter of exempting Bosnia-Herzegovina from the arms embargo^^ and a 
on 
failed draft resolution aiming for formalise such an exemption. 
3.1. Restrictions under the Charter 
The Council cannot be a party to the Charter and thus the Council cannot be legally 
bound by it in the same way that is true for a Member state. However, the Charter 
created the Council and determined its functions and powers and therefore, it is logical 
to argue that the powers of the Council can only extend to that which is provided for in 
the Charter.^' The main difficulty here is that some of its powers were formulated with 
the intention of having a wide margin of discretion (as principally seen in Article 39) 
and so the limits outlined in other parts of the Charter might in some ways be 
incompatible with the powers in Chapter V I I and thus be overruled by the necessary 
operation^^ of those powers. '[W]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the 
assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the 
Damrosch, L . F . Enforcing Internatioruil Law Through Non-Forcible Measures 'Enforcing 
International Law') 269 Recueil Des Cours 9 (1997) at p. 125. 
See note 10 of Chapter One. 
A/RES/47/21 of 1992. 
^'^S/RES/713of 1993. 
°^ Provisional verbatim meeting record of the Council - S/PV.2347 29 June 1993 at 148. 
See Tadic Appeals Chamber: Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction. 2 October 1995 at 28. 
Due to the discretion afforded to the Council, the quality of necessity is of course, judged entirely 
by the Council. 
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United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the 
Organization.'^^ 
The superiority of Chapter V I I is confirmed by the fact it comprises the ultimate means 
by which the fundamental purpose of the UN might be achieved. However, an 
alternative means to achieve the fundamental purpose of the UN under the Charter is by 
peaceful settlement, measures for which are contained in Chapter V I . This method, 
unlike Chapter VI I , carries the legitimacy of the requirement in Article 1(1) that such 
settlements are to be 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.' 
These act as legal limits solely to the Council's exercise of powers under Chapter V I , 
which suggests that the principles of justice and international law do not limit the 
Council's exercise of powers under Chapter VII.^** The Council is fundamentally 
limited in terms of achieving the fundamental purpose of the UN through Chapter V I by 
the fact that such measures cannot be binding upon Member states, and so the 
alternative means cannot compete. 
3.1.1. Article 23 - Composition**^  of the Security Council 
Five nations^^ make up the permanent membership of the Council (the 'P5'), while ten 
other representatives elected by the GA^'' make up the remaining non-permanent 
membership. The composition of the Council has a significant role in terms of any 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations ibid, note 67 at 168. 
See Goodrich, L .M. , Hambro, E . and Simons, A.P. The Charter of the United Nations, 3"* ed. 
(1969) New York; London: Columbia University Press at pp.27-28 as cited in 'Limitations' op.cit 
(Chapter One, note 92) at p.65. In addition, Goodrich et al. note that during drafting of the Charter 
that 'the major powers refused to accept an amendment...requiring that collective measures be taken 
in accordance with international law and justice...' With regard to arms embargoes, another 
important comment of the drafters was noted: 'the object of collective measures was to prevent or 
suppress the use of force, and not to achieve a settlement.' (My emphasis). 
For reform discussion within the UN, see e.g. ^13 and Chapter X I V (f244 et seq.) of A more 
secure world: our shared responsibility - Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change A/59/565 (2004). 
The People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. 
The GA must pay due regard first to 'the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the 
maintenance of [IPS] and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable 
geographical distribution.' (Article 23(1)). 
98 
Five seats for African and Asian countries; One seat for Eastern European countries; Two seats for 
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action pursued.Under Article 27(3), there are two ways in which action on non-
procedural matters can be blocked; one is the use of the veto of a permanent member 
and the other is where the P5 agree, but only 3 non-permanent members concur. It is 
obvious that i f the political will of any one permanent member desired a negative 
outcome in respect of a proposed collective security action, there is nothing that can be 
done to avoid that outcome, purely because of the veto.'*^° Indeed, '[pjolitical will is a 
crucial factor at every stage and the United Nations cannot regulate state conduct unless 
members, and particularly the Permanent members of the Security Council, wish it to do 
so.'"" NinCic notes that unlike other states, none of the Great powers has had to 
renounce its sovereignty; '[t]hey are thus never placed in a position to assume legal 
obligations to which they had not given their consent . ' Indeed, this situation cannot 
be changed without the consent of all five permanent members because such consent is 
required before any amendments to the Charter can be made.'*^ ^^  Yet this, like the 
second part of Article 24(1)'"'* is something to which states consent when they decide to 
become members of the UN and thus bind themselves to the provisions of the Charter. 
Issues regarding composition can cause difficulty for Chapter V I I measures, as 
described by the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee for Somalia: 
'The Security Council mirrors power realities. The unequal power 
structure gives rise to views of its inability to act in an objective, 
consistent and credible manner...The Council itself must have its own 
Latin American and Caribbean countries; Two seats for Western European and other countries. For 
the current list of membership see, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (February-2007). 
See, e.g. the potential conflict of interest that exists for the P5 in respect of arms exports and arms 
embargoes, below in Chapter Four (at note 7). 
Note the effect of the Cold War (1947-1991) on Council action. Very few sanctions regimes or 
arms embargoes were imposed during this period because of the situation between the USA and the 
USSR. 
Doxey, M.P. International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective ('Contemporary Perspective') 
2"" ed. (1996) Macmillan Press at p.7. 
'^ ^ 'Sovereignty' op.cit. (Chapter One, note 86) at p.95. Consent may be either explicit or tacit - the 
P5 are also bound by decisions upon which they acquiesced by virtue of an abstention from voting, 
as has occurred on a number of occasions (most often by China) where arms embargoes were 
imposed or modified. (See Table 5, Annex). 
Article 108. 
"^ ^ I.e. the agreement that the Council was chosen to act on behalf of the UN (which comprises 
Member states) in maintaining IPS. 
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lessons learned unit that would analyse and consider the effectiveness 
of the measures it implements and the practices and procedures it 
employs, particularly in the area of sanctions and the mandates of the 
sanctions committees...' 
The Informal Working Group on General Issues related to Sanctions'^^ had been set up 
prior'^^ to this 'to develop general recommendations on how to improve the 
effectiveness of United Nations sanctions' '^ ^ and its most recent report was published in 
2006.'^^ The mechanism is however only temporary."^ 
3.1.2. Article 24(2) 
'In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations.' According to the travaux preparatoires of the 
Charter, this provision is seen as the 'sole reserve' to the Council's freedom to act under 
Chapter V n . ' " 
3.1.2.1. Chapter I - The Purposes and Principles of the UN 
It could be argued that the purposes and principles embody only a political limitation to 
the powers of the Council.'^^ Some treaty principles or customary laws may present a 
limit to the Council's powers under Chapter VII, but only to the extent that they are 
subsumed under Chapter I of the Charter, not of themselves. 
Mr Baja during the 5332"** meeting of the Council (19/12/05) - Provisional verbatim meeting 
record S/PV.5332 at p.6. 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/index.html (April-2007). 
'"^  S/2000/319 of 17/04/00. 
S/2005/841 of 29/12/05. 
'^ "^  S/2006/997 of 22/12/06. 
"° See S/RES/1732 (2006) - 'Decides that the Working Group has fulfilled its mandate...' 
'Wide freedom of judgment is left as regards the moment it may choose to intervene and the 
means to be applied, with the sole reserve that it should act "in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Organization (end of article 1). [sic - lack of closing speech marks] Statement of the 
Rapporteur of Committee, Joseph Paul-Boncour at the opening meeting of the Committee. UNCIO 
vol.XII op.cit., at Part \, p, 572. (p.l of original document- 'Doc.134, III/3/3, May 9, 1945'). 
See Wood, M. (KCMG) ''The UN Security Council and International Law" Lecture Two - The 
Security Council's Powers and their Limits - 8th November 2006 University of Cambridge ibid, note 
24 &tf20. 
""^  See Article 103 and further discussions below. 
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The principles and purposes of the UN provide a limitation to Council action via Article 
24 as it limits Council discretion in determination of the objectives of its action.""* It 
must always be acting in order to maintain IPS. It is important that the principles and 
purposes of the UN encompass fundamental human rights norms, to which the Council 
may be subject. According to Angelet,"^ this goes well beyond what is expounded in 
Article 1(3) and cases such as the advisory opinion in Legal Consequences for States of 
the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Securitv Council resolution 276 (1970)"^ and the United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran case"'' show examples of the legal commitment to upholding 
human rights norms. 
Angelet has noted that ' . . . i t also appears to be in the Security Council's interest to base 
its decisions on the principles and rules of intemational law, so as to foster the 
acceptance of these decisions by the 'target' entity...as well as by the United Nations 
Members in general'"^ and this embodies the principle that for justice to be done, it 
must be seen to be done. It is further explained that i f it can be in the Council's best 
interest to found its actions on intemational law, it must be seen to rely on those 
principles"^ and likewise, it could be assumed that the Council must not be seen to 
violate those principles in addition to the suggestion that it in fact, must not violate 
them. However, as noted earlier,'^'^ Article 1(1) shows, the principles of intemational 
law are a limit ascribed to the peaceful settlement of disputes and so while it may be in 
the Council's interest 'to base its decisions on the principles and rules of intemational 
law', in law it need not. 
Angelet, N. Intemational Law Limits to the Security Council in Gowlland-Debbas, V (ed.) United 
Nations Sanctions and Intemational Law The Graduate Instimte of International Studies 'UN 
Sanctions' (2001) Kluwer Law Intemational pp.71-82 at p.74. 
^^^Ibid. at p.75. 
" ^ I C J Rep. (1971) p. 16 at p.57. 
" ^ I C J Rep. (1980) p.3 atp.42. 
Angelet op.cit. at p.71-72. 
'^^Ibid. at p.72 
Ibid, note 94 - Goodrich et al. and 'Limitations'. 
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Angelet concludes that there are various limits under international law to the exercise of 
Council enforcement action under Chapter VI I , but none impose limits which would 
hamper the Council's ability to fu l f i l its responsibility under the Charter to maintain 
IPS. This implies that therefore the Council is using its powers to take superfluous 
action which is a strong allegation indeed. A recent debate has emerged over the 
terrorism sanctions and the sanctions committees' 'blacklists', which raises further 
questions about the limits to the powers of the Council, regarding the delegation of its 
powers'^' and abiding by, inter alia, rules of due process. 
Does Article 1(1) impose a requirement of effectiveness of measures thereby requiring 
the Council to act effectively or to cease when it can be shown that it has not? It is 
suggested, that while effectiveness is an ongoing sub-objective for all Chapter V I I 
measures, such an obligation may unduly restrict the Council's ability to at least try to 
maintain or restore IPS and so this is unlikely to constitute a formal limit. 
3.1.3. Article 50 
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the 
Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations 
or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising 
from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the 
Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems. 
As states have a right to consult, the Council does have a duty to make consultations 
possible, but solving the problems is a practically beneficial endeavour to undertake,'^ '^  
rather than a legal duty. In addition, such a legal duty would not create a general 
obligation for the Council to act any differently in future cases and so would not limit 
its use of the powers in Chapter VI I . 
Article 29. For discussion, see 'Delegation' op.cit note 9. 
See further below in Chapter Five. 
Article 50. 
E.g. the practical benefit gained by ensuring enforcement of the measures and perhaps also, in 
maintaining friendly relafions. 
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3.2. International humanitarian law 
For the reasons already outlined, international law does not present a legal limit to the 
Council's exercise of power, however, it is unlikely to be ignored in practice.'^^ 
Schrijver notes the importance of the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding civilian 
protection in times of war due to the indirect effects of enforcement measures.^ ^^ When 
the measures used are arms embargoes, this rule does not present the same degree of 
concern that arises when the sanctions are imposed upon other commodities. The 
increased use of exemptions in arms embargo measures and more careful targeting has 
relieved some, but not all of the concerns the Fourth Geneva Convention raises. A 
restriction on arms proliferation should be positive for a civilian population, but some 
indirect effects remain when enforcement is incomplete, such as the diversion of 
resources in order to pay for illicit weapons. The principle of proportionality is 
embedded in DHL and corresponds well to the types of enforcement action possible 
under Chapter VI I . Whether the threat to IPS arises from and internal or international 
conflict situation, proportionality 'must still be applied in that whatever action the 
Council chooses to take, it must be appropriate and necessary for the achievement of its 
stated purposes...and may not affect other interest to an extent disproportionate to the 
advantage obtained or pursued.' '^ ^ 
3.3. Jus Cogens 
'The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to both 
customary international law and treaty. The relief which Article 103 of 
the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conflict between 
one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligation cannot - as a 
matter of simple hierarchy of norms - extend to a conflict between a 
Security Council resolution and jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to state 
the opposite proposition thus - that a Security Council resolution may 
even require participation in genocide - for its unacceptability to be 
apparent.' 
'"^ Indeed most, i f not all, Council delegations wil l consult legal advisors in the drafting of 
resolutions. 
'Economic Sanctions' op.cit. (note 62) at p. 156. 
'^^ Angelet op.cit. at p.72. 
Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 
1993, ICJ Reports 1993, p. 325, Separate Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Lauterpacht at 440. 
International Law, Arms Embargoes and the United Nations Security Council 66 
Jus cogens norms embody the indisputable legal limit on the powers of the Council. As 
there are very few norms which may be classified as jus cogens, the limit loses part of 
its practical, but still none of its legal significance. 
3.4. Judicial Review 
Whether or not the acts of the Council are justiciable and by whom is an issue worthy of 
thorough examination'^' and remains undecided. There is certainly no formal system 
for it.'^^ As the issue is not of immediate practical consequence with regard to the 
Council's powers to take action to maintain or restore IPS, and as it would not reduce or 
remove the parameters within which the Council must operate as already set under the 
Charter and jus cogens, it will not be considered here. Suffice it to pose the question; 
which of the legal limits discussed above might be justiciable i f exceeded? The answer 
to this would show which limits possess the potential to affect the way the Council acts 
to maintain or restore IPS thereby altering the entire system of collective security under 
the Charter. 
4. Conclusion 
There are very few clear legal limits that restrict the Council's exercise of its powers 
under Chapter V I I . Nonetheless, in practice, the Council is unlikely to act in a way that 
would contravene the limits that do exist (or some others that might only be considered 
as political limits) unless it was deemed necessary for the maintenance of IPS. In the 
case of violation of a jus cogens norm, it is unintelligible that there could be a necessity 
in terms of IPS that would warrant such action. In addition, no Council resolution 
would, with knowledge, deliberately include such a provision because it would not 
achieve the consensus required to be adopted. There is probably sufficient political 
'-^ See Chapter Five. 
It might be asked; must the Council act using its available powers to prevent the beginning or 
progression of a violation of a jus cogens norm or does it maintain its discretion? 
The issue has been considered by a number of authors. See, e.g. Dugard, J. Judicial Review of 
Sanctions in ' U N Sanctions' op.cit. (note 114) at pp.82-91; Martenczuk {op.cit. note 40) and the 
references he cites in his note 5 at p.518-9 (omitted). 
See 'Keeping the Peace' op.cit. (note 52) pp.67 et seq. 
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discord between members of the Council to conduct a mutual form of internal oversight 
- a peer review, perhaps. The argument that the embargo on the former Yugoslavia 
disproportionately affected the Bosnian side and thus helped to facilitate the genocide is 
however, an important consideration to take into account. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, Council practice is evolving to temporally limit the effects of its decisions. It is 
suggested that i f such a problem arose in the future, this mechanism would assist the 
Council in reviewing its own actions. 
C H A P T E R T H R E E 
T H E REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL PRACTICE REGARDING MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGOES 
1. Introduction 
The principal exercise for this chapter was to identify and record all mandatory arms 
embargoes imposed by the Security Council using its Chapter V I I powers from its first 
meeting in 1946 to the present day. Although similar identification has previously taken 
place (and published, at least up to May 2004') for Security Council sanctions in 
general, a legal focus solely upon arms embargoes has not yet been found and similarly 
no collection of related information in addition to the specific resolutions which impose 
or terminate arms embargoes has yet been found. Consequently, one aim was to collect 
and present information on all resolutions which impose,^ terminate, modify, re-affirm 
r in some other way refer to past or existing arms embargoes. This way, it was 
envisaged that a complete catalogue^ of the Security Council's practice in relation to 
arms embargoes would be produced. 
1.1. Methodology and rationale behind review and classification 
This chapter presents information as a set of assertions based on the material collected 
and will not contain any judgements on the merits or failings of the practice. The key 
resource for this research process was the Security Council's website." These records 
were systematically searched for documents with content relevant to arms embargoes. 
The relevant resolutions were classified into groups of either 'internal', 'international' 
'mixed' or 'absence o f armed conflict situations. This distinction was drawn in order 
to fix these variables so that a comparative analysis could take place to identify what 
' Table 3.1 by Staibano in Trends in UN Sanctions: from ad hoc practice to institutional capacity 
building pp.32-34 in 'International Sanctions' op.cit. (Introduction note 12) and her noted source -
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm (April-2006). 
^ Including those which were imposed conditionally, i.e. 'unless X is done or not done then an arms 
embargo wil l come into force.. . ' . 
^ See Table 5 - the chronological index of all of all resolutions associated with arms embargoes with 
basic factual information. 
"* http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc resolutions.html (September-2006). 
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role, i f any, context plays in respect to a number of other classifications labelled as 
'discussion points'.^ This information was catalogued in a number of tables,^ which (by 
presenting the Council's actual practice) form the basis of the observation, analysis and 
evaluation contained in the remaining chapters. The reasons behind this review include 
the analysis of Council practice relative to its mandate and identification of any design 
and/or operational deficiencies in arms embargoes. The review was essential to the 
construction of arguments for and against the existence of a framework. Table 6 
presents statistics relevant to the earlier made classifications. It highlights the frequency 
of use of these 'discussion point' variations in internal, international and no-conflict 
situations and as used overall, when all cases are taken together. The purpose of this 
was to make it possible to distinguish the most typical cases where arms embargoes 
have been used (i.e. those which follow these patterns) and conversely, to distinguish 
the most unique cases. This, it is suggested, will assist the formation of an opinion as to 
whether arms embargoes are ad hoc measures, or whether they fit into a normative 
framework. 
2. The Four Contextual Bases 
For the purposes of this chapter, identification of the type of conflict is purely to chart 
any contextual differences in the practice of the Council when it has used arms 
embargoes. For the purposes of Chapter Five, the view taken on the classification of 
these conflicts will determine the extent of the principles of IHL that can be applied to 
the 18 conflict cases outside of the 'international' category. 
2.1. The first contextual basis - no armed conflict 
Chapter V I I has been used where there is no armed conflict in progress, but where a 
threat to IPS nonetheless exists. Some of these cases^  show the Council operating in a 
preventative and general manner. 
See Table 6, Annex. 
^ Tables 2 and 3 present information regarding the imposition and termination of arms embargoes, 
including their legal mandates and stated objectives. Table 4 presents further information regarding 
the operation of the arms embargoes, e.g. exemptions and monitoring mechanisms. 
' E.g. S/RES/1390 (arms embargo and other measures targeting terrorists) and S/RES/1718 on the 
DPRK (nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles). 
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2.1.1. What is an armed conflict? 
The following definitions from the Uppsala University Armed Conflict database have 
been used as the primary basis for the classifications in this study because they provide 
simple, objective criteria against which each case can be measured. This chapter does 
not aim to construct a universally acceptable definition of armed conflict, but tries to 
ensure that any distinctions made as to variations in conflict (i.e. the classifications) are 
consistent. Thus, 'an armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which 
at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths'^ in 
one calendar year.' 
2.1.2. International terrorism 
International terrorism may be a factor in an internal'' or international armed conflict or 
it may be completely independent of such classification.'^ One argument for why the 
rules of IHL are not applicable to the two arms embargo cases that concerned 
international terrorism because "terrorists" cannot be properly characterised as a 
"parties" to a conflict as required by IHL.'^ In addition, terrorists do not meet the IHL 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions all.htm (April-2007). 
^ UCDB - http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php (April-2007). 
'° Note, '[t]he massacres performed by Hutu militias and Hutu civilians are often estimated as 
having resulted in 500,000-800,000 deaths. These deaths are not classified as battle-related...' 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictInformation.php?vears=:1994&bcID=92&variables%5B%5D= 
4&button=+Search (April-2007). 
" There is an obvious association between the internal troubles in Afghanistan in the late 1990's and 
the later internationally recognised issues of terrorism. This arms embargo case (S/RES/1333) was 
imposed against a background of internal disorder and so it has been classified as an internal armed 
conflict arms embargo. 
12 
The Libyan case (S/RES/748) was associated with a specific terrorist act; The Usama bin Laden et 
a/./Taliban case (S/RES/1390) was not associated with a particular territory. Although international 
terrorism is an international issue, it is not of itself dependent on or a consequence of armed conflict 
- see the preamble of S/RES/1373 of 2001 'Reaffirming further that...any act of international 
terrorism, constitute[s] a threat to [IPS]'. 
See p. 18-19 in International humanitarian law and The Challenges of Contemporary Aimed 
Conflicts Report prepared by the ICRC (28th International Conference 2-6 December 2003) 
available 
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requirements for 'combatant' status, the basics of which are to distinguish oneself from 
the civilian population, to carry arms openly and to respect the laws and customs of 
war'.''* There is an understanding that the requisite level of harm for the existence of an 
armed conflict can exist in acts of terrorism. As the minimum threshold in terms of 
fatalities is 25 people, many isolated terrorist attacks engulf this figure. One of the 
cases in point concerned a terrorist attack which took 270 l i v e s . T h e death toll from 
the attacks of 11 September was greater s t i l l . H o w e v e r , another aspect that 
distinguishes terrorism from armed conflict is the indiscriminate nature of the killings. 
Civilian deaths during armed conflict may be considered incidental to the fighting 
between parties, or even additional to it, in the sense that such killings are intentional 
(and therefore breach IHL). This may occur in civil war, when many civilians take up 
arms, and the distinction between combatants becomes increasingly difficult to 
maintain.'^ 
2.2. The second contextual basis - International armed conflict 
According to the UCDB, an international/interstate armed conflict is one 'between two 
or more governments'.'^ This definition, like the others used in the UCDB, is 
dependent on the status of the parties: a party is either a government or it is not. This, 
however, begs the question; what is a government? The UCDB defines 'government' as 
'[t]he party controlling the capital of the state' because this can be empirically 
determined. It 'is concerned with who is controlling power in practice...not...who is 
http://www.icrc.orgAVeb/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5XRDCC/$File/IHLxontemp armedconflicts FIN 
A L ANG.pdf (April-2007). 
"* See, e.g. Article 13 GC I I ; Article 44(3) Geneva Protocol I . 
'•"^  Pan A M flight 103 which exploded over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988. 
Although the 1390 sanctions regime against Usama bin Laden et al. were not a direct reaction to 
those events, it was in support of the failure to comply with S/RES/1267 on counter-terrorism. 
This is further complicated by the use of child soldiers (also a breach of I H L under Article 77(2) 
of Additional Protocol I 1977). See also Article 38 of the UNCRC (1989). The issue of SALW also 
increases the difficulties here because SALW can be used by young children. This is something that 
distinguishes these types of weapon from others (e.g. the machetes used in Rwanda), which are less 
likely to be used by a child. 
This simple definition negatives consideration of other aspects of a conflict which might be 
common to international conflicts, such as the involvement of third states. However, such aspects 
wi l l be necessary in determining the potentially international namre of an otherwise internal conflict. 
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the rightful holder of the power.' It would appear to exclude from its scope the idea that 
more than one party could control the capital of a state, or that control could be equally 
divided between parties and therefore excludes intrastate conflicts from its ambit. 
2.3. The third contextual basis - Internal armed conflict 
According to the UCDB, an internal/intrastate armed conflict is one 'between a 
government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries'. 
An internal armed conflict is thus one that takes place within a single territory. It may 
occur within a state where armed groups, outside of the control of the legitimate 
government, create disorder of their own volition (i.e. an insurrection) or react to 
unacceptable behaviour by the state (e.g. minority force in defence of the right to self 
determination, which may also amount to secession.)'^ It is suggested that it may also 
occur in cases where no legitimate government can be discerned and armed 'warlords' 
and their supporters have de facto control over different sections of the territory. 
2.4. The fourth contextual basis - Mixed-nature armed conflicts 
Essentially, this context comprises internal armed conflicts that have had foreign 
involvement. According to the UCDB, such a conflict is one 'within a country between 
a government and a non-governmental party; where the government, the opposition or 
both sides receive troop support from other governments, that actively participates in 
the conflict.' This factor of foreign troop involvement has been argued^^ to be one of 
the ways in which an internal conflict can become international. It does not necessarily 
mean that foreign involvement by way of the provision of armaments alone may 
internationalise the conflict. If that were the case, almost every armed conflict would be 
internationalised, and this conclusion cannot be sustained. The 'dismemberment of a 
confederation',^' as occurred in the former Yugoslavia could have retrospectively 
" See Doehring, in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.57; This point is developed in Chapter Five. 
20 
' In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it may 
become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character alongside 
an intemal armed conflict) i f (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or 
alternatively i f (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other 
State.' Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment of 15 July 1999 at 84. 
^' Doehring op.ci'A at p.57. 
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shown that the conflict there had international and internal aspects, because it 
influenced creation of newly independent states. Importantly, the ICJ in Nicaragua said 
that in the case of a mixed conflict, 'there is no need to address the question whether 
[certain] actions must be looked at in the context of the rules which operate for the one 
or for the other category of conflict' because 'the minimum rules applicable to 
international and to non-international conflicts are identical.'^^ This would imply that 
only the minimum rules may be applied in a mixed conflict situation, thus despite its 
international elements, no greater protection and control under IHL could be afforded to 
those involved in such a conflict. 
2.5. Internationalised armed conflicts 
The importance of this potential type of conflict is that it provides a mechanism through 
which an internal or mixed armed conflict is elevated to the status of an international 
armed conflict, thus gaining the added benefits available under traditional EHL. This 
type of conflict has been described as one that is 'not actually 'international' but are for 
some purposes treated as 'internationalized'.^^ Traditionally, this would only include 
those armed conflicts that are defined in Article 1(4) of Geneva Protocol I . However, 
perhaps due to the disproportionate number of internal and mixed conflicts occurring in 
the world, there appears to have emerged discussion on whether a particular conflict is 
'international', separate to a (relatively) simple and empirical finding of 'two or more 
governments'. 
One method that has been used to test for interaationalisation is the determination of 
'three different standards of control under which an entity could be considered a de 
facto organ of a State, each differing according to the nature of the entity.'^'* This 
determination was considered to be able to both generate the international responsibility 
of a State and also render the conflict international.^^ This argument was found 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) (Merits) Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p . l4 a t p i 9 , p . l l 4 . 
" 'Armed Conflict' op.cit. (Chapter Two note 18) at p. 197-198. 
'Internationalized' op.cit (Chapter One note 58) at p.325 and his note 70 (omitted). 
Tadic op.cit. note 20 at 140. 
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unpersuasive by the ICJ because it broadens 'the scope of State responsibility well 
beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility: a 
State is responsible only for its own conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons 
acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf.'^^ The ICJ noted that 'it may well be that the 
[Tadic] test is applicable and suitable... [i]nsofar as the "overall control" test is 
employed to determine whether or not an armed conflict is international'^'' but doubted 
its broader application to matters such as State responsibility, given that the Tribunal 
adjudicates upon issues related to criminal responsibiHty.^^ The Court effectively said^^ 
that the occurrence of intemationalisation is dependant upon the degree and nature of a 
state's involvement in an armed conflict on another's territory but that such 
intemationalisation is independent of any consideration relating to the responsibility of 
that state in respect of that involvement. 
3. Basic summary of results 
The Council imposed arms embargoes on twenty-two occasions during the selected 
period of study."" The relevant informafion on the two earliest cases^ ^ was unavailable 
through the UCDB, but both were placed into the internal armed conflict context.^^ 
'Genocide Judgment 2007' op.cit. (Chapter One note 4) at 1406. 
-'^ Ibid, at 1404-406. 
Ibid, at 1403: '[T]he Court attaches the utmost importance to the factual and legal findings made 
by the ICTY. . . [But] The situation is not the same for positions adopted by the ICTY on issues of 
general international law which do not lie within the specific purview of its jurisdiction and, 
moreover, the resolution of which is not always necessary for deciding the criminal cases before i t . ' 
Although it did not 'think it appropriate to take a position on the point in th[at]...case, as there 
[was] no need to resolve it for purposes of th[at].. .Judgment.' Ibid, at 1404. 
^'^ Ibid, at 405. 
^' 25 January 1946-31 January 2007. 
Southern Rhodesia (S/RES/232) and South Africa (S/RES/418). 
For South Africa, there was clear reference to the level of violence and 'acts of aggression' within 
the arms embargo resolution. The inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in the internal armed conflicts 
group could be challenged. The inclusion was based upon the understanding that the situation with 
which the Council became involved later developed into an internal armed conflict. Although as has 
been noted the latter situation was 'never dealt with ' by the Council. (See Kooijmans, P.H. The 
Security Council and Non-State Entities as Parties to Conflicts ('Non-State Entities') in Wellens, K. 
(ed.) International Law: Theory and Practice - Essays in honour of Eric Suy (1998) Martinus 
Nihjof f 333-346 at p.335). 
Moreover, this was the first application of Chapter V I I measures by the Council, and its objectives 
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Arms embargoes were imposed nine times in the internal armed conflict context;^ "* they 
were imposed twice in the international armed conflict context;''^ they were imposed 
nine times in the mixed armed conflict context;^^ and finally there were two cases where 
they were imposed in the absence of armed conflict.''^ In one of these cases there was 
neither an associated government nor territory and so an armed conflict within the 
definition expounded by the UCDB was not applicable. Twenty-one of these cases 
were officially associated with one or more specific territories.^^ One country has had 
three separate arms embargoes imposed upon it^^ and two countries have had two 
separate impositions.'^^ In all other cases only one embargo has been imposed, although 
in four of these cases'*' the measures have been renewed at least once. Nineteen of the 
twenty-two cases were imposed or re-imposed with unlimited duration. 
Arms embargoes have not been used every time the Council has determined a threat"*^  to 
or breach"*"^  of IPS, which shows that they are not automatic reactions to threats or 
breaches of international peace. This corresponds to the discretionary nature of the 
Council's power under Article 39. However, they are the most commonly used of the 
Chapter VII measures. In ten of the twenty-two cases, a mandatory arms embargo was 
the first and only (i.e. standalone) Chapter V I I measure to be imposed upon the situation 
and target were the most difficult to categorise. For these reasons, this case is identified in Table 6 
by a * in the columns where data relating to it has been entered. This is so that it can be seen that the 
overall patterns in practice were not affected by its inclusion. 
See Tables (#) A (Annex). Reduced to eight times, i f Southern Rhodesia is excluded. 
See Tables (#) C (Annex). 
These were classified as 'mixed' conflict cases, possessing elements of both intra and interstate 
armed conflicts. See Tables (#) B (Annex). 
" See Tables (#) D (Annex). 
The exception is the case of S/RES/1390 regarding terrorism. 
Liberia - S/RES/788, S/RES/1343, S/RES/152I. 
*° Sierra Leone - S/RES/1132, S/RES/1171 and the former Yugoslavia/Kosovo - S/RES/713; 
S/RES/1160. 
S/RES/1333, S/RES/1493, S/RES/1521 and S/RES/1572. 
See e.g. 'threat to [IPS]' - S/RES/1072 of 1996 on Burundi - although this was not strictly a 
determination of a threat to IPS, but a deep concern of the threat posed to peace and security (in a 
region) by the situation. In addition, an arms embargo was threatened (Part B ^11); 'threat to peace 
and security in the region' - S/RES/1101 of 1997 (Albania). 
See e.g. the Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands S/RES/502 of 1982. 
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at the time of imposition."^ On occasion, the target territory consented to the measures'*^  
or retained partial control over their operation. The latter point is presented by the 
'arms boycott factor' information displayed in Table 2. Half of the cases have been 
terminated or have expired,'*^ and three of the eleven cases were suspended prior to 
termination. There is an established practice of terminating measures by passing a new 
resolution to that effect. However, as there has been an increase in the number of 
'limited duration' enforcement measure regimes, it likely that more cases will simply 
expire."^ ^ With regard to contextual differences'*^, 5/9 internal cases'*^ , 1/2 international 
cases, 4/9 mixed cases, and 1/2 'absence of a conflict' cases are no longer in force. 
Common concurrent measures included, targeted financial sanctions such as the 
freezing of funds or assets; embargoes on oil, aviation, diamonds or timber; and travel 
bans. Four forms of Council-mandated monitoring exist:^° sanctions committees, expert 
panels or groups, monitoring groups and via existing peacekeeping missions.^' 
Sometimes the Secretary General is requested to report on implementation.''^ Regional 
arrangements''^  have been used to assist in the monitoring efforts. The sanctions 
See Table 4 'concurrent measures'. 
E.g. Former Yugoslavia. Conversely, the Government of Rwanda (in a rare case where the target 
was sitting as a non-permanent member of the Council at the time) voted against the arms embargo 
in S/RES/918. 
See Table 3 'Current status'. 
''^  Although note, only one 'limited duration' case (S/RES/1298 Eritrea/Ethiopia) has expired 
without measures being immediately renewed. The Council issued a Presidential Statement to mark 
the expiration of the measures due to occur the following day. (S/PRST/2001/14). Another case 
(S/RES/1132) was set to expire but was terminated prematurely and a new embargo was imposed 
upon non-governmental forces alone. 
Other contextual differences can be compared in Table 6, Annex and see S.5.1.1 below. 
Reduced to 4/9 i f Southern Rhodesia is excluded. 
There have also been regional arrangements for monitoring, such as the OSCE's Sanctions 
Assistance Missions (SAMs) in the former Yugoslavia. See 'International Sanctions' op.cit. at p.39. 
^' E.g. U N M I L was directed to monitor observance of the embargo in Liberia and UNCOI's mandate 
was extended to monitor implementation of the arms embargo in cooperation with its Group of 
Experts, other peacekeeping missions in West Africa and relevant governments (12(m)-(n) 
S/RES/1609). See Tables 4 and 6 for additional information. Regional peacekeepers such as 
ECOMOG, have also been authorised to 'ensure strict implementation' (see fS of S/RES/1132). 
-'^  E.g.seeS/RES/418at<]I6. 
SAMs in the former Yugoslavia case and the OSCE Verification Mission for the Kosovo 
measures. 
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committees are established under Rule 28 of the Council's provisional rules of 
procedure "^* and are dissolved at the same time measures are terminated. Expert 
panels/groups and monitoring groups have limited-duration mandates and need to be 
renewed. The table below shows the range of (paraphrased) duties undertaken by the 
two key mechanisms. Not all duties were created in all cases, and several were not 
frequently used. 
Table A: 
Range of duties 
Mechanism 
Sanctions 
Committee 
Examine reports of states to Secretary-General on measures taken for the effective 
implementation of measures; Seek from states further measures on such 
implementation; Recommend ways of increasing effectiveness of measures; 
Consider information brought by states regarding violations of measures; 
Recominend appropriate measures in response to violations - provide this 
information to the Secretary-General to distribute to states; Promulgate guidelines 
that may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of measures; Report to the 
Council on, inter alia, identification of violators and vessels involved in violations; 
Designate individuals and entities onto a 'blacklist' upon which additional 
enforcement measures wi l l be imposed and to update and maintain this list, and to 
consider and decide on exemption requests to such measures; Publicise relevant 
information; Liaise with regional and UN peacekeepers regarding implementation; 
Consider visits by the Committee Chairmen to targeted region and neighbouring 
states; Cooperate with other relevant Council Sanctions Committees; Provide prior 
approval to the relevant government for the movement of military equipment and 
supplies into the targeted region; Give special attention to communications under 
Article 50 f rom neighbouring or other states with special economic problems 
concerning the carrying out of measures. 
Panel/Group 
of Experts 
Investigate violations of measures; Collect and assess information on verification 
(whether or not target complying with demands) and thereby assess progress 
towards meeting the conditions for the lifting of measures; Investigate links 
between the exploitation of natural resources and the fuelling of conflict; Collect 
information linked to illegal activities of listed individuals; Report to the Council 
on implementation of measures and keep the Committee updated; Coordinate 
activities as appropriate with regional peacekeepers; Report on implementation, 
violations (including by rebels and neighbouring countries) and on the various 
sources of financing breach (e.g. illicit arms for natural resources); Report to the 
Council on observations and recommendations on how to minimise any 
humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the measures; Scrutinise information 
collected by peacekeepers; Gather and analyse all relevant information in the target 
state and region on the flows of arms; Consider and recommend ways of improving 
the capabilities of states to implement the measures effectively; Consider the 
adequacy of air traffic control systems in the affected region; Provide the 
Committee with a list (with supporting evidence) of violators and accomplices; 
Cooperate with other Expert Groups/Panels; Generate independent information on 
violations, including from sources in civil society, governments and the business 
54 'The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified 
question.' 
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community; Assess the capacity of states in the affected region to ful ly implement 
the measures, including a thorough review of national/customs/border control 
regimes. 
There have also been a number of 'one-off monitoring mechanisms used, including, 
UNICOI for the 918 measures (Rwanda);''^ a Monitoring Group for the 733 measures 
(Somalia);"'^ a Monitoring Group in New York and a Sanctions Enforcement Support 
Team for the 1333 measures (Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan);" and an 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for the 1390 measures (Usama-bin 
Laden/Taliban/Al Qaeda).^ ^ Also unique, were the monitoring mechanisms in Iraq -
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, although these were particular to verification tasks 
regarding Iraq's WMD.^^ 
3.1. Target addressees in practice 
This section establishes with whom or what the Council was aiming to communicate 
and thereby target by means of the measures in the resolutions. There were five types 
of target addressee identified in the arms embargoes resolutions: Governments; de facto 
authorities; the parties to the conflict; any recipient in the territory (i.e. the Government 
and non-state actors, including individuals in the relevant territory); and non-state actors 
alone. Al l but the final type of target addressee indicated the imposition of an embargo 
which would affect the whole of the relevant territory. Table 6 shows that it was 
equally common for the Council to target governments alone and non-state actors alone. 
3.2. Obligation addresses in practice 
In addition to the ubiquitous mandatory decision 'all states shall prevent the sale, supply 
and transfer...' which creates an obligation for all states, there have been calls for 
compliance by all states (including non-Member states) and international organisations 
" 11 S/RES/1013 (4 point mandate). This was recognised as 'an example of a useful means for 
strengthening the effectiveness of an arms embargo established by the Council' (preamble 
S/RES/1196). 
'^^  13 S/RES/1587 (9 point mandate). 
" 13 and 4 of S/RES/1363 (3 point mandate). 
16 of S/RES/1526 + annex thereto (9 point mandate). 
For further details, see http://www.unmovic.org (March-2007). 
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as well 60 
3.3. Stated or apparent objectives in practice 
There is one ultimate rationale which motivates not only the use of arms embargoes, but 
all measures imposed under Chapter VII - the maintenance or restoration of IPS. It is 
worth recalling De Wet's discussion of the Council's apparent double strategy^^ because 
a multidimensional element arises from the 'layering' of objectives and purposes when 
arms embargoes are used. This layering contributes to the difficulty in measuring the 
effectiveness of arms embargoes in terms of their success in achieving their goals. 
Table 6^ ^ shows the pattems in the use of the four identified^^ types of objectives 
individually and in combination. The data presented there shows that the most common 
purpose for the overall use of arms embargoes was to promote peace (type B). The 
table below shows the arrangement of the 'layers' of the goals and purposes arms 
embargoes have aspired to fu l f i l . 
Table B: 
Rationale The maintenance or restoration of IPS 
Sub-rationale Contlict containment Compliance by coercion 
Objective Arms control 
Type A 
Peace-promotion 
Type B 
Punishment 
TypeC 
Bargaining 
Type D 
The measures used for attempting to ensure compliance by coercion operate in two 
ways. First, through negative or forced coercion, i.e. 'punishment': Demands are made 
in an earlier resolution which did not impose any measures. If the demands are not met, 
the Council issues an embargo for that failure to comply; or a threat is issued after an 
Article 39 determination, that an embargo will come into force unless a certain 
condition or set of conditions is deemed to have been satisfied within a set time period. 
This type of coercion becomes punishment as soon as the target fails to comply as 
60 
61 
E.g. fZO of 864/93 (UNITA). 
I.e. The Council inight be able to address an internal problem by way of its potential international 
effects - see Chapter Two. 
62 
63 
See Annex. 
Identification of these objectives involved reviewing the objectives stated in the text of the 
Council resolutions and looking for indications of other or identical objectives that were apparent 
within the text. The details contained in the legal mandates were most indicative and therefore most 
useful in performing this task. 
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ordered. In all instances where a threat was issued, the target defaulted and the embargo 
came into force. Second, through positive or induced coercion, i.e. 'bargaining': An 
embargo is imposed immediately after an Article 39 determination, and 'readiness' to 
terminate once certain demands were met is stated or other incentives for early 
termination or suspension are offered. These types of objectives accord with Article 41 
because they are used to enforce decisions of the Council. This could be interpreted as 
the measures being used to enforce international law, either because the demand made 
of the target, by the Council, was already an obligation under intemational law or 
because the demand of the Council constituted a decision and therefore invoked Article 
25 and made the demand a new intemational obligation under the Charter. 
The measures used for attempting to contain a conflict operate by an embargo being 
imposed immediately after an Article 39 determination, which will persist until the 
Council says otherwise. These types of objectives are rarely associated with demands 
other than that which is immediately related to the armed conflict, such as ceasing the 
hostilities, or disarming, i f indeed, any demand is made at all. Sometimes a 'readiness 
to terminate' was stated in relation to these demands for peace. Rather than trying to 
modify the behaviour of a target, these objectives try to modify the state of the situation 
itself 
Sometimes the objectives within different sub-rationales are mixed. The following 
combinations of objectives were used: types A and B; types A and D; types B and D; 
and types C and D. Only type C was never used with types A or B and only type D was 
used in combinations with all other types. Before and during the 1990's, it was more 
common for individual objectives to be used,^ '* rather than combinations of objectives. 
Since 2000, it has been more common for combinations of objectives to be used,^ ^ 
rather than individual ones. 
3.4. Basic legal mandates in practice 
The requisite legal foundation for the use of enforcement measures under Chapter V I I is 
^10/13 cases. 
7/9 cases. 
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Article 39 of the Charter. There were eight formulations of legal mandates used in the 
arms embargoes resolutions,*^^ they were: 
1. A breach of IPS 
2. A threat to IPS 
3. A threat to IPS in the region 
4. A threat to peace and security in the region 
5. A threat to IPS and stability in the region 
6. A threat to IPS in the area of x 
1. A threat to IPS, in particular to the cause of y 
8. No explicit Article 39 determination given in the resolution itself or in a 
Chapter V I I resolution immediately preceding it^'' (in terms of Council action 
regarding that state). 
The data presented in Table 6 shows that the most common formulation of a legal 
mandate for the overall use of arms embargoes was Type 2. This was the expected 
result because it embodies the standard phrasing for the use of Chapter VI I measures. 
The most useful information to gamer from these formulations is the wide variety that 
Council has used. If it is argued that, essentially, it is understood that international 
peace is what is being considered, why does the Council not simply state that and use 
the most precise formulations (Types 1 or 2) in all cases? Article 39 refers simply to 
'any threat, however, this cannot be interpreted as being a non-international threat, 
because the mechanism of Article 39 is designed for measures to be taken 'to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.' It is suggested that the use of the term 
international should therefore be uniform, even if additional regional references are 
included to demonstrate the extent of the Council's concerns. Hence, Types 4 could be 
argued to fail to fu l f i l the element of Article 39, but certainly Type 8 would, because the 
one essential requirement is not apparent in the document that established the legal 
^ See Table 3. (Annex) 
A case where an Article 39 determination was not given in the resolution itself was Iraq 
S/RES/661 of 1990. However, the Council's action on the matter immediately preceded the arms 
embargo resolution, both in terms of Council action regarding Iraq and temporally. The initial 
Council action was in response to the occupation of Kuwait, however measures continued once the 
withdrawal had taken place because of the threat to peace cause by fighting in Iraq itself regarding 
the Kurdish population. 
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measures. It could therefore be possible to contest the legality of S/RES/1160 and 
S/RES/1171, however, both cases did refer to Chapter V I I . In the former, one 
representative did refer to a threat to IPS in the meeting when the resolution was 
adopted, but this position must not have achieved consensus for it was omitted from 
the text of the resolution. In the latter case, the function of the resolution was to modify 
the targets of an existing arms embargo by terminating that resolution and passing a new 
resolution. So it could be argued that the determination in the original resolution 
persists, however as the target of the measure was being modified, a new determination 
could have easily been included. No representatives made any statements during that 
meeting. 
4. Nature and scope of arms embargoes 
Many practical difficulties exist for the UN system and the Council, like many other 
entities in the UN also undertakes multilateral negotiations. Due to the existence of a 
voting system, the constraint of the requirement of consensus (which is required in 
many other areas of UN work) is avoided by the Council. Nevertheless, the text of any 
document which has been internationally agreed is unlikely to ever truly represent the 
views of any one member state. Compromises must be reached to allow progress to be 
made and so the textual analysis of these Council resolutions is performed with these 
imperfections in mind. Nevertheless, the Council should expect a certain level of 
evaluation of its chosen terminology as the resolutions passed are legally binding. It 
could be that the only reason for finding some evidence of a normative framework is 
because there is a method of practice within the UN of 'borrowing' previously used 
(and therefore, previously accepted) terminology to formulate each new decision, 
without expending (often restricted) time redrafting innovative, ingenious and/or more 
textually consistent resolutions. 
4.1. Introduction 
Earlier chapters have attempted to identify the origins of the authority behind the 
imposition of arms embargoes, but what is the precise source of the obligation which 
See Table 3B. 
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arises once a Council resolution has been adopted? Although it would appear correct to 
state that it is the national implemented laws which create the arms embargo as a legal 
device, not the Council resolution - so the obligation not to violate the arms embargo is 
addressed, secondarily, to any person or entity that the implementing state directs. The 
Council is only owed a legal obligation from its Member states (and possibly other 
states) to implement the decisions it passes in its resolutions - i.e. to 'accept and carry 
out' the Council's decisions. 
A model construction of the obligations addressed to member states when an arms 
embargo is imposed (i.e. the scope of the embargo) might be as follows: 
[The Council] Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures 
to prevent the direct or indirect, sale or supply or transfer to [...the 
target addressee(s)^^ ] , by their nationals (including by their 
nationals outside of their territories) or from their territories, or using 
their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel, including 
[...more detailed list of weapons types^"...], (whether or not 
originating in their territories), and to prevent the provision of any 
technical assistance, advice or training related to the provision, 
maintenance, use or manufacture (including the provision of licences 
for manufacture) of the prohibited items and any activities by their 
nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to 
promote such sale, supply, transfer or provision.^' 
It is interesting to note that the phrase 'the necessary measures to prevent...' is used 
rather than 'the measures necessary to prevent...' because the latter implies those 
measures wil l be documented somewhere. In addition, the terminology in the former 
implies the lowest common denominator option - basically letting states 'get away 
with' doing the minimum possible to attempt to prevent actual or planned violations of 
the measures, rather than making them do all that is within their power to ensure the 
prevention of actual or planned violations of the measures. Perhaps this is because the 
Council and all UN member states accept that it is not practical to expect that the 
''^  To State(s) X / the territory of State(s) X / to entity/entities Y / to any person or body in State(s) Z 
or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from State(s) Z. 
™ Including; weapons and ammunition, military vehicles (including aircraft) and equipment, 
paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned. 
This was complied from the language of the 22 arms embargo cases as used by the Council. 
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measures will be implemented and enforced absolutely. 
4.2. Political or legal measures? 
Kuyper has noted'^ that how measures are viewed by the authorities charged with 
implementation and the citizens affected by them is important in deciding if they are 
legal obligations or political decisions. Those states that create new legislation to 
implement the measures clearly perceive the measures to be legal. Do arms embargoes 
actually bind states in practice, given the absence of formal reprimands for a state's 
failure to effectively implement the measures within its internal jurisdiction? They are 
bound by a norm, but like most international law, there is no overarching mechanism 
that is capable of enforcing obligations arising from that norm and so compliance relies 
on the individual political will of each state to implement the measures. 
4.3. Primacy 
An interesting factor shown in the Council's practice is the primacy of arms embargoes. 
Even when imposed as part of a comprehensive regime, arms embargoes have always 
been contained in a separate operative paragraph (or sub-paragraph) within the 
resolution, even on occasion, when the Article 39 qualification was not. 
In addition, half of the arms embargo resolutions contained a provision, the model 
example of which could be stated as follows: 
[The Council] Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the 
United Nations, and all international and regional organizations, including 
the United Nations and its specialized agencies, to act strictly in 
accordance with the provisions of this resolution, notwithstanding the 
existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any 
international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or 
permit granted prior to the entry into force of the prohibitions imposed by 
this resolution. 
Although this primacy is not conveyed through a decision, but a recommendation, the 
existence of Article 103 indicates that these provisions serve as a reminder of the pre-
eminence of Council resolutions. This also serves to remind states of the fact they 
See Anthony op.cit (Introduction note 22 - Bonn) p.5 et seq. 
Kuyper, P.J. The Implementation of International Sanctions - The Netherlands and Rhodesia 
(1978) Sijthoff and Noordhoff International Publishers at p.6. 
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cannot invoke internal law as a reason for failing to fulf i l their international 
obligations.^"* 
4.4. Main obligations 
The fundamental obligations upon states are to abide by Articles 25 and 48 by accepting 
and carrying out the decisions of the Council. To do this, the explicit obligations 
outlined above in the model construction need to be implemented and those obligations 
enforced. The only effective way to do that would be to make such activities criminal^^ 
or civil offences under internal law.''^ The internal law would need to include all of the 
elements contained in the resolution, for example: 
1. It is an offence for a National of [State X ] , wherever he or she resides, to directly 
or indirectly: 
a. Sell, supply or transfer the prohibited items to the targeted 
destination/user; 
b. Provide any technical assistance, advice or training related to the 
provision, maintenance, use or manufacture (including the provision of 
licences for manufacture) of the prohibited items to the targeted 
destination/user; 
irrespective of the origin of the prohibited items. 
2. It is an offence to promote (or calculate the promotion of) the occurrence of the 
activities outlined in S.l. 
3. It is an offence to use a flag vessel or aircraft of [State X] to perform the 
activities outHned in S.l. 
4. It is an offence to perform the activities outlined in S.l from the territory of 
[State X ] , irrespective of an individual's nationality. 
In order to effectively enforce the law, as is required, states must impose appropriate 
'"^  See Chapter Five. 
Making the violation of an arms embargo a criminal offence was 'encouraged' in ^2 of 
S/RES/1196 of 1998. The Council has also made recommendations with regard to legislative, 
administrative and judicial action and the imposition of penalties for violation. See, e.g. S/RES/1343 
at ^ [21; S/RES/1390 at US; and S/RES/864 at ^21. 
The benefit of a civil law offence in English law regarding the covert operations of illicit arms 
brokers and illicit arms transfers would be the lower standard of proof required for liability. 
However, the value of punishment in criminal law for increasing compliance with the law remains 
largely in its potential deterrent effect. Custodial sentences and large fines would be more likely to 
deter some potential offenders (although presumably not all) than would the case in providing only a 
civil remedy. 
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penalties (whether criminal or civil) designed to reprimand offenders, deter future 
breaches and to enforce any other principle of punishment under the internal law. In 
order to identify breaches, states must also regulate the activities of individuals or 
entities that export weapons (to any destination) i f they are a national of the state or i f 
they reside there or i f a relevant (e.g. arms/logistics) company is incorporated in that 
state. States must also investigate potential violations and apprehend alleged offenders. 
As well as implementing the resolution, there are three sub-obligations upon all states. 
In order to support the legal status of the measure, states must not; deliberately violate 
the embargo; or assist other states or entities that violate the embargo, whether 
intentionally or otherwise. In addition, states are under an obligation to amend the 
internal law, i f the Council amends any part of the resolution, which also includes the 
obligation to repeal the internal law once the Council has decided the measures are to be 
terminated. There are additional obligations upon neighbouring states^ ^ to physically 
enforce the embargo. Methods of doing this might be to create or improve internal law 
regarding export and import (border) controls and to police relevant borders where 
resources exist. It is suggested that the arms embargoes do not obligate non-regional 
Member states to occupy land or sea border areas in order to physically police exports 
and imports. 
Failure to fully implement and/or enforce the arms embargo in the ways described 
above would constitute a violation of Articles 48(1) and 25. I f this happens, the Council 
could then take action against the violating state to ensure future compliance, unless 
effective action can be taken under another sphere of international law, such as that of 
state responsibility. The international obligations required for state responsibility can be 
identified but to whom the obligation is owed is more problematic. This issue will be 
considered below, in Chapter Five. 
5. A normative framework? 
5.1. Arguments in support 
The work of the Expert Working Group'''^  on a Common Understanding of Arms 
Peacekeeping forces and Council monitoring mechanisms have been given mandates to provide 
assistance for the physical enforcement of arms embargoes and other measures to ease the burden on 
neighbouring states. 
78 
Hereinafter, the 'Bonn group'. 
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Embargoes during Bonn-Berlin process produced a 'Model Resolution'^^ with four 
defined sections: (preambular paragraphs) causes and objectives of the embargo; 
(operative paragraphs) scope of the embargo; monitoring; and additional provisions. 
Through the review in this thesis, it is apparent that some patterns have emerged in the 
Council's practice on the use of arms embargoes.There is overwhelming support for 
the requirement of an Article 39 determination prior to action. The clearest evidence of 
the development of norms in the Council's use of arms embargoes is in connection with 
its decisions to use exemptions and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at the time 
the embargo was imposed. In addition, it was far less common for arms embargoes to 
be used as 'standalone' or 'exclusive' enforcement measures. There did not appear to 
be any significant contextual difference in the way these variables were used. 
5.1.1. The role of context? 
The greatest contextual difference to note is the significantly larger number of internal 
and mixed armed conflict situations recorded compared to the international or no armed 
conflict situations. This is likely to be due to the fact that there have been many more 
non-international conflicts in operation since the end of the Second World War. To 
establish the true role of context, it would be necessary to also ascertain in which cases 
the Council did not make determinations under Article 39 but where armed conflict was 
in progress and the cases in which it did make such a determination, but no Chapter V I I 
action was taken. Such investigation would go beyond the scope of this thesis, but the 
point is worth recalling because it emphasises the fact that this study, based solely on 
determining patterns regarding the practice on one type of Chapter V I I measure, is 
necessarily limited. 
5.1.1.1. Target Addressees 
In both internal and international armed conflict situations, the most common targets 
were governments (33% and 100% of cases respectively). The mixed situation most 
commonly targeted non-state actors (44% of cases) and the no armed conflict situations 
See Davis, I. (Rapporteur) Chapter 2 (p.25) of Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes 
and Travel and Aviation Related Sanctions: Results of the 'Bonn-Berlin Process' Brzoska, M. (ed.) 
(2001) BICC, Bonn, http://www.bicc.de/events/unsanc/2000/booklet.php (January-2007). 
See Table 6, Annex. 
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were divided equally between a government and a non-state actor. This would indicate 
that targeting is an ad hoc process where the Council does not make a choice relevant to 
the contextual situation as such; rather the target presents itself as a problem to the 
Council and the Council responds. 
5.1.1.2. Legal Mandate 
The variety of formulations for the legal mandate used in internal conflicts are so evenly 
spread, that the differences between the most and least common results are only two 
cases apart. Use of the terminology 'a threat to IPS in the region' was therefore only 
slightly more common in internal cases than 'a threat to IPS'. The small number of 
cases in the international and no armed conflict groups are highlighted as to their limited 
ability to show significant patterns in practice.^' It is likely that the disparities in chosen 
terminology are due to the conditions in which these decisions are taken. The 
affirmative vote requires the agreement of nine sovereign states with respect to a 
delicate political situation. The omission of the word 'international' in some cases 
therefore, is assumed to be due to necessary political compromise rather than any legal 
consideration. The mixed and no armed conflict cases most commonly used the second 
formulation;^^ which is perceived to be the most appropriate because it aligns with the 
terminology of the Charter. 
5.1.1.3. Objectives 
The range of stated or apparent objectives was evenly spread in all contexts. Rather 
than denying the existence of a norm here, it is suggested that this observation reveals 
the multifaceted nature of the purposes behind arms embargoes. They are not simply 
used as coercive 'carrots and sticks' to achieve compliance with Council demands. 
They have a variety of objectives used, often in combination, in response to the needs of 
the situation. As will be discussed later, the fundamental need in all armed conflict 
situations is a method to reduce the intensity of the violence (and therefore the number 
of casualties) and one objective in particular, is designed for precisely that purpose. 
81 
In the international group, the first case of a protracted interstate conflict (where the embargo 
remained in force equally between the two parties for its entire duration) had the unusual 
formulation 'a threat to peace and security in the region' (S/RES/1298). 
'A threat to [IPS]'. 
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5.2. Arguments in opposition 
With the exception of operational points, such as the exemptions, monitoring 
arrangements and use of concurrent measures, these results would suggest that the 
Council has evaluated each case on its own merits when deciding to use arms 
embargoes and in the way it has constructed the measures. From one perspective, this is 
laudable because despite the shared contexts in many cases, the details of the conflict, 
its parties and the underlying tensions are complicated and in some ways unique. It 
could be said that there have been no like cases to treat alike. From another perspective, 
it is reasonable to criticise the Council regarding the inconsistencies in terminology^^ 
and the continued lack of clarity concerning the objectives, how they operate and how 
they are connected to the ultimate rationale of the maintenance of IPS. It is the 
language of the text that will determine its legal character and through this, the precise 
content of the states' obligations. For this reason it is desirable to have common 
standards that form a template for future use, as the Bonn group have shown. As well 
as increasing the clarity of resolutions, this would also increase the efficiency of 
drafting and may well assist the standardisation of implementation efforts, as has been 
suggested is desirable.^ '* 
6. Conclusion 
There are patterns evident in practice, but these are not consistent enough to establish a 
functioning normative framework. The Council needs to maintain its flexibility in order 
to respond to any threat or breach of the peace. The partly ad hoc approach taken in 
practice appears to be conducive to that requirement. Fundamentally, the alleged 
existing norms in practice tend to focus on the objectives'^ of measures. Indeed, this 
See further, Luck op.cit (Introduction note 22 - Bonn). 
See e.g. 'Economic Sanctions' op.cit (Chapter Two note 62) at p. 157; Biersteker, T.J. , Eckert, 
S.E., Halegua, A., and Romaniuk, P. Targeted Sanctions and State Capacity - Towards a framework 
for national level implementation in 'International Sanctions' op.cit at pp.57-64. 
I.e. the UN's public perspectives regarding for what purposes it employs the sanctions, see e.g. the 
Sanctions Committee website - http://www.un.org/sc/committees; 1166 of A/50/60/S/1995/1; and the 
preamble of S/RES/1196 of 1998 regarding the Secretary-General's report on "The causes of 
conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa" 
(A/52/871)(S/1998/318). 
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should be the case, because the logical way to measure the success of measures is by 
their apparent attainment of their stated goals. In the next chapter the objectives and the 
legal basis for arms embargoes will be further examined and the interaction between 
these elements wil l be considered. 
C H A P T E R F O U R 
WHAT IS THE CORRECT L E G A L BASIS FOR ARMS EMBARGOES WITHIN 
THE CHARTER? 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter does not intend to judge whether or not specific Council resolutions were 
ultra vires or unlawful in any other way. Instead, this chapter will first examine the 
specific legal mandate for arms embargoes; and second, will discuss whether there 
could be alternative legal bases available under the Charter, taking into account 
considerations about the placement of arms embargoes within Chapter VI I of the 
Charter. 
1.1. The Concept of a Mandate in General 
'[T]he likelihood of continued collective action depends on the perceived legitimacy of 
the decision maker, the Council itself.'' 
1.1.1. Legitimacy^ and Legality 
The delicate distinction between law and politics is apparent in every area of Council 
theory and practice. It is a political body empowered to take legally binding actions. 
'Legitimacy' is an inherently political, sociological and perhaps also moral term. In 
law, its partner is 'legality', however, the terms are not synonymous. Legality is a 
consequence of adherence to the positive law itself. It is binary in nature; either legality 
is found or it is not. Legitimacy (in terms of law) however, may be a multifarious 
quality awarded after the assessment of positive laws. 
The concept of a mandate is embedded in the rule of law as it operates on the national 
' Caron, D. The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council (1993) 87 American 
Journal of International Law 552 at 554. 
~ See further, Franck, T. M. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) New York: Oxford 
University Press; Georgier, D. Politics or Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in 
International Law (1993) 4(1) E J I L 1, especially at p. 12; and Section B of A/59/565 (High Level 
Panel) on the question of legitimacy (beginning \1QA). 
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level. The presence or absence of a mandate will determine the fundamental content 
and structure of all laws, whether prescriptive or proscriptive. Although the absence of 
a mandate may not necessarily make an action illegal, it may still lack legitimacy as 
understood in political and legal fields. Mandates create a measure of legality and a 
sense of legitimacy for action taken. Action taken without the requisite mandate may 
generate illegality or illegitimacy, depending on the context in which it is being judged. 
Legal accountability may arise from such illegality and non-legal accountability (e.g. 
political, moral) may arise from such illegitimacy. Illegality may trigger operations of 
law which automatically cancel the action.^ Illegitimacy might provide an excuse for 
disregarding any such action but it will not change the content of the law. 
As described earlier, the Council has a mandate under Chapter VII which authorises 
collective action; however, i f the mandate is exceeded there may be an argument for 
illegality of the action and/or the illegitimacy of the action. At the very foundations of 
this, the correct mandate (from which measurement of the accuracy of the actual 
mandate used, as evidenced in the Council's practice) must be established. I f the 
relevant provisions are not employed correctly, or i f procedures (such as voting) are not 
followed, illegality may be charged. Whereas, i f the legitimacy of action is contested, 
this follows not from what occurs on the face of the Council action, i.e. that which can 
be established from the text of the resolutions, but instead, it follows from concerns 
whether or not a legitimate motivation caused the decision to be taken (e.g. is the 
problem really international?) and whether its objectives and the way the measure 
operates (i.e. by compelling compliance or containing conflict) are acceptable. 
The imbalance of power between UN Member states as concentrated in the Council is 
one of a variety of circumstances which present a need for the Council's mandate to be 
seen to be complied with, not only in terms of including appropriate references in 
resolutions to the powers in use, but also on a wider scale, perhaps via endorsements of 
the OA, where all Member states are equally represented. Doxey noted that the 
^ See, e.g. the principle of uUra vires. 
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'permanent members and their clients are permanently exempt from formal censure''' 
with regard to the Interlaken I I process on targeted financial sanctions. It is submitted 
that this problem is equally relevant, i f not more so, to the Council's use of arms 
embargoes, because of the possible conflict of interest which arises for the permanent 
members: an American study^ has shown that the P5 are the biggest exporters of 
conventional arms to developing nations and such nations are the most common targets^ 
of Council arms embargoes. Thus, in international law a mandate comprises two things: 
a measure of legality (whether or not the practice is in accordance with the legal limits 
of the powers to act); and a measure of legitimacy (whether or not the motivations 
behind the practice is in accordance with the overall rationale for taking action at all). 
2. Exploring the specific legal mandate for arms embargoes 
In trying to establish the correct legal basis for arms embargoes, it must be asked 
whether or not such measures fall clearly into one of the categories listed in Article 41. 
For standalone arms embargoes, the closest match is the 'partial interruption of 
economic relations' because not all economic relations are interrupted. This also 
connotes the intended temporary nature of measures involving economic relations; they 
serve as an interruption, not an absolute severance of relations (as diplomatic relations 
are described), which may be restored, rather than renewed. 
The Council's use of arms embargoes does not constitute a specific legal regime to deal 
with (e.g. criminalise) illicit trafficking. Fundamentally, they interfere with what 
would, but for the embargo, be a lawful arms transfer. Arms embargoes are seldom 
invoked in response to a clearly identifiable breach of international law. Unlike other 
enforcement measures under the heading of 'measures short of the use of force', arms 
Doxey, M.P. United Nations Sanctions: Lessons of Experience in the report of the Second 
Interlaken Seminar on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions 29-31 March, 1999 at p.210. Available at 
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/00641/index.html?lang=en (April-2007). 
See 'SAS-2002' op.cit. pp.22-29, 32 and 39 and their references to Grimmett, R. Conventional 
Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 1993-2000 CRS Report for Congress (2001). The P5 ranked 
in this order: l " - USA; 2"" - Russia; 3'" - France; 4'" - UK; 5* - China (See Table I F at p.52 Arms 
Transfer Agreements with Developing Nations, 1993-2000 available at 
http://www.worldpolicv.org/proiects/arms/reports/arms.pdf (April-2007). 
^ The vast majority of arms embargoes have been imposed against developing nations in Africa. 
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embargoes are not usually imposed for the economic pressures under which a state may 
be put.^ It is suggested that it may be the case that the obligation-addressees of the arms 
embargoes (to date, that is, 'all states') collectively suffer greater economic 
consequences from inter alia, losses from the absence of sales or transfers of weapons, 
than the target addressees (the state or entity prohibited from buying or dealing in the 
weapons). 
As is evident in the arms embargo resolutions, the Council has operated under Chapter 
V I I while only once citing Article 41 as its basis for doing so^ and in that case the arms 
embargo was used with other measures concurrently. The omission of a specific Article 
may be deliberate, as it may be satisfied that Article 39 implies that the only measures 
capable of maintaining or restoring IPS once threatened or breached are those explicitly 
mentioned therein. In the alternative, it may be because the Council knows it can act 
without being specific and so does. In fact, as the Council is under no obligation to take 
the listed measures after an Article 39 determination, it is feasible that Article 40 
measures could be used instead. 
The Council might be unclear about the correct specific legal base for its actions, 
because it tends to focus on the political, not legal, dimensions of a problem.^ Without 
doubt, it has always acted under Chapter V I I and so practice maintains that the correct 
chapter - action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression - is being used. It is important to establish an accurate legal basis for the use 
of an arms embargo because i f properly executed, it has the potential to interfere with a 
variety of other rights and principles protected by international law, some of which will 
be considered in Chapter Five. 
^ See for example, Iraq Sanctions - S/RES/661; S/RES/678 which had a devastating effect on the 
civilian population. 
Southern Rhodesia. 
^ Analysis of the relevant meeting records (these are listed in the index of resolutions - Table 5, 
Annex) may be able to give an indication over whether Article 41 was established as the appropriate 
basis for action - indeed, it may have been the need for consensus/cooperation to achieve results that 
forced the actual texts of resolutions imposing action against threats to the peace to be vague. This, 
it is suggested, is the most likely reason for the weaknesses in Chapter VII action, as it is throughout 
tlie entire UN system. It appears to be an unavoidable problem if the legitimacy that comes with 
open participation wants to be maintained. 
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2.1. The legal nature of an arms embargo 
2.1.1. Decisions and enforcement measures 
Article 25 needs to be interpreted with the implied assumption that 'agreeing to accept' 
and 'carrying out' the decisions of the Council are two independent obligations. 
In relation to arms embargoes, a minimum of two decisions are involved. 'The Council 
decides that 
1) all states shall... 
2) .. .prevent the sale, supply or transfer of arms and related materiel' to the target.' 
Decision 1 invokes Article 48(1) and decision 2 invokes Article 25. Decision 1 creates 
the 'obligation addressee' by asserting which Member states must take the action 
required to fu l f i l the obligation created by the second decision. The action required in 
this example, is the implementation of an arms embargo in internal law. Thus, the 
legally binding force of the arms embargo instrument comes from Article 48(1). This 
instrument is not a decision of the Council per se and so does not gain its legal force 
from Article 25. Decision 2 creates a standard from which the obligation addressees 
must not deviate, as would be the case for any decision taken by the Council where 
Article 25 is invoked. It is submitted that this is what is meant by the phrase in Article 
41 'to give effect to the decisions of the Council'. Thus an enforcement measure is a 
measure used to provide the means by which a decision'*^ of the Council may be 
enforced. The 'decisions' in Article 41 do not necessarily relate to other decisions 
which might also be present in the same resolution. These other decisions could either 
operate in the way described above, by invoking both Article 48(1) and 25," or they 
could only invoke Article 25. The latter category would include any demands the 
Council makes of a target addressee, thereby also making the target an obligation 
addressee. It is important to note that any obligation(s) made of the target via Article 25 
are completely independent of the obligation(s) addressed to 'some or all' states via 
Articles 48(1) and 25 together. Therefore, what is seen as simply an arms embargo (the 
One which invoked both Articles 48(1) and 25. 
" This would occur where more than one type of enforcement measure is imposed in the same 
resolution, i.e. concurrent use of enforcement measures. 
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instrument) actually possesses two distinct parts (the obligation and the means to fu l f i l 
it) both of which are important legally. 
2.1.2. Enforcing decisions, law and/or peace? 
Despite the above analysis, enforcement measures appear to be seen solely as sanctions 
used to enforce those decisions of the Council which only invoke Article 25, i.e. those 
that make specific demands of the targets. But such decisions are not enforcement 
measures, per se. These 'sanctions' represent a third decision of the Council in one 
resolution (with additional fourth or fif th etc. decisions, corresponding to each extra 
demand made). These demands could either be reiterations of existing international law 
obligations owed by the target (attempted enforcement of international law) or political 
demands which gather the force of new international law because they comprise 
decisions of the Council which invoke Article 25 (but not, also Article 48(1)) and 
therefore become legal obligations to that addressee. If arms embargoes are used in the 
first way, viz. as measures to enforce existing law, Damrosch contends that for this 
application to be 'on a "principled" basis, the principle ought to be restricting the flow 
of arms to initiators and/or perpetrators of conflict rather than to areas of conflict.''^ 
Such an analysis, ignoring the 'peace enforcement' role,''' also begs the question of how 
the Council can adjudicate the matter of the fault of the parties, a role although not 
explicitly excluded from Article 41 like it is in Article 40, is nevertheless encroaching 
on a judicial role. However, Damrosch does not assert that all non-forcible measures 
are designed to enforce (existing) law, and that '[ajnalytically, sanctions to induce 
political compromise need to be distinguished from sanctions to enforce international 
law.''"* It is submitted that this mislabelling of 'sanctions' (i.e. demands) needs to be 
distinguished from enforcement measures, although the two may co-exist in one 
resolution.'^ 'Sanctions', if indeed present, may operate in a manner subsidiary to the 
'Enforcing Intemational Law' op.cit. (Chapter Two note 86) at p. 127. 
I.e. one clearly connected with the overall rationale. See, e.g. Frowein/Krisch in 'Simma' op.cil. 
at p.705; Arangio-Ruiz, G. On The Security Council's «Law-Making» ('Law-Making') (2000) 
83 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 609 at p.611. 
" Ibid, note 12 at p. 130. 
As they are in the cases that have 'coercive compliance' objectives. 
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enforcement measure, in that as a side-effect of the primary function'^ of the 
enforcement measure, the measure also happens to support the solely Article 25 
demands. Moreover, 'the Council has no power...to threaten enforcement measures in 
order to impose upon a State a conduct which is not genuinely instrumental to that same 
end.'" Thus, the demands must be in pursuit of the maintenance or restoration of IPS. 
It may be that what are seen as 'sanctions' (i.e. demands) gain their legal force from 
Article 41; default on which may lead to enforcement measures. But here, the 
enforcement measure is still not necessarily a traditional sanction. The enforcement 
measure is created because a threat to IPS has been caused by the target's failure to 
18 
abide by the demands made of it. Sometimes, non-binding recommendations are 
made (such as strongly urging parties to 'cease hostilities and agree to a cease-fire''^) 
and simultaneously, enforcement measures are used. Once again, the legal foundation 
of the enforcement measure is independent of the conduct of the parties, although their 
compliant behaviour may lead to the situation no longer constituting a threat to EPS, 
which would justify termination of the measures. Compliance alone, without a 
determinable removal of the threat to the peace, cannot legally ju&tify the termination of 
measures. 
2.1.3. Legal Implications arising from the legal nature of an arms embargo 
Decision 1 is important for two reasons: first, to ensure that the failure to create a 
practical effect of the arms embargo will have a legal consequence, that is, it will 
represent a violation of provisions of the Charter; second, because it confirms that the 
arms embargo is an enforcement measure and only enforcement measures can override 
the principle of non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
I.e. to provide a means for the execution of the decision to take a measure 
'Law-Making' op.cit. note 13 at p. 627. 
'One must view the application of sanctions to a State not complying with as particular 
recommendation as resting on an independent decision by the SC under Chapter VII , i.e. as being a 
measure against a threat to the peace, constituted by the act of non-compliance with the specific 
terms of the recommendation in question. Delbriick in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.456-7. 
See, e.g. Somalia, ^ 4 of S/RES/733 of 1992. 
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of a state.^ *^  There is a corresponding international doctrine of intervention and the 
purpose of this is '...to provide an acceptable balance between the sovereign equality 
and independence of states on the one hand and the reality of an interdependent world 
and the international law commitment to human dignity on the o t h e r . T h u s , the 
Council is not prevented from acting in any situation which it has determined to be a 
threat to the peace, whether or not such action would so intervene. 
2.2. Do arms embargoes fit the mould of Article 41? 
2.2.1. The 'sanction' element 
According to Doxey, international sanctions are 'penalties threatened or imposed as a 
declared consequence of the target's failure to observe international standards or 
international obligations.'^^ Arms embargoes are commonly referred to a 'sanctions' 
however the use of this is a generalisation which, when compared to the actual practice, 
becomes a misnomer. To understand this point it is helpful to consult Tables 2 ('Target 
Addressee...' column) and 3 ('Legal Mandate' column).^^ When these factors are 
compared in each case, it can be seen that in the majority of cases, it was the situation, 
not a particular targeted entity, which motivated the decision to impose an arms 
embargo. However, this is a difference of only one case. As this categorisation is not 
presented in any of the annexed tables, it is shown below.^ '* 
Table C 
Targeted entity group Situation group 
Tables # A Cases 1,2 and 6. Tables # A Cases 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 
9* Tables # B Cases 3, 6 and 7. 
Tables # C Cases 1 and 2. Tables #B, Cases 1, 2, 4*, 5, 8 and 
9. Tables # D Cases 1 and 2. 
With regard to context, it is interesting that all of the international and no armed conflict 
20 Article 2(7). 
^' Higgins, R. Intervention and International Law p.30 Bull, H. (ed.) Intervention in World Politics 
(1984) OUR 
22 . Contemporary Perspective' op.cit. (Chapter Two note 101) at p.9. 
23 
24 
Annex. 
To avoid any confusion; e.g. Table # A, Case 1 is S/RES/232 on Southern Rhodesia. Table # B, 
Case 9 is S/RES/1701 on Lebanon. These numbers are exactly the same in Tables 2 and 3. 
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cases (Tables # C and D) were imposed as 'sanctions' compared to only 6 out of 18 
internal or mixed armed conflict cases (Tables # A and B). In those cases in the 
'situation group' where a demand was made of the target, only those demands which 
were not directly connected to the containment of conflict could be correctly classified 
as 'sanctions'.'Sanctions' can be evidenced by a 'sunset clause'^'' where the Council 
expresses its intention to terminate the measures once the demands are met. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that some of the arms embargo cases are clearly not 
sanctions, the generalisation that classifies all Article 41 enforcement measures as 
'sanctions' is therefore incorrect. It is particularly unhelpful with respect to the 
understanding and effectiveness of arms embargoes. Arms embargoes can be general 
and non-discriminatory, and can be imposed without reference to the specific acts of a 
potential target. They can target an ultimate destination (i.e. a territory) or a particular 
end-user or both. Only in the latter cases must there be an identifiable target addressee. 
2.2.1.1. The classically punitive concept of a legal" sanction 
'It is the conduct of a party to a dispute and not so much its non-compliance 
with a prior call of the Security Council (which can also have been made 
under Chapter V I , in which case it is not binding) which is the determinative 
factor for the taking of enforcement measures.'^ ^ 
According to Hart, it '[shall be taken that] neither Article 16 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations nor Chapter VI I of the United Nations Charter introduced into 
These cases are identified by the * symbol in Table C, above. In one case, part of the demand was 
to cease the incitement of violence (Cote d'lvoire) and in the other, the sole demand was to 
'relinquish power...and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected Government and 
a return to constitutional order' (Sierra Leone I). 
See, The Swiss Confederation, the United Nations Secretariat and the Watson Institute for 
International Studies Brown University Targeted Financial Sanctions - A Manual for Design and 
Implementation at p.58 Available -
http://www.seco.admin.ch/themen/00513/00620/00639/0064 l/index.html?lang=en (February-2007). 
See also, ^ 16 of S/RES/841; ^  11 of S/RES/1343. 
" '[T]o some commentators true legal sanctions are non-existent in the absence of third party 
procedures or a centralized system to determine whether reaction to alleged violations of 
international law are indeed legitimate.' 'UN sanctions' op.cit. (Chapter Two note 114) at p.3. 
28 
Kooijmans, P.H. Provisional Measures of the UN Security Council ('Provisional Measures') 
pp.289-300 in Centers, E. and Schrijver, N. Reflections on international law from the low countries: 
in honour of Paul de Waart (1998) Martinus Nijhoff at p.299. 
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international law anything which can be equated with the sanctions of municipal law.'^^ 
It would seem that little of the aforementioned Article 16 was brought into Article 41, 
due to the lack of an underlying 'boycott' element (i.e. true isolation) as a response to an 
unlawful act (resorting to war). 
Arangio-Ruiz^^ has argued that sanctions are responses to wrongful conduct and to 
punish such conduct via a sanction is to pass judgement on behaviour. This, he argues, 
is not part of the role of the Council. An individual state is free to condemn the actions 
of another state and even may do so in an international forum, such as a Council 
meeting, but legal enforcement that opinion is a step 'outside [the] scope of the Security 
Council's competence.' 
When Schrijver generalises about the use of economic sanctions^' by the Council 
(which includes but is not limited to arms embargoes) he defines their objectives as 
'[the coercion of the target state] to put an end to unlawful policies...[or 
alternatively]...to serve as collective measures to redress an international wrongful act 
and to restore legality.' This definition, according to Gowlland-Debbas, 'establishes a 
link between Charter mechanisms for peace maintenance and state responsibility.'^"^ In 
determining that Kelsen's conclusion that 'the purpose of the enforcement action under 
Article 39 is...to maintain, or restore peace [not law]...''^'^ is 'borne out of the wide 
discretion...under Article 39 which do not require attribution of guilt or of 
responsibility', Gowlland-Debbas cites the International Law Commission's definition 
of the term "sanction"^^ as a means of supporting the idea that collective measures are 
Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law Second Edition (1994) OUP (Clarendon) at p.217. 
°^ 'Law-Making' op.cit. atp.631. 
Offering the possible exceptions of Libya and Iraq where punishment or repression of the target 
state may have been intended. 
'Economic Sanctions' op.cir. at p.l46. 
Gowlland-Debbas, V. Comments pp.163- 173 in 'International Economic Law' op.cir. (Chapter 
Two note 62) at p. 163. 
'^^  (My emphasis). See ibid, and for the original: Kelsen, H. 'Law of the UNs' op cit. at p.294. 
Ibid, note 33 at p. 164, citing the YBILC 1979 vol. 11 pt.2 at121, p.l21: 
'[Sanctions are] reactive measures applied by virtue of a decision taken by an international 
organization following a breach of an international obligation having serious consequences for the 
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legal sanctions, which possess 'an important law-enforcement function.' With respect, 
it is suggested that this interpretation of legal sanctions extends beyond law-
enforcement and into determination of the law, or more precisely, the adjudication of 
matters of legality. Neither of these areas is strictly designed for the Council's 
involvement. In relation to enforcement measures, it is the Member states that must 
enforce the law they create by implementing Council resolutions. 
Crawford^^ notes that the word 'sanction' is never used in the Charter"*^  and that Council 
authorises 'collective responses' but it does not impose "sanctions" in the strict sense 
detailed by Professor Abi-Saab. Hence, they are not necessarily imposed as responses 
to internationally wrongful acts and moreover, it would, in general, be the 
consequence(s) of the wrongful act threatening or breaching IPS which invoked the 
Council's response, rather than the act itself.^ ** The UN maintains that 'the purpose of 
sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening [EPS] and not to 
punish or otherwise exact retribution.'^'^ However, one clear way to attempt to modify 
undesirable behaviour (for the short-term at least) is chastisement and the Council has 
used this method in practice. 
2.2.2. Economic Pressure: Enforcement measures 'may include complete 
or partial interruption of economic relations...' 
Modem international sanctions are neither essentially punitive like internal law 
sanctions, nor are they an attempt to isolate or boycott that target vis-a-vis all other 
entities. One reason for the latter is that international law no longer regulates purely 
interstate relations; a concept which would have been novel for Members of the League. 
Although like other economic measures, arms embargoes are a trade restriction, they are 
international community as a whole, and in particular for certain measures which the United Nations 
is empowered to adopt, under the system established by the Charter, with a view to the maintenance 
of [IPS].' 
Crawford, J. The relationship between Sanctions and Countermeasures in 'UN Sanctions' op.cit. 
atp.57. 
''^  However it is present in the travauxpreparatoires - see 'UNCIO Vol.XII' op.cit. at p. 581. 
38 
The exceptions might be the four cases categorised as having purely 'punitive' objectives at the 
time of imposition (See Table 3). 
Supplement to 'An agenda for peace' (A/50/60/S/1995/1) p.l6 at'[[66 (My emphasis). 
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also a transfer and supply restriction (i.e. a comprehensive boycott on that particular 
'commodity', designed to eliminate the introduction of any new supplies of that 
commodity into the designated area or to the designated target). The economic analysis 
is not appropriate in all cases because not all arms embargoes are based on compliance 
with a demand of the Council. In those where it may be, the basic rationale is that the 
'cost' to the target of non-compliance with the demands, must be greater than the cost of 
compliance. Economic sanctions are designed to pressurise the target into undertaking 
a 'cost-benefit' analysis of non-compliance and choosing compliance. Thus only two 
options are intended to be available: either compliance (which would lead to the 
termination of measures when compliance was the primary objective), or non-
compliance (which would mean sufferance of an economic hardship directly related to 
the theoretically now scarce commodity)."**^ 
2.2.3. Problems for the economic theory of 'sanctions' 
2.2.3.1. The availability of a third option when the restricted 
commodities are weapons 
As arms embargoes have never been fully enforced on the ground'*' some of the trade 
restrictions may have instead served to strengthen the minimal control certain parties to 
the conflict had over a particular resource.'*^ While there is trade in armaments there 
will always be more than two options for a target. A third may be the option to invest 
more effort and more resources (monetary or otherwise) into acquiring the prohibited 
This type of sanction also assumes that the target currently has a monopoly over the commodity in 
question, so by taking it away it is isolated or boycotted because it cannot get new supplies from 
anywhere in its own jurisdiction. When used to target a state that is fighting a civil war against, e.g. 
an armed opposition group (AOG) in its territory, it is clear that the target state does not have 
ultimate control over the armaments within its territory. If it did, there would be no armed conflict. 
When used to target a non-state entity, it becomes nonsensical, because the non-state entity, 
precisely because of its 'not-a-state' status, will not have a monopoly over all of a particular 
commodity within the territory. Although some commodities could be argued to be within the 
control of a non-state entity due to physical location of the commodity, such as the RUF's control of 
certain areas of Sierra Leone where natural resources were available, such as the diamond fields, or 
Taylor's control of forests for the exploitation of timber in Liberia. In addition, sometimes the state 
structure would be so badly damaged by the conflict that the idea of any individual entity, state 
based or otherwise, having a monopoly over any specific commodity is absurd. 
See below. Chapter Five on practical enforcement issues. 
If no single entity is in control of the 'state' (as evident in Liberia, Somalia...) then the scarcity of 
some resources may only affect the already weakest parties. 
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commodity from illicit sources .Arms embargoes could be doing more harm than 
good by inadvertently fuelling the illicit trade."*"* As a commodity, it is still a case of 
supply and demand, so arms embargoes can cause suffering to the civilian population 
because of the diversion the natural resources of the territory into the illicit market, to 
ensure a seamless flow of weapons continues to reach those in control of the resources. 
These last two points may indicate that the costs endured by the obligation addressees of 
the arms embargoes, and by areas in which the UN is attempting to make progress may 
be disproportionate to the 'cost' expected to be forced onto the target. 
2.2.3.2. Artificial compliance 
The economic sanction theory of arms embargoes, where they are used as incentives or 
punitive measures (depending on their terms), plays a short-term game to negotiate for 
the short-term goal of compliance. This method does nothing to ensure future lapses 
back into the situation threatening international peace which evoked the attention of the 
Council in the first place. It may be assumed that whatever is being demanded by the 
Council would automatically include resolution of the problem of the proliferation of 
conventional weapons, thus also paying due regard to the possibilities of preventing 
future conflict by having introduced some control over the tools with which conflicts 
are being fought. But rather than entering this diplomatic process, why not go straight 
to the source of the problem? That is, the events that have caught the Council's 
attention - the fighting and the insecurity arising therefrom. It would surely be easier to 
resolve conflict by controlling armaments (and thereby the target's power), rather than 
trying to coerce the individual will of a target state or entity."*^ By (perhaps 
inappropriate) analogy, take the task of reasoning with an infant for him or her to not 
"'^  Generally, when commodities are prohibited the restrictions are as against other states importing 
those goods from the targeted, so in the case of diamonds, timber and oil - natural resources of some 
states targeted by the Council, the embargo relates to imports. For arms embargoes, the restriction is 
for export - the destination rather than the origin is embargoed. And unless all of these measures are 
used concurrently, to ensure an economic effect, they will be ineffective as economic measures, 
which necessarily have 'coercive compliance' objectives. 
*^  See Brzoska at p. 126 in 'Statecraft' op.cit. 
"'^  See Nathan, L. op.cit. (Introduction note 22) at p.6: 'The assumption that internal pressure can 
induce the target party to abandon an unacceptable course of action underestimates the resolve of 
groups which believe that their freedom or survival is at stake and whose members are willing to kill 
and die for their cause. Indeed, coercive leverage that intensifies a party's insecurity is likely to 
make that party more rather than less intransigent.' 
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pick up an article dangerous to him or her: Is it better to negotiate with the child (who 
has neither the capacity nor will to appreciate your perspective) in an attempt to 
persuade that the article could cause harm, or to simply remove it from the child's 
reach? In an emergency situation, it is surely the latter. That is not to say negotiation 
has no role or value in situations of threats to IPS: in many ways this is the only method 
to try to gently bring a target back into an international forum, so that sustainable peace 
or resolution may be achieved. However, such genuinely diplomatic efforts are not 
compatible with the stigma of 'sanctions'. Coerced compliance can guarantee neither 
genuine nor future obedience. 
2.2.3.3. The logical purpose of arms embargoes 
The logical purpose of an arms embargo is to stop, or at the very least, reduce the 
numbers of new weapons entering the prohibited territory or being acquired by the 
targeted entity. Ultimately, this is to contain conflict by reducing its intensity thereby 
decreasing its negative effects."*^ But the achievement of this objective needs to be 
maintained until a pacific method of conflict resolution is in place. I f the embargo is 
lifted any earlier, there is no guarantee that the intensity of the conflict will not increase 
again, hence the threat to the peace subsists. The EU, an implementing institution for 
arms embargoes, segregates its information on 'arms embargoes' and 
'economic/financial sanctions' under its Common Foreign and Security Policy and it 
notes their purpose as being to 'stop the flow of arms and military equipment to conflict 
areas or to regimes that are likely to use them for internal repression or aggression 
against a foreign country.'''^ The House of Lords Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs (UK) describes arms embargoes as 'sanctions of a non-economic kind'.'*^ The 
Council itself has noted 'the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of arms 
embargoes as a means to diminish the availability of arms with which to pursue armed 
''^  Another possible (and implicit) purpose of conflict containment embargoes, is to prevent internal 
conflicts becoming international, by means of the external involvement of other states, even by the 
provision of weapons - See Scott, C. et at. A Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments 
concerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the United Nations Security Council's Arms 
Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994-1995) 16 Mich.JIL 1 at p.6. 
47 
48 
http://ec.europa.eu/extemal relations/cfsp/sanctions/index.htm#l (April-2007). 
At Chapter I , ^ 2, in the 2nd Report of Session 2006-07 The Impact of Economic Sanctions 
Volume I : Report (9 May 2007): 
Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldeconafhtm (May-2007) 
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conflicts."*^ 
2.2.3.4. Undermining the logical purpose 
The economic theory ignores the instrumental value of controlling the proliferation of 
weapons to situations that threaten or breach IPS. It might well be the case that some 
economic measures do have the effect desired in the view of the Sanctions Committees, 
which is to 'apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by 
the...Council without resorting to the use of force.'^" Even if such a result was accurate 
in terms of how enforcement measures function in law (i.e. the actual arms embargo),^' 
the role of an arms embargo measure in that process might be negligible. It would very 
difficult to measure the precise effect of each measure contained in a comprehensive 
sanctions package. So, for arms embargoes, more useful information might arise from 
their exclusive use."^ ^ The Sanctions Committee perspective, like many others, focuses 
on the 'sanction' aspect, thereby ignoring all of those arms embargo cases which do not 
operate as sanctions, but as pure enforcement measures. 
If compliance with a specific demand of the Council by the target is one or the only goal 
of an arms embargo, this undermines the value of arms control by condoning the 
resumption of unregulated arms trafficking once 'compliance' has been achieved. If, 
and only if, internal arms regulation was a requirement^^ embedded in the demands of 
which compliance was expected could this problem of being undermined be 
S/RES/1196 of 1998, preamble. 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ Note, the Committees relate the purposes quoted above to the 
'use of mandatory sanctions', yet when they introduce the overview of this area of the Council's 
work they refer to the 'enforcement measures' that can be taken to maintain or restore IPS, without 
once making the distinction that exists in law. 
'^ Which, as was argued earlier, is not. How these measures function in law is the ultimate 
consideration for the effectiveness of the collective security system and the involvement of the 
Council, because it is the legal function that makes the measures legally binding. 
In the seven 'standalone' cases, 64 % had a type B objective, 21 % had a type A objective and 
14% had a type D objective. Percentages are based on 'overall' use. (Compare the figures in bold 
parentheses in Table 6, Annex.) 7 cases, overall objectives: 4.5 = Type B; 1.5 = Type A; 1 = Type 
D. Individual objectives: 1 = A; 3 = B; 1 =A + B; 2 = B + D. 
Although this could be seen as a step too far into the realin of domestic jurisdiction. The Council 
has on other occasions U-ied to modify the behaviour of a regime with regard to other matters, such 
as democracy and human rights. 
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circumvented. Even then, the temptation to re-arm due to the resumed flow of weapons 
would be difficult to ignore, especially i f the target continued to feel insecure. Peace 
and security can only compete with its opponents by removing the actual weapons from 
their hands. This can be legifimately and practically achieved by the efficacious use of 
arms embargoes and properly monitored disarmament programmes.^'' I f compliance 
with an obligation is not the objective of the measure, then grouping these measures 
together with those which do have compliance as the goal will simply weaken the 
measures that have a compliance objecdve and make those without one, (i.e. arms 
control and peace promotion arms embargoes) entirely irrelevant from the perspective 
of their effectiveness."'"' 
The catch-all method in which arms embargoes are used weakens their enforcement 
because the Council negotiates by offering termination once other, sometimes 
completely separate goals, are achieved. Objectives are still unclear in these 
resolutions. They are often mixed, resulting in contradictions of purpose or the 
possibility of one goal being forgotten in the midst of any sign of compliance by a 
target. The lack of clarity in turn reduces motivation to implement and enforce the 
measures and makes the task of identifying when objectives have been achieved more 
difficult. 
2.2.3.5. More suitable sanctions alternatives to compel compliance? 
There are many other measures which could be used more effectively to compel 
compliance without undermining the intuitive purpose of arms embargoes. These could 
*^ By creating a database, an official from one of the UN's Panels of Experts to an arms embargo 
was able to show that some weapons handed in by ex-combatant rebels through a disarmament 
programme, were redistributed ('legitimately') among government forces only to be handed in a 
second time by rebels. (Personal correspondence). 
Take the case of Iraq and especially S/RES/687. Here the objectives appear to change from the 
punitive objective as seen in the original resolution (S/RES/661) to the combined objectives of 
bargaining, arms control and peace promotion. The latter two of these objectives are long-term 
prospects, and a formal ceasefire does nothing to constrict the pursuit of 'balanced and 
comprehensive control of armaments in the region'. However, the bargaining objective clearly 
triumphs over the other objectives, because it is stated, within the operative paragraphs, that there is 
a way for measures to be terminated. From a culmination of other resolutions, the way for this to be 
done, was by the Government of Iraq making changes to its policies and practices (involving as it 
did at the time, policies which threatened IPS, such as threats to use prohibited chemical and 
biological weapons...). 
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be travel bans, targeted financial measures, aviation bans or on commodities likely to 
have an impact on the target economy. Indeed, Article 5 permits the suspension of the 
exercise of the rights and privileges of a Member against which preventative or 
enforcement action has been taken. Given the existence of available alternatives, why 
are arms embargoes being used in a way that permits their logical purpose to be 
undermined in some cases? The main reason fathomed is that it means a minor arms 
control effort can be undertaken at the same time as utilising the collective security 
system to deal with threats to the peace. It might also be because the impact on the 
civilians is deemed to be low. However, the underlying purpose of measures which 
primarily aim to coerce compliance is political, not practical, and is for the benefit of 
the international status quo between UN member states, rather than helping to end 
conflict for the benefit of the civilians and ultimately preventing future conflict. 
2.2.4. 'Smart sanctions' 
Arms embargo exemptions'^ can allow for the shipment of non-lethal military 
equipment for humanitarian and protective use and protective clothing required by the 
UN, journalists and aid workers (such as flak jackets, to take one example). It may also 
allow for arms and other military supplies solely for the use of protection and 
peacekeeping forces to enter the embargoed destinations. The use of exemptions has 
increased since concerns were noted over the extent of indiscriminate negative effects 
from the use of enforcement measures in comprehensive sanctions regimes. 
Thus, the popular term 'smart' or 'targeted' sanctions arose, where more use was made 
of specific measures which intended to affect the target of the measure rather than the 
civilian population connected with the targeted territory. Arguments have since arisen, 
that through this smarter method, 'sanctions' are becoming more effective. But in terms 
of legal success for arms embargoes, nothing has necessarily changed. What is required 
for legal success is effective implementation and enforcement by member states. What 
has changed is that the civilian population might not be suffering as severely as was the 
case during comprehensive regimes. However this, although positive change, is not 
tantamount to asserting the existence of effective measures. In all probability, these 
See tables 4 and 6 (Annex). 
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measures are more likely to be ineffective as 'sanctions', purely because the 'boycott' 
effect wanes as the level of specificity of measures increases. Cortright notes that 
measures which are imposed rapidly using immediate comprehensive action are more 
effective than measures which are imposed incrementally, with a gradual, slow and 
flexible process involved.Moreover, whenever an arms embargo has an exemption, 
an extra risk of diversion into the illicit market is created for all legitimately-imported 
weapons. 
3. Alternative legal bases for mandatory arms embargoes: Article 40? 
Although Article 41 appears to be the correct basis upon which to base arms embargoes, 
the economic and sanctions categories under which they are perceived compels the 
question; are there any other legal bases available which could be more suitable than 
Article 41? It is not disputed that Chapter V I I is the appropriate section for the 
imposition of mandatory measures, and the Council's practice in citing Chapter V I I is 
testament to this. Arms embargoes are inherently non-forcible,^** and so Article 42 
would not be an appropriate basis. The only other provision in Chapter V I I capable of 
imposing binding measures is Article 40. Although Article 40 measures can be seen as 
being only recommendatory in nature, the test of whether the Council intended to 
produce binding effects will depend upon the character of the terminology used and the 
context for use."^ ^ States have commented on the binding nature of provisional 
measures, for example in relation to Iraq, when Article 40 was explicitly invoked.^'' 
3.1. Arguments in support of Article 40 
'The imposition of an embargo on the supply of arms seems to have become a common 
preliminary step in the Security Council's dealing with civil war situations and 
'Sanctions Decade' op.cit. (Introduction note 16) at p.26. 
Although they may require forcible measures or additional (but different) non-forcible measures 
(i.e. those that can more appropriately be labelled 'sanctions', such as travel bans and targeted 
financial measures) to supplement enforcement, as implementation alone (based upon the norm of 
Article 25) may not be sufficient to motivate the political will needed for enforcement. 
See 'Provisional Measures' op.cit. note 28 at p.299. 
^ See Provisional Verbatim Meeting Record: S/PV.2933 regarding S/RES/660 of 1990. 
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situations involving a serious humanitarian crisis. .61 
Given the ubiquitous nature of arms embargoes vis-a-vis the Council's agenda, and the 
Council's relatively recent willingness to take additional Chapter V I I measures in 
support of them, arms embargoes do appear to be developing a character similar to that 
of preliminary or provisional measures. I f they were seen as having simply conflict-
containment objectives, their purpose would be to begin to reduce the intensity of the 
violence in an armed conflict or post-conflict situation.^^ They aim to and would, in 
fact,^ '^  prevent a physical aggravation of the situation. Moreover, it would be logical to 
impose an arms embargo at the same time as calling for a ceasefire, (the latter has been 
done under Article 40^ "*), thus assisting the likelihood of a ceasefire coming into 
operation. Arms embargoes are inherently preventative in nature; however, this does 
not categorically place them under Article 40 as Article 41 measures may also be 
preventative. If arms embargoes require additional forcible measures to ensure their 
enforcement, would this remove them from the scope of Article 41 due to the expressly 
exclusion of measures involving the use of armed force? 
3.2. Arguments in opposition 
Arms embargoes have been both short and long-term in duration; to date, the longest 
running case with the original target addressee unchanged (Somalia) shows (15 years 
old as of 23 January 2007) that arms embargoes can be seemingly open-ended. The 
shortest duration for an arms embargo (excluding cases where measures were renewed) 
was the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, at exactly one year. While one year could be 
accepted as a provisional period, 15 surely cannot. In addition, the sole objectives have 
not been for conflict containment (i.e. preventative methods) alone, even in the 
standalone arms embargo cases. There is a clear need to maintain a lower level of 
violence (by continuing to halt the flow of new weapons) until a peaceful settlement is 
^' 'Interpretation' op.cit. (Chapter Two note 54) at p.71. 
Where, on occasion, hostilities break out again, as was the case in the DRC. 
''^  The factual evidence of this assumes that effective implementation and enforcement took place. 
However, it is suggested that arms embargoes would be more effective in achieving this goal, 
considering its simplicity and clarity relative to the layering that is evident at present. 
^ See the examples given in 'Provisional Measures' op.cit. at p.291. 
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reached, and this would require the arms embargoes to be capable of having long-term 
duration. I f this is not possible under Article 40, then Article 41 becomes the only 
alternative. 
There does appear to be a general acceptance^^ that Article 41 is the sole legal basis of 
arms embargoes, irrespective of any attributes which appear inappropriate, but reasons 
as to why they could not be provisional measures are not as forthcoming. Kooijmans 
remarks that Combacau's^^ argument that an arms embargo directed against one of the 
parties to a conflict would be prejudicial to the rights of that party and therefore 
incompatible with Article 40, is too simplistic. In addition to the prejudicial nature of a 
one-sided mandatory arms embargo, Kooijmans explains that such a measure 'is usually 
seen as the first stage of a sanction and sanctions belong to the domain of Article 41 and 
42. He later maintains that '[a] mandatory arms embargo, even i f is directed against all 
parties, must be seen not so much as a measure taken in order not to aggravate the 
situation but as a measure to give effect to the Council's decisions, which is the 
terminology of Article 41 ' for the same reason given above. It would appear that no 
argument is offered as to why arms embargoes cannot be provisional measures; the 
offering is simply that arms embargoes are more suited to Article 41. It does not 
necessarily follow that simply because a measure 'is usually seen as the first stage of a 
sanction' that it must therefore belong solely to that realm. This could be interpreted to 
be an argument in favour of the legal basis of arms embargoes being Article 40, because 
there is nothing to stop any other type of Article 40 measure being the first stage of a 
'sanction'. Indeed, account shall be taken of a failure to comply with provisional 
E.g. In the UK, Section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946 (c.45) reads: Tf, under Article forty-
one...the...Counc\\...call[s] upon His [sic] Majesty's Government...to apply any measures to give 
effect to any decision of that Council...'. 
In addition, Secretary General Ban has recently stated 'The legal basis for sanctions is contained in 
Article 41 of Chapter VII of the...Charter' (Speech to the Symposium on Enhancing the 
Implementation of Security Council Sanctions ('SG Sanctions Speech') - 30 April 2007, available at: 
http://www.un.Org/News/Press/docs//2007/sgsml0968.doc.htm (April 2007)), even though the 
Council continues to refer only to Chapter VII without being specific as to the relevant Article. 
Furthermore, see, Repertoire: Eleventh Supplement (1989-1992)-Chapter XI , especially at p.32 et 
seq. of part 3. 
^ 'Provisional Measures' op.cit. at 296; Combacau, J. Le Pouvoir de Sanction de I'O.N.U. (1974) 
Paris: Pedone at p. 167. 
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measures, and so Article 40 measures can be (but do not need to be) precursors to 
measures under Articles 41 or 42. 
Kooijmans further states: 
'[a]n appeal to all States not to provide the parties to the dispute with 
weapons may be a provisional measure under Article 40 i f the other 
conditions for its applicability are met...such appeals are non-prejudicial to 
the rights of the parties and are certainly helpful for the prevention of an 
aggravation to the situation'.^'' 
It must next be asked, what are the other necessary conditions for Article 40? 
Kooijmans implies that provisional measures must respect the non-intervention 
68 
principle. The travaia preparatoires indicate that provisional measures were not 
intended to be classified as enforcement measures,^ ^ which would have the effect of 
removing them from the realm of collective action that may supersede the 'non-
intervention' principle in Article 2(7). The reasons for this are not clear. Is it because 
they might not invoke Article 48(1) because there is no decision to carry out? The 
Council may only 'call upon the parties concerned' to comply with the measures; 
however, i f it is accepted that Article 40 measures can be binding. Article 48(1) will be 
invoked and thus it can be labelled an enforcement measure. In addition, the 
interpretation of 'enforcement measures' to mean 'measures taken to enforce the peace 
once threatened ' could include Article 40 measures, because all of the Council's 
powers are granted for the discharge of its duties relating to the maintenance of IPS. If 
these arguments are not accepted, there are alternative approaches. 
Conforti, (who disagrees^^ with the view that it is the Article 39 determination that gives 
binding quality to actions of the Council), notes that cases where enforcement measures 
are used or 'which in turn lead to enforcement measures being adopted' are exempt 
'Provisional Measures' op.cit. at p.296 
Ibid, at p.297. See also Tadic op.c/Y.(Chapter Two note 91) at 33. 
See, 'UNCIO vol. XIP op.cit. at Section D, p, 505. (p.4 of original documenO heading: 
'provisional measures preliminary to enforcement measures' and at p.507 (p.6 of original docuinenO 
it refers to 'the enforcement or provisional measures'. (My emphasis). 
Conforti, B. The Law and Practice of the United Nations Second Edition (2000) Kluwer Law 
International at p. 183. 
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from the domestic jurisdiction principle.^' Such a possibility of enforcement measures 
being taken in the future is expressly provided for in Article 40, and so if this is the 
correct basis for exemption from the main principle in Article 2(7), the Council would 
be permitted to take provisional measures in respect of any situation, whether internal or 
external to a state. In addition, '...when a situation is designated a threat to the peace it 
is inevitably taken out of the domestic realm and put into the international sphere. Any 
action within Chapter VI I , whether enforcement or not, is not limited by Article 2(7).'^^ 
Arangio-Ruiz notes that '...the implementation of provisional measures whether merely 
recommended or bindingly decided upon by the Council is generally understood to be 
entrusted to the parties themselves...'.^^ If this were the case for arms embargoes, they 
would likely never be implemented. Indeed, while used under the label 'sanction', arms 
embargoes, whether voluntary or mandatory, carry a certain stigma. However, as 
Kooijmans notes, the 'parties concerned' appears to be addressing 'not only the parties 
to the dispute, but also any other international actors...instrumental in [achieving the 
prevention of an aggravation of the situation].'^'* 
There are some benefits that would arise from arms embargoes being legally based in 
Article 40 that do not exist under Article 41: First, the generalisation of the 'sanctions 
realm' and the related economic issues would be removed; and second, the culture of 
prevention would be reinforced. Moreover, it would not in any way affect the Council's 
ability to take other enforcement measures under Article 41 to compel compliance. 
3.3. Chapter VI and a half? 
In conclusion on this point, the main problem would appear to be the longevity of the 
current arms embargoes, which simply does not correlate to very nature of provisional 
measures and so practice would appear unable to endorse this legal basis. It could be 
that arms embargoes are one of the 'mechanisms which evade a classification in terms 
Ibid, at p. 159. 
'Keeping the Peace' op.cit. (Chapter Two note 52) at p.57. 
'Law-Making' op.cit. at p.648/9. 
'Provisional Measures' op.cit. atp.295. 
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of the Charter provisions'7^ Nevertheless, because of their capacity for prevention of 
threats to peace (by assisting disarmament efforts) as well as emergency reactions to it 
(conflict containment), arms embargoes would appear to sit comfortably between 
Chapters V I and V I I . In law, this is not an acceptable conclusion, however, arms 
embargoes are an enforcement measure with great potential (under the objectives of 
arms control and peace promotion and i f used effectively) to reduce the urgency of the 
situation, which would allow recourse to Chapter V I to arise once again. Chapter V I is 
important at the first stage of a dispute where the Council's involvement is designed to 
be limited to making calls for pacific settlement without suggesting any content for that 
settlement;''^ the control remains in the hands of the disputing parties, as shown in 
Article 33. Chapter V I I is the collective security mechanism which can be triggered by 
the failure of parties to resolve the dispute by peaceful means, and thereby puts the 
control into the hands of the UN. 
4. Conclusion 
The main problem demonstrated in this chapter is that arms embargoes operate in a 
different way and for different reasons to that which is perceived as being uniformly 
applicable to all enforcement measures. The 'sanctions' label is a misnomer, not least 
because the primary notion of a sanction relates to its punitive character (rather than an 
encouraging form of coercion), but because the basic legal interpretation of enforcement 
measures has been overshadowed by political expediency. Arms embargoes have value 
as measures taken to maintain or restore IPS that is independent of whether the 
behaviour of the target or entities fighting in the designated territory is modified or 
remains as it was. I f arms embargoes were truly effective, the choice to continue 
fighting at the levels of intensity permitted by the use of conventional armaments, 
especially SALW, would be taken out of the hands of the combatants and their leaders 
and put under the control of the rest of the international community via collective 
security. An arms embargo has the potential to actually force a change in behaviour and 
" Ibid, at p.298. 
Hilderbrand, R.C. Dumbarton Oaks - The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for 
Postwar Security (1990) University of North Carolina Press at p. 136. 
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the intensity of violence because i f the tools necessary to fight at that level are removed 
or reduced, the entities will become incapacitated and physically unable to continue 
their previous threatening behaviour. Whether such incapacitation could give rise to a 
legal reason not to use arms embargoes will be discussed in the following chapter, in 
addition to considerations regarding other areas of international law affected by the use 
of arms embargoes. 
C H A P T E R F I V E 
OTHER ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISING FROM THE USE OF 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ARMS EMBARGOES 
1. Addressees 
1.1. International legal personality 
A basic (but rebuttable) presumption with regard to the actions of the Council is that the 
Council may only impose legally binding international obligations upon entities that 
possess a measure of international legal personality. International legal personality 
could be described as the possession of rights and duties under international law by an 
entity. Traditionally this corresponds to the notion of being a 'subject' of international 
law.' The broad recognition by states, of a particular entity's status as a subject 
possessing international legal personality, can be important in confirming that status for 
practical effect,^ but this is not uniformly applicable in all cases.^  When the Charter 
was written, the only entities thought to possess international legal personality were 
states. Indeed, the concept of non-state entity involvement in the international 
community to the degree evident today was unlikely to have been contemplated at the 
time.'* The existence of the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials after the Second World War, 
and more recently, the ICTY,^ ICTR and ICC have all shown that individuals can bear 
' See, e.g. Lauterpacht, H. International Law Collected Papers, Vol.11 (1975) CUP at p.489; and for 
rejection of the notions of 'subjects' and 'objects' see 'Problems and Process' op.cit. (Chapter One 
note 96) at p.49. 
^ See, e.g. the OA's grant of observer status to the PLO - A/RES/3237 (XXIX) 
22 November 1974 and participation in international conferences being a result of recognition by 
regional groups - A / R E S / 3247 (XXIX) - 'International Law' op.cit (Chapter One note 54) at p.220 
^ Noortman, M. Non State Actors in International Law ('NSAs') in Arts, B., Noortman, M., 
Reinalda, B. (eds.) Non-State Actors in International Relations (2001) Ashgate pp.59-76 at p. 69 
regarding the finding of legal personality of insurrection movements inespective of such 
recognition. 
'^  Note, however Higgins' point {Ibid, note 1) that 16* and 17* Century scholars such as Plutarch and 
Grotius respectively, 'effectively acicnowledged [and refined the idea] that non-state entities had 
internationally recognized legal rights.' In addition, see Alston, P. (ed.) Non-State Actors and 
Human Rights (2005) OOP. 
^ The case of Tadic (Trial Chamber II, Judgment of 7 May 1997) has shown that Council is 
permitted to act in a way that affects individuals: 'The International Tribunal...has the competence 
to exercise the authority granted to it by the Security Council to make findings in this case regarding 
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responsibilities under international criminal law and that non-state entities (including 
individuals) hold duties under international law in certain circumstances such as the 
obligations in DHL applicable during armed conflict. It is clear that individuals possess 
rights under international law; however these are vertical rights, in that they must be 
enforced via the internal law of each state and cannot be relied upon directly.^ 
In certain states, such as Somalia, the branches of government have been so severely 
eroded by the internal conflict that it does not function as a state otherwise would. 
Despite this, Somalia's international legal personality remains intact. As Thiirer 
explains; '[T]he "failed State" is one which, though retaining legal capacity, has for all 
practical purposes lost the ability to exercise it...there is no body which can commit the 
State in an effective and legally binding way, for example, by concluding an 
agreement.'^ It is suggested that this applies only to agreements within the scope of the 
VCLT, and so agreements under Article 3 VCLT may still be practically possible to 
conclude. Peace agreements^ fall under Article 3 VCLT and the non-state party to an 
international agreement of this type obtains international legal personality within the 
framework of the agreement.'' The quality of permanence of legal personality appears 
to be applicable only to states. It has been argued that in the situation of a non-state 
entity acquiring personality via an internationalised peace-agreement, that personality 
exists only until the agreement has been implemented, but that also thereafter, they can 
be 'held accountable under international law in instances of non-compliance.So, for 
most purposes, they do not retain the international legal personality afforded to them by 
the guilt of the accused, whether as a principal or an accessory or otherwise as a participant.' at 
1669. 
^ See, e.g. Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ (1945): Only States may be parties in cases before 
the Court. 
^ ThUrer, D. The "Failed State" and international law (1999) 81 (836) I R R C 731 under section I. 
Description of the phenomenon - http://www.icrc.orgAVeb/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmiy57JO6U (October-
2006) 
* 'Peace agreements resemble internationalized contracts in the use of international law as a basis for 
a legal order that is "neutral" as between the parties...[h]owever...the use of international law is 
driven...by the need to take processes of domestic legal reform outside their normal channels so as 
to address the illegitimacy of the preagreement legal and political order.' - Bell, C . Peace 
Agreements: Their nature and legal status (2006) 100 AJIL 373 at p.406. 
' 'NSAs' op.cit. note 3 at p.69. 
'Non-State Entities' op.cit. (Chapter Three note 33) at p.339. 
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the agreement. 
1.2. Obligation addressees 
As noted earlier, in practice, 'all states' are the sole addressees of the obligations to 
implement arms embargoes decided upon by the Council. Any entity within the 
jurisdiction of an implementing Member state will be an indirect addressee of the arms 
embargo, but the extent of their obligations will be determined by the internal law 
particular to that state. International organisations have been called upon to 'act strictly 
in accordance' with the measures," however this does not form a legal obligation and 
the Council has never addressed such entities in a way that could be interpreted as 
legally binding. The term 'all states' includes non-Member states but from where does 
the direct obligation arise given the fact non-Member states are not party to the Charter 
and therefore unlike Member states, have not provided their consent and so cannot be 
bound? It has been argued'^ that Article 2(6) 'creates binding obligations' on non-
Member states; however no obligations can arise under the treaty itself except for states 
parties. Schrijver refers to this problem as a 'bone of contenfion' which remains and 
notes the Swiss declaration regarding the Second Gulf War that although it would 
implement the sanctionsagainst Iraq, it was not legally required to do so."* However, 
it is feasible that a customary law has developed to the effect that in matters relating to 
the maintenance of IPS, non-Member states are required to act in accordance with 
Council decisions. In any case, this issue is not of great practical concern today due to 
the large number of UN Member states'^  and because the most significant non-Member 
state became one in 2002.^^ 
" See e.g. f l of S/RES/748; f9 of S/RES/841; 120 of S/RES/864; fl5 of S/RES/918; %l 1 of 1132; 
f\0 of S/RES/1160; f9 of S/RES/1298; ^17 of S/RES/1333. In addition, at |21 of S/RES/1343, 
States were called upon to 'take appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in 
their jurisdiction... act in conformity with United Nations embargoes.' 
See 'International Law' op.cit. at p.835 and references to Kelsen and McNair therein. 
'^S/RES/661. 
'Economic Sanctions' op.cit. at p. 147-8 and note 51 therein. 
192 Member states as of 28 June 2006. 
Switzerland - S/RES/1426 of 2002. 
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1.3. Target addressees 
When Chapter V I I is invoked by the Council, the question of international legal 
personality becomes important with regard to non-state entities targeted by the Council 
because their international legal personality is questionable. International obligations 
(rather than mere relations) arise from Council action, the roots of which are found in 
the Charter.'^ As non-state entities cannot accede to the Charter, what is the Council's 
legal basis for imposing obligations (default on which would give rise to enforcement 
measures) upon such entities? Could this be an explanation for the absence of specific 
articles when imposing measures? Does Chapter V I I give the Council a 'free rein' to 
take measures 'against any entity which it considers to be an obstructive factor in the 
restoration of peace' as could be implied from Kooijmans' writing?'^ Even if legal 
personality is found, what is the source of the Council's power to take measures against 
non-signatories? Is Article 41 part of CIL and if it is, is it applicable to all or no non-
state entities, or only those with international legal personality? 
1.3.1. Problems with regard to a lack of international legal personality 
I f an entity lacked international legal personality, it would appear incorrect to impose 
obligations upon it under international law and then reprimand them for non-
compliance. The basic problem here is the disadvantaged position of non-state entities 
relative to states, vis-a-vis the Council. For example, unlike states, these entities cannot 
lawfully (albeit under certain circumstances)'^ take countermeasures against an 
internationally wrongful act of a state. Representation at the UN remains the 
prerogative of states.^ '' The Charter provides for the participation and representation of 
a 'specially affected'^' state in the discussion of enforcement measures, although no 
Although in general international law and perhaps customary international law, principles have 
changed in order to acknowledge the different types of actors, the source of these obligations is not 
the Charter. The Charter is only applicable to the states that have ratified it. That is a basic rule of 
treaty law, which combines with the pacta sunt servanda principle to show that treaties must be 
performed in good faith by parties that have consented. 
'Non-State Entities' op.cit. at p.339 
See Article 22 of the E .C' s draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
-° Article 4(1). 
'^ Article 31. Article 32 also creates provision for non-Member states' participation. See also Rule 
37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. 
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right to vote on any such measures is afforded by virtue of interest alone.^ ^ 
The precautionary measure contained in Article 50 applies to states alone, whether they 
are members of the UN or not. It does not give any rights to non state entities that 
suffer special economic problems as a result of the implementation of Council 
enforcement measures. The wording of Article 50 shows that non-MS are assumed to 
have obligations under the Charter - or at the very least, that they are bound to abide by 
Council decisions. As this is written into the constitutive document of the UN, it is 
impossible to say that the Charter codified a pre-existing customary international law 
that the decisions of the Council must be carried out by all entities, as the Council did 
not even exist beforehand. However, it is possible for a concurrent customary law to 
emerge, but this would only take account of the practice of states. 
UN Secretary-General Ban has recently said that 'great difficulty has been encountered 
in exerting leverage on non-State actors.'^^ Perhaps part of the reason for this could be 
the lack of clarity over the status of such actors in international law. 
The acquiescence of states may be important in justifying the Council's targeting of 
non-state entities because they tend not to object to such measures being taken. If they 
did have any objections, states have recourse to the fora available at the UN. However, 
the only forum available to non-state entities, not permitted as observers to the UN, 
would be through the territorial state in which it is based. If the entity is engaged in an 
internal conflict, the state power will not be an appropriate vehicle for contesting the 
measures. 
As noted earlier, not all arms embargoes require an identifiable target entity, however, 
the Council has targeted non-state entities on a number of occasions. In connection 
with arms embargoes, there are two ways Council action can directly affect non-state 
entities (including individuals). The first is when such entities are explicitly targeted by 
Only membership on the Council (whether temporary or permanent) creates eligibility to vote 
(Article 27), and so only if that interested state happens to be sitting as member of the Council at the 
relevant time, is it entitled to vote. Rwanda (1994) is an example of when measures were imposed 
on a serving member of the Council. 
'SO Sanctions Speech' op.cit. (Chapter Four note 65). 
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the Council where arms embargoes are used as 'sanctions' to coerce compliance by 
bargaining or punishment. The second is when Sanctions Committees create 
'blacklists' of entities against which certain supplementary measures (excluding arms 
embargoes '^') are directed to be taken, for the purpose of punishing a violation of the 
arms embargo. 
1.3.2. Problems with ascertaining the international legal personality of a 
non-state entity. 
1.3.2.1. Explicit targeting 
There have been five cases^ ^ where demands were made of non-state entities in cases 
where arms embargoes were used as sanctions against non-state targets. In the first 
case, UNITA was again^^ directed to establish a ceasefire and to agree on the 
implementation of the peace agreement. UNITA's failure to comply instigated the 
imposition of an arms embargo and other enforcement measures. This case has been 
explained by UNITA acquiring a measure of international legal personality by virtue of 
the peace agreement to which it was designated as a party. The agreement was not 
apparently 'internationalised' during negotiation, but only when confirmed in the 
Lusaka Protocol of 1994.^ ^ However, the Council acted against UNITA before this 
point, so did it act against an entity that did not possess any international legal 
personality? 
It has been argued that in the absence of recognition via internationalised agreements or 
through IHL, rebel movements can 'acquire partial international legal personality only 
through the SC measures'.^ ** However, it has also been argued that '[enforcement] 
measures do not in themselves have the effect of giving international personality to the 
It is highly unlikely that the Council would impose an arms embargo as a 'sanction' for the 
violation of a separate measure, such as a travel ban or a targeted financial measure. 
S/RES/864 (UNITA); S/RES/1132 and 1171 - non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone; 
S/RES/1333 and 1390 - Taliban and associated entities. Note S/RES/1390 is the only case where an 
individual (Usama bin Laden) has been named in a Council resolution. 
The cessation of hostilities had been previously demanded in 13 of S/RES/785; and in particular, 
regarding a ceasefire, for 'offensive troop movements' to stop (14 of S/RES/793). 
" 'Non-State Entities' op.cit. at p.338. 
28 
Frowein/Krisch in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.716. 
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target.' It could be argued that, when peace agreements are involved, the Council 
deals directly with the state alone, thereby not exceeding its mandate under Chapter V I . 
However Chapter V I I is the relevant realm for the cases in point. The non-intervention 
principle is superseded, but does this give the Council the right to assert its control over 
entities and individuals within a state? Article 104""^  might support such a finding. 
If the Council was pressed to give the foundation of its right to target UNITA, it could 
be found in paragraph 13 of S/RES/864 where the Council condemned UNITA's attacks 
on UN Personnel and reaffirmed that such attacks 'are clear violations of [IHL]. ' Thus, 
UNITA's international legal personality would arise through its position under IHL and 
not the peace agreement. According to Zegveld,^' the limited personality that arises 
from IHL for armed opposition groups can be objectively ascertained through the legal 
instruments pertaining to M L , such as the Geneva Conventions and also by the fact of 
being a party to an armed conflict. Thus, in almost all of the arms embargo cases, it 
would seem the Council does have a basis for deciding to act against non-state entities 
engaged in the armed conflict. 
The second and third cases can be considered simultaneously. In Sierra Leone, 
demands were made of the non-govemmental forces (i.e. the military junta and the 
RUF) to 'relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the 
democratically elected Government' and to disarm and demobilise. Their failure to 
comply was connected to the continuation of the measures. Again, the likely 
explanation for the targeting of non-state entities in Sierra Leone, is that the armed 
groups acquired a measure of personality through IHL. However, in this mixed 
international/internal armed conflict the full range of IHL may not apply, so it should be 
questioned; did the demands made of the forces correspond to what they were obligated 
to do under international law? If their personality is limited to their role in an armed 
conflict, are their obligations under international law also limited to the same field? 
'Non-State Entities' op.cit. at 339. 
"^ 'The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.' 
" Zegveld, L . Amed Opposition Groups in International Law: The Quest for Accountability PhD 
Thesis (2000) at p.212 as cited in 'NSAs' op.cit. at p. 67. 
International Law, Arms Embargoes and the United Nations Security Council 122 
Could it be that once personality is acquired, irrespective of limitations thereto, an entity 
can be obligated to the ful l extent of international law? 
The fourth and fifth cases can also be considered simultaneously. The primary 
demands^^ were that the Taliban: cease the provision of sanctuary and training for 
international terrorists and their organisations; turn over Usama bin Laden to 
appropriate authorities to facilitate his arrest and trial; and close all terrorist training 
camps in the territory under its control. The Taliban continues to disregard these 
demands, but from where does its legal obligation (which would justify the measures as 
sanctions) to do otherwise originate? The options of acquiring international legal 
personality via peace agreements or DHL are not applicable here, based upon the 
classifications used earlier. The Taliban was in control of most of Afghanistan, but 
received little diplomatic recognition, but was probably nevertheless considered to have 
a measure of international legal personality. Has the status of its international legal 
personality changed now that it no longer has the same degree of control? 
1.3.2.2. No personality, no problem? 
Could the Council justify its assertion of power over the non-governmental forces in 
Sierra Leone by virtue of the consent of the state in which it was acting, without 
considerations of the existence of personality? This consent could be seen as a 
temporary relinquishment of sovereignty by Sierra Leone, where the UN acts as a 
guardian of the state's power in order to regain control of the territory which had been 
legitimately elected by the population. However, this is more akin to the operation of 
transitional governments where state structures have collapsed, which was not the case 
in Sierra Leone. The official powers in Angola and Sierra Leone retained some control 
over the imports of weapons when UNITA and the RUF were targeted, which if 
followed, may in future suggest that consent is part of the mechanism involved in 
targeting non-state entities that are not connected with terrorism. 
The Council's legal power to act against any entity, whether state, individual or non-
state actor, might simply stem from the power to take action for the maintenance of IPS. 
-^ Contained in: fU S/RES/1214 of 1998, f2 S/RES/1267 of 1999 and fl-3 of S/RES/1333 of 2000. 
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This argument could be accepted in respect of arms embargoes which target non-state 
entities, i f they were understood to be pure enforcement measures and not 'sanctions'. 
What could be happening is that ultimately, arms embargoes are imposed in pursuit of 
IPS and that the 'demands' the Council makes of non-state entities are not equivalent to 
the imposition of international legal obligations via Article 41, as would be the case 
when demands are made of targeted states. This would mean that UNITA, the RUF and 
former military junta in Sierra Leone and the Taliban and its associates are not legally 
bound to comply with the decisions of the Council in the absence of international legal 
personality. But the Council may nevertheless impose enforcement measures, in view 
of the threat to the peace. If it was concluded that these entities do not have 
international legal personality, then the use of sanctions terminology, 'grace periods' 
and 'sunset clauses' only serve to confuse the objectives of the measures and therefore 
make their success difficult to measure. Perhaps more importantly, from a procedural 
perspective, it might become more difficult to decide when to terminate such measures. 
Usually, the 'sunset clauses' indicate that compliance is the route to termination. This 
method could be used when compliance is not a legal obligation, but simply a political 
incentive. The Council's use of the term 'demand' is ambiguous and so it could be that 
the Council does not interpret these demands as being legally binding obligations. 
1.3.2.3. Blacklisting 
Blacklisting has been used in the cases of the Taliban, the DRC and Cote d'lvoire. 
Fundamentally, the same considerations as discussed above are applicable here, and the 
consideration is whether or not the Council (through its Sanctions Committees) can 
target individuals and punish them for violating an obligation which they only owe to 
their respective (implementing) Member state and not the UN itself It is suggested that 
this problem is not greatly significant because it can be explained as simply facilitating 
enforcement and thereby assisting states in their efforts to apprehend and punish such 
violators. The more important problem arising from blacklisting is the actual operation 
of the lists and potential violation of the human rights of those listed. This is of more 
concern when enforcement measures like travel bans and targeted financial measures 
are used, however, because such measures have been threatened as a means of 
punishing violations of arms embargoes, consideration of these points is still desirable 
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here. 
2. Primacy revisited 
The fundamental point with regard to any of the problems outlined below is that unless 
a particular right embodies a jus cogens norm, the decisions of the Council under 
Chapter V I I will override that right, by virtue of Articles 103^ ^ and 105(1).^'' The 
Council's powers sit at the top of the international obligations hierarchy.^^ Article 103 
does not appear prima facie, to affect customary law obligations, and, in any case, the 
customary rules which would be relevant to the points raised in relation to enforcement 
measures, do not yet exist.^^ However, in the hierarchy of sources of international law, 
treaties are usually seen to be positioned above CIL due to the explicit consent involved 
and so it could be argued that i f treaties are subject to Article 103 (and treaties are a 
more powerful source of international obligation) it must also be the case for CIL. 
States may not invoke internal obligations"^^ as an excuse for failing to implement a 
Council resolution, even when such obligations preceded the adoption of the resolution. 
The 'notwithstanding' provisions referred to earlier^^ are explicit about the equally 
retrospective and prospective nature of Council enforcement measures and make 
reference to the fact that pre-existing rights or obligations under contracts and licences 
cannot affect the requirements made of states in the resolutions. This is of particular 
Article 103 reads: 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.' 
Article 105(1) reads: 'The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.' Thus, no national (or 
regional) judicial action could affect the position of the UN, when measures are taken under Chapter 
VII. 
See also Article 59 of the I L C draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
See Fassbender, B. Targeted Sanctions and Due Process - The responsibility of the UN Security 
Council to ensure that fair and clear procedures are made available to individuals and entities 
targeted with sanctions under Chapter Vn of the UN Charter Study commissioned by the Office of 
Legal Affairs - United Nations March 2006. Available at 
http://www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_studv.pdf (December-2006) at p.6. 
" See also. Article 27 of the V C L T ; and Articles 3 and 32 of the ILC's draft Articles on State 
Responsibility. 
Chapter Three 'Primacy'. 
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importance for arms embargoes where the internal effect of the law, would be to 
prohibit pre-existing contracts being completed. In turn, this could lead to civil 
proceedings for breach of contract.^^ 
3. Rights affected by implementation'*^ 
Some concerns are derived from regional human rights treaties,"*' others from the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights'*^ and additional arguments have been 
constmcted with regard to the two human rights treaties of the UN - the International 
Covenant on Civil and Polifical Rights (1966)^ *^  and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).'*'* To date, no cases have been found 
where the implementation of an arms embargo has given rise to an appeal to a judicial 
body for human rights violations. The standalone arms embargo does not give rise to 
many, i f any, contestable human rights abuses, however, potential problems shall be 
briefly outlined. 
The rights involved when measures secondary to an arms embargo (i.e. imposed as a 
No breach of a human right could be alleged here, however, because non-retroactivity of laws is 
applicable to criminal law only. 
See e.g. Cameron, I. Protecting Legal Rights - On the (in)security of targeted sanc tions pp. 181-
206 in 'International Sanctions' op.cit. (Introduction note 12). 
The Secretary-General paid due regard to this issue in the 'SG Sanctions Speech' {op.cit) when he 
said: 'A more recent challenge to effective implementation of sanctions revolves around the issue of 
due process in the listing and "de-listing" of individuals designated for targeted sanctions, such as 
asset freezes and travel bans. The Council has moved to address these concerns, and maintain 
confidence in the credibility and legitimacy of its measures, again with the assistance of Germany, 
Switzerland and Sweden, and in cooperation with the Watson Institute at Brown University. Further 
to the Council's resolution 1730, the Secretariat has created a focal point for de-listing, which 
provides direct access of listed persons and entities to Committees.' 
Note, however, a report that these cooperation efforts 'appear to have been largely ignored' by the 
1267 Committee: 
http://www.securitvcouncilreport.Org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2294423/k.3920/Januarv 2007BRTar 
geted Sanctions ListingPeListing and Due Process.htm#De listing (April-2007) 
E.g. the E C H R (adopted 04/11/50; in force September 1953), ACHR (adopted 22/11/69; in force 
July 1978. 
Adopted by A/RES/217(in) of 10/12/48. 
Adopted 16/12/66, (in force March 1976) ( 'ICCPR') 
Adopted 16/12/66, (in force January 1976) ( ' ICESCR') 
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method of enforcing the arms embargo) are of equal concern to those when travel bans 
and financial sanctions are primarily employed as against individuals because the 
measures will operate in the same way. The only difference is that the measures are 
now entirely punitive in nature, adopted in order to reprimand violation of the arms 
embargo. To date, there are no cases known to this author contesting the legality of 
such 'secondary sanctions' listings.''^ This may be due to the fact that until recently, 
there were no procedures available for de-listing. With regard to the Taliban cases, only 
those individuals attempting to dissociate themselves from Al-Qaida, or denying any 
association at all, are likely to contest their place on a Sanctions Committee list. 
3.1. The requirement of due process before rights are removed'*^  
Fassbender explains that some of the problems facing individuals targeted on sanctions 
lists include: lack of notification prior to the event; no direct petition to the Committee 
of the Council for de-listing; no chance for a hearing by the Council or Conunittee; and 
due to the supremacy of Article 103 of the Charter, national methods to present a legal 
challenge the listing are lacking, as states are bound to comply with Council 
resoludons.'*'' 
3.1.1. Lack of a fair trial and associated rights 
Individuals had been placed on blacklists (and were thereby subject to punitive 
measures in light of violations of arms embargoes or other obligations), without 
necessarily even being notified of the charges against them, and without being tried to 
establish the verity of their culpability, were punished by means of travel bans and 
financial sanctions. Under normal circumstances, such a position could not be tolerated 
See e.g. in D R C %U of S/RES/1596 - ttavel bans in place for A E violators; and in Cote D'lvoire -
f32 of S/RES/1721: 'Underlines that it is fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons 
to be designated by the Committee established by %\4 of resolution 1572 (2004) who are determined 
to be. ..in violation of the arms embargo, as provided in resolutions 1572 (2004) and 1643 (2005)'. 
See e.g. Cameron, L The ECHR, Due Process and UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism 
Sanctions 
Available at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal affairs/legal co-
operation/pubhc international law/Texts & Documents/2006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf 
(February-2007) 
Op.cit. note 36 at Sect B p.4-5. 
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in law. However, the right to a fair trial and associated rights, as available under Article 
14 of the ICCPR is applicable only to criminal charges and the violation of an arms 
embargo may or not be a criminal offence; its status will depend on the choice of 
implementation of the state. Due to the lack of a UN-specific mechanism to deal with 
requests to be removed from blacklists, individuals placed on lists and thereby subject to 
travel bans and having their assets frozen, have been unable to contest the measures 
unless their state of which they are nationals was willing to petition the relevant 
Sanctions Committee. I f domestic remedies were exhausted, another option for appeal 
was only available for those individuals in regions where individuals may have the 
requisite locus standi in a higher court (for example, as exists in Europe and was utilised 
by Yusuf ^). Without this they could not challenge the measures imposed against them. 
This situation has been partially alleviated after the adoption of S/RES/1730 of 2006 
which adopted a de-listing procedure and S/2007/178 concerning the establishment of 
the focal point for de-listing with the Secretariat. This came 6 months after the Council 
stated it was 'committed to ensuring that fair and clear procedures exist for placing 
individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them...'."*^ It wil l be of 
interest to follow the progress of this new focal point to see i f it operates as an adequate 
mechanism through which consideration of appeals against listing can take place. 
3.2. Other international human rights 50 
"'^  Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission (Case T-306/01) 21 
September 2005. Yusufs case was against the E C ' s implementation of the relevant Council 
resolutions. The C F I said: 'Admittedly, the procedure [of petitioning to a state] confers no right 
directly on the persons concerned themselves to be heard by the Sanctions Committee, the only 
authority competent to give a decision, on a State's petition, on the re-examination of their case. 
Those persons are thus dependent, essentially, on the diplomatic protection afforded by the States to 
their nationals. Such a restriction of the right to be heard, directly and in person, by the competent 
authority is not, however, to be deemed improper in the light of the mandatory prescriptions of 
international law.' (atpi4-5) . 
S/PRST/2006/28 (22 June 2006). 
See e.g. Birkhauser, N. Sanctions of the Security Council Against Individuals - Some Human 
Rights Problems 
Available at - http.//www.statewatch.ore/terrorlists/docs/Birkhauser.PDF (February-2007); and van 
den Herik, L. and Schrijver, N. in Section Two (p.9-23) - Human Rights Concerns in Current 
Targeted Sanctions Regimes from the Perspective of International and European Law in 
Strengthening Targeted Sanctions through Fair and Clear Procedures Biersteker, T.J. and Eckert, 
S.E, published by the Watson Institute. 
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The case of Yusuf^' is relevant here, although the arms embargo itself was scarcely 
mentioned because it was the freezing of funds and travel ban that created the impetus 
for action and these measures were created as part of the original regime, rather than in 
support of the arms embargo. 
3.2.1. The right to property 
The right to property and the freedoms^^ of contract, trade and navigate, come into 
question when an arms embargo is used (whether used in conjunction with other 
measures or as a standalone measure). These rights are common to the targets of the 
measures and to those affected by the implementation of the measures by states, such as 
arms companies, dealers and indirectly, it might be said, governments themselves. The 
right to property is expressed is two parts in the UDHR: the right to own property 
(individually and in concert) and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one's 
property. It would be difficult to argue that measures debated and adopted 
internationally by the UN, could constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property, such 
that might be thought to occur, for example, i f a contract was unable to deliver goods 
promised because of the arms embargo. The right to property is also contained in the 
First Protocol to the ECHR, but it is absent from the ICCPR and ICESCR, which 
highlights its low status in the hierarchy of rights protected by international law. 
There are conflicting rights, such as the right to life of the civilians suffering from the 
persistence of armed conflict,^^ of which suffer abuse because of the rights to property 
and freedoms to contract, trade and navigate, but these potential violations may be 
remedied by the arms embargo. This conflict of rights creates the need to perform a 
balancing exercise. The right to life is clearly superior to the others mentioned, 
however, there is a difficulty in that the other rights and freedoms are easily protected or 
Yusuf ibid, note 48 - now on appeal to the E C J . 
For discussion see, e.g. Garde, A. Is it Really for the European Community to Implement Anti-
Terrorism UN Security Council Resolutions? (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 281. 
I.e. In the absence of positive law to prohibit certain behaviour, in this case making a contract, or 
engaging in trade, individuals and entities individuals and entities are free to behave as they choose, 
limited only by the rules particular to that enterprise (i.e. the law of contract and so on). 
Protected, inter alia, under Article 6 ICCPR; Article 3 UDHR; Article 2 of the ECHR; and for 
civilians under IHL. 
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respected by the absence of an arms embargo (as the defauk position is that it is 
acceptable to trade in almost all conventional arms), whereas the presence of an 
embargo cannot guarantee the protection of the right to life, thus creating an argument 
against their superiority in the balance. In addition, as arms are sometimes needed to 
protect or respect the right to life (such is the nature of security) an argument arises 
against their use. However, as the Council's practice shows, the use of exemptions 
mitigates this problem, by allowing certain groups (for example, peacekeeping forces) 
to receive arms and related materiel so that the only arms legally entering the territory 
are those designed to protect the population, thus striving to protect the right to life. 
Direct associations have been made between the abuse of human rights and the use of 
SALW.^^ 
Another way deprivation of property may occur is through the seizure of goods, i.e. 
arms cargo found in place or en route to a place prohibited under a Council resolution. 
Once again, it would be difficult to argue that this was an arbitrary deprivation of 
property, given the background to the measures. A difficulty could arise i f seizure 
occurred unlawful ly ,and this could be the case if insufficient authority was vested in 
the individuals or entities''*' seizing the property. 
In the case of Bosphorus,^^ the ECJ said: 'Any measure imposing sanctions has, by 
definition, consequences which affect the right to property and the freedom to pursue a 
trade or business, thereby causing harm to persons who are in no way responsible for 
the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions.In relation to arms 
embargoes, arms manufacturers and brokers may be at least partly/acma//y responsible 
'^^  See reports by Special Rapporteur Barbara Frey for the Human Rights Council on the prevention 
of human rights violations committed with S A L W A/HRC/Sub. 1/58/27 (Final Report). 
and E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37 (Progress report under the auspices of the CHR). 
E.g. piracy, or perhaps INTERPOL, depending upon their powers. 
E.g. this may include customs officials, police or military personnel that patrol territorial waters 
and so on. 
In the E C J - Bosphorus Hava YoUari Turzim ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport. Energy and 
Communications and others C-84/95, 30 July 1996. 
Ibid, at 22. 
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for the threat to IPS. Responsibility, in this sense, is not intended to connote legal 
culpability, but a part of the causal chain of events. The Court went on to say: 
'Moreover, the importance of the aims pursued by the regulation at issue is such as to 
justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators'. 
Ultimately, the right to property is not absolute and it is certainly not a jus cogens 
right.^« 
3.3. Freedom to trade, contract and navigate? 
These cannot be construed as human nor any other kind of rights. They are freedoms 
which can be curtailed i f necessary for an overriding interest, such as the maintenance 
of EPS. The necessity of interferences with the freedoms to trade, contract and navigate 
arises because otherwise the embargoes could not operate. The action is proportionate 
because security is an overriding interest of states and all participants in the 
international community and this consideration could only be qualified by the evidence 
to show that unrestricted arms flows do not cause insecurity. In any case, as these 
freedoms are realised via contracts agreements, they are subject to Article 103 and the 
'notwithstanding' provisions mentioned in Chapter Three. 
3.4. Travel bans and financial sanctions 
The right to property may also be invoked in relation to financial sanctions, but would 
be superseded for the same reasons as given above. The right to freedom of movement, 
as contained in Article 12 ICCPR may be restricted by a travel ban, but the Council 
accommodates the principle in Article 12(4) ICCPR^' by often providing that no travel 
ban 'shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals.'^^ The 
right 'freedom of thought, conscience and religion' under Article 18 ICCPR has also 
been accommodated within travel bans by providing exemptions for the purposes of 
Ibid, at 23. 
*° See Yusuf. op.cit. at 293: '[l]t is only an arbitrary deprivation of [the right to property] that 
might... be regarded as contrary to jus cogens.' 
'No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.' 
®E.g . f9 ofS/RES/1572. 
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63 religious observance. 
4. Self determination" 
4.1. Introduction to the right 
This part of the discussion excludes those cases where the background to the measures 
did not involve an armed conflict^^ and therefore did not invoke the rules of M L . The 
main question for this section is whether or not the denial of self determination could 
occur due to the imposition and operation of an arms embargo by the Council and 
would therefore be a violation of international law, warranting an appeal to the Council 
to desist from such action in future. To determine this, the following points must be 
established: what is status of the right to self determination, who bears this right and in 
what ways could an arms embargo violate it in respect of those persons? 
Self determination underscores an interaction between the Council and the GA, as the 
latter bears a responsibility to protect inter alia, self determination^^ potentially causing 
a situation where the work of one organ overtly undermines the other. On the side of 
the Council, this is relevant because the basic purpose of collective action is for the UN 
to be united against threats to international peace. If two of the principal organs of the 
UN are at odds with one another, the whole system could be affected. On the side of the 
GA, the situation is relevant because respect for the right of self determination is one of 
the purposes and principles of the UN; it is recognised as a human right in custom and 
in the UN human rights treaties^^and is argued by some to be a rule of jus cogens!'^ As 
shown in Chapter Two, this final point would be sufficient to restrict the Council's 
application of an enforcement measure that violated the right to self determination. 
*^E.g.H0ofS/RES/1572. 
^ In general, see e.g. Cassese, A. Self-Determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal 
(1995) CUP; Rigo-Sureda, A. The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study 
of United Nations Practice (1973) Leiden: Sijthoff. 
I.e. Libya 748 and Taliban 1390. 
^ 'Keeping the Peace' op.cit. at p.169-172. 
Article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR. 
See Doehring in 'Simma' op.cit at p.62. 
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4.2. Whose right? 
This problem is primarily of relevance to those cases targeting solely non-state actors or 
the 'parties to the conflict', but is also relevant where an arms embargo affects the entire 
territory. Self determination is an issue relevant to the concept of collective security 
against a common threat, which happens not to be a state. The situation envisaged is 
one where the government of a state is fighting its own people who have banded into 
armed groups, or i f the control of the country has decentralised to such an extent that 
different parts are run by different authorities, or by no authority at all. Unlike the 
original self determination field, decolonisation is no longer the root of change, as most 
colonies are now self-governing, however, alongside ethnic conflicts, some of the 
internal conflicts do have the influence of their previous colony powers as a factor in the 
operation - from e.g. the lack of natural resources from earlier exploitation or perhaps 
that the colonial powers left behind 'technology' such as weapons. 
4.2.1. National Liberation Movements (NLMs) 
NLMs have a unique non-state actor position under EHL because they are considered to 
fight in international conflicts.^^ In addition, although NLMs are not able to be party to 
the Geneva Conventions and protocols. Article 1(4) of Protocol I is applicable to them, 
dependent on their consent via Art 96(3).™ Their right to self determination is 
undisputed and could be violated by an arms embargo if the content of the right is such 
as to permit the use of armed force for its maintenance. 
4.2.2. Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) / Insurgents 
Zegveld reviewed the accountability of AOGs and set out the law relevant to the 
behaviour of such groups. An AOG derives its position under IHL from the position of 
the authority (in control of the territory from it operates) with regard to the Geneva 
Conventions and protocols thereto. I f a state has ratified it,^' an AOG operating within 
that state can reap the benefits of the protection it affords to combatants and can be 
"^^  'Accountability' op.cit. (Chapter One note 73) at p. 18. 
^°Ibid. at p. 17-18. 
See earlier comments (Chapter One) on numbers of states parties to the relevant conventions and 
protocols. 
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bound by the obligations therein. Armed opposition groups fight internal wars only, but 
does this factor affect their right to self determination? 
When considering the deficiencies in conventional arms controls, should it not be asked 
how this breed of non-state actor has evolved? Did they evolve out of the failures of the 
international protection of minorities?^^ However, as the situation in Rwanda showed, 
being the minority does not necessarily mean being the weakest party. AOGs are 
classified by the fact that they are armed. This shows the default position that arms 
sales, supplies and transfers are legally deemed inherently acceptable until measures 
contrary to this are imposed, i.e. an arms embargo. The removal of acceptability only 
continues for the duration of such measures. Why are AOGs distinguished from 
NLMs? NLMs also fight, but are afforded a status more akin to that of the state, which 
is the political direction of the aspirations of such a movement. This could be because 
they have behaved in such a way as to merit this respect, which might create an 
assumption that that AOGs are not generally behaving in a state-like manner, perhaps 
for example, by abiding by the rules of IHL. The GA has said that the exercise of the 
right of self determination does not equate to aggression^^ which would imply that force 
may be lawfully used to enforce the right of self determination. So, in cases that are 
determined to be genuine struggles against the suppression of self-determination (i.e. to 
enforce the right it must be threatened) the use of force is permitted for that particular, 
confined purpose. 
4.3. The effect of arms embargoes 
Did that Council act in a way that could affect the right to self determination of NLMs 
by forceful means? It is suggested that the relevant non-state actors in the arms 
embargoes cases were AOGs rather than legitimate NLMs and so there is no question of 
such groups having a right to be armed for the purposes of self determination and to 
achieve that status by force. This could amount to 'violent secession'; something 
The international response came in the form of a number of treaties and provisions, such as Article 
27 of the ICCPR (and General Comment No.23(50) by the UNHRC); C E R D ; and the Durban 
declaration. 
" Art 7 of GAOR XXLX, supp no.31 (A/9631) p. 142. 1974 as cited in Doehring op.cit. at p.52. 
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which, according to O'Connell, is not permitted under self determination.^'* However, 
in some cases, the background to the conflicts encompassed deep ethnic 
incompatibilities, where outright removal of the opposing party was a greater desire 
than the mere taking of control of the territory. 
5. Self defence 
5.1. In General 
Self defence is an intuitive human concept. It is the essence of survival when faced 
with a threat. There is a clear moral right to self defence, and a legal right exists under 
specific conditions in municipal criminal law. Under international law there are two 
clear sources of a legal right to self defence - there is the treaty-based rule (applicable 
only to UN Member states) contained in Article 51 of the Charter and there are custom-
based rules. Although much of the Charter is considered representative of customary 
law, the original customary rules on self defence are distinct from any customary rule 
based on Article 51. It is important to consider this issue here because it can be argued 
that arms embargoes impair the right to self defence. Under the Charter a state's right 
of self defence is theoretically curtailed as soon as the Council takes measures under 
Chapter V I I against it. Only absolute enforcement of the measures (which is of course 
desired) would curtail the actual capacity to defend one's self and even this would not 
necessarily be an absolute curtailment as arms embargoes do not have a direct effect on 
existing stockpiles. Arms embargoes are not a tool for restricting legal capacity to 
defend oneself, although it could be argued that the legal capacity becomes irrelevant 
when curtailed by a physical limitation. I f a warring party already has weapons there is 
nothing an arms embargo could do to curtail their use, except insofar as the supply of 
ammunition was successfully restricted by it. I f other dangerous weapons are prevalent, 
such as the machetes used in the Rwandan genocide, embargoes on conventional arms 
and related matdriel will not have restricted the self-defence capacity of those 
individuals, groups or governments determined to use any weapons to achieve their 
aims in the conflict. 
O'Connell, M.E. Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War (1991-1992) 67 Indiana Law 
Journal 903 at p.908 
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5.2. Customary Law 
A definition for the customary rules for a right to self defence arose relating to the 1837 
shipping case of the Caroline''^ In discussions^^ it was qualified by two requirements: 
necessity and proportionality. A parallel for this has emerged in the treaty-based right 
of self defence. 
In Nicaragua v. USA,^^ explicit comments were made in respect of self defence and 
Article 51: 
'[E]ven i f a treaty norm and a customary norm relevant to the present 
dispute were to have exactly the same content,^ ** this would not be a reason 
for the Court to hold that the incorporation of the customary norm into treaty 
law must deprive the customary norm of its applicability as distinct from the 
treaty norm.'^^ 
This is usually applied (as was the problem in the case) in order to avoid non-
applicability of certain provisions of a treaty due to reservations. Customary law can 
trump treaty law in this regard. Moreover, this provides application to those entities 
unable to rely on Article 51 by virtue of not being a party to the Charter. 
5.3. Treaty Law - Article 51 
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain [IPS]. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of 
self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
29 BFSP 1137-1138; 30 BFSP 195-196. 
16, 
Enclosure 1 - Extract from note of April 24, 1841' available at 
http://www.vale.edU/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/br-1842d.htm#web2 (February-2007). 
Op.cit. Chapter Three note 22. 77 
78 
Which, it should be noted, they do not - Article 51 has a particular aspect relating only to the 
Charter, i.e. that self defence is only acceptable until Chapter VII measures have been taken. 
However, note the interesting comment of the Legal Adviser to the US Department of State 
regarding the Caroline case, where the customary version of the right to self defence was expounded 
- 'the exercise of the inherent right of self defence depends upon a prior delict, an illegal act that 
presents an immediate, overwhelming danger to an actual and essential right of the state.' DUSPEL, 
1975, p.l7 as cited in 'International Law' op.cit. at p.l025. This corresponds to the requirement of a 
prior armed attack contained in Article 51. 
™ Ibid, note 77 at p.94-95. 
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under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore [IPS]."^" 
Article 51 has a number of self-evident but important qualifications. On a simple 
textual interpretation, the right exists only in connection to an armed attack, and will 
subside once measures have been taken by the Council (presumably under Chapter VII) 
in pursuit of its primary duty. Council measures taken at any time will override the 
operation of measures taken in self defence. The requisite timing of an armed attack has 
been subject to dispute however the debate on pre-emptive or anticipatory self defence^' 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, the precise scope of an 'armed attack' 
has undergone discussion and some elements of this may be worth noting. For 
example, the dispute over whether the provision of weapons as assistance to rebel 
groups could constitute an armed attack against the state fighting the rebels (and 
therefore justify the use of force based on self defence) was rejected by the ICJ in 
Nicaragua v. USA.'^ ^ 
It is important to see the right of self defence in its context as a justification for the use 
of force by states, as this is usually prohibited.^'' This highlights the fact that although 
acting in self defence is an inherent right of a state, the action will not per se be deemed 
to constitute acceptable behaviour. It remains wrong, but is excused and but for the 
satisfaction of the conditions of self defence the action taken would be an illegitimate 
use of force and may constitute an act of aggression - itself deserving of Council 
measures. 
Is a right to self defence, also a right to purchase and acquire arms? It may be difficult 
to prove that the particular purchases or acquisitions are for the purposes the buyer 
purports (i.e. self defence). In addition, it must be established who or what possess 
'"Article 51. 
See, e.g. Reisman, W.M., and Armstrong, A. The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-
Defense (2006) 100 AJIL 525. 
Op.cit at p. 103-4. 
• Article 2(4) Charter; the rule exists also in C I L and is part of the foundations of the UN where 
disputes are to be settled peacefully (Article 2(3) and Chapter VI) . 
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these rights. The default position for states is the legitimate purchase, transfer and 
acquisition of arms, subject to rules of contract law. As explained above, there is a 
legally protected right to property and a freedom to trade, neither of which are 
inalienable (and the latter is not protected by human rights law), and i f contested would 
be subject to tests of proportionality. The default position for individuals or non state 
entities that comprise groups of individuals is a similarly open right to make contracts in 
the arms trade. However, any non state entity or individual's ownership and possession 
rights will vary according to the internal laws of their state. 
The main difference occurs in that a state may legitimately have a monopoly on the use 
of force within its own territory and to that end has a greater claim to a right to 
armaments. Moreover, the types of weapons acceptable for civilian possession tend to 
be smaller weapons as it is harder to justify the need for non-military possession of 
military style weapons, such as assault rifles. However, these weapons are the types of 
weapons most prominently used in civil wars, by state forces and non state entities 
alike. As is ultimately the problem in the conventional arms control arena, the default 
position of the right to purchase and acquire arms is governed not by international law, 
but by domestic, and in some cases regional, regulation. It remains an internal matter 
until a multilateral arms embargo is imposed. 
5.4. Case in point 
A significant adverse and unintended humanitarian side-effect of arms embargoes can 
occur when an embargo reinforces an unequal measure of fighting power, leading to 
breaches of international law as a result of the incapacity for one side to defend itself. 
In the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide '^^ case. it was argued that the arms embargo reinforced the status quo where 
one side had a stronger military position in the war.**^  As that side^^ was already 
sufficiently armed, it had a significant advantage over its opponent who had few 
military resources. The main argument in respect of the arms embargo was that it 
effectively made the implementing states accessories to the genocide. The majority of 
Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, ICJ Rep. 1993, p. 3 
See furdier, Scott. C et al. op.cit. Chapter Four note 46. 
The Bosnian Serbs (FRY). 
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the Court refused to consider the issue because the '[provisional] measures requested by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina...go beyond matters within the scope of the Genocide 
Convention...' so the Court confined 'its examination of the measures requested, and 
of the grounds asserted for the request for such measures, to those which fall within the 
scope of the Genocide Convention.'^^ 
However, Judge Ad Hoc Lauterpacht, in his separate opinion to the second request for 
provisional measures, stated that: 
'So far, then, as this fourth request is related to the elimination of the arms 
embargo vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would be prepared to say that the 
Applicant may have an indication of a provisional measure in the following 
terms: that as between the Applicant and the Respondent the continuing 
validity of the embargo in its bearing on the Applicant has become a matter 
of doubt requiring further consideration by the Security Council.'^^ 
This conclusion pays regard to the difficulty seen in this case, of an arms embargo 
effectively removing a right to self defence, which may have led to the violation of a 
rule of jus cogens. 
6. The Role of the Council in enforcement 
6.1. Responsibilities of states under the Charter 
The only official punishment the UN can take against a Member state is expulsion under 
Article 6 when there has been persistent violation of the Principles of the Charter; 
however, violations of Articles 2(5), 25 and 48 are unlikely to be deemed as such. 
Leaving aside the probative issues, this Article has never been used and is highly 
unlikely to be invoked. 
Violation of an arms embargo by a state by assisting in breach or violation of the 
obligation to implement the measure can be considered to be a threat to IPS, thereby 
justifying further measures'^ ^ against such states. The logic for this type of threat is 
^'^ Ibid, note 84 at 133. 
Ibid. atf35. 
89 
Further Requests for the Indication of Provisional Measures Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, op.cit. (Chapter Two note 128)at p.442 (1107 
of the separate opinion). 
90 
Labelled 'secondary sanctions' by Frowein/Krisch 'Article 41' in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.748. 
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based upon the idea that the obligations are in place because they are deemed to be 
instrumental in overcoming the threat and so any contrary action both undermines the 
collective action and further exacerbates the threat. The measures taken against Liberia 
in S/RES/1343 were directly related to its 'active support...for armed rebel groups in 
neighbouring countries'. This point highlights the instrumental normative value of arms 
embargoes and all enforcement measures, because it creates another way for the spread 
or aggravation of conflict to be designated as unlawful. This in turn may deter such 
occurrences and therefore deter the assistance (such as the provision of arms) which 
violates the measures. As this represents the only likely reprimand for states, the P5 
would be exempt from any practical form of reprimand due to the veto. 
6.1.1. State assistance in breach 
'Most often a violation of end-user undertakings requires the assistance of a 
sympathetic government, or, at the very least, the collaboration of a corrupt 
high-ranking government official. Such ruses are particularly successful is 
the assistance comes from a neighbouring country.' ' 
Many arms embargoes violations have occurred because neighbouring states would be 
supporting one side to an internal conflict and flagrantly breaching embargoes, as the 
Liberian case shows. By virtue of the embargo, such behaviour would amount to a 
violation of Article 2(5). The reasons for such behaviour may be political, which 
outweigh the perceived benefits of adherence to the Charter, indeed, '[t]he reluctance of 
governments to act against targets whose support may be needed in other circumstances 
is often a serious hurdle in building sanctions coalitions.'^^ In respect of enforcement 
measures, it could be that political commitments are perceived by states as having 
greater normative value than legal obligations. It is political considerafions that 
uldmately guide action and collective security is itself a political endeavour. There is 
no overarching mechanism to enforce the international law obligations of states under 
the Charter and so it is not the legal commitment that prompts states to act. 
When non-state entities assist a target in active breach it is a matter for the state in 
which the entity resides or operates. The Council may make suggestions for action 
^' 'SAS-200T op.cit. p. 134. 
92 
'Contemporary Perspective' 0/).C/r.(Chapter Two note 101) at p.4. 
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against those entities as it did in the Southern Rhodesian case.^ ^ It is suggested that 
violation of an arms embargo could not be an international crime. Such violation does 
not directly accord with the ICC's jurisdiction under Article 5 of the ICC Statute. 
Indirect application would lack the necessary, verifiable proximity and causation. 
Article 8(2)(b) of the ICC Statute shows intolerance of specific types of weapons,^'' but 
this does not include conventional weapons. There is nothing explicit in the 'Elements 
of Crimes' (2000) to prohibit the sale and transfer of weapons to armed conflicts. 
However, individual criminal responsibility can be invoked (under Article 25 (3)(c) of 
the ICC Statute) against individuals that aid or abet in order to facilitate commission of 
a crime, including providing the means for its commission.^^ This suggests that arms 
brokers with the seemingly requisite intent (i.e. the broker aids or abets 'for the purpose 
of facilitating the commission of such a crime') could be criminally responsible in 
international law for crimes committed with the armaments they have provided. 
However, it is expected that arms brokers would deny any consideration of the future 
uses of the armaments they provide to individuals and entities that use them to commit 
international crimes, or indeed those that use them to violate norms of EHL or human 
rights law. Perhaps this is an area where states could take action within their internal 
legal spheres to ensure that brokers are legally obligated to consider such possibilities 
before executing a transfer. It is not clear whether knowledge (of providing the means 
to commit an international crime) alone is sufficient to invoke the responsibility of an 
individual for aiding and/or abetting the commission of an international crime.^^ 
7. Other spheres of international law under which to hold states 
responsible? 
7.1. State Responsibility 
See f4 of S/RES/333 of 1973. 
This is largely derived from existing laws and developing norms - see sections xviii-xx. 
See, Wood, B. Strengthening Compliance with UN Anns Embargoes -Key Challenges for 
Monitoring and Verification in Verifying Disarmament and Non Proliferation Agreements Today 
DDA Occasional Papers No. 10, March 2006, pp.53-73 at p.57 Available at: 
http://disai-mament.un.org/ddapublications/OP10/4Wood.pdf (March-2007). 
However, it is thought to be highly unlikely to be sufficient. 
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The law of state responsibility may provide another route for the determination and 
punishment of a state's failure to abide by its international obligations in respect of 
enforcement measures. A recourse separate to the law of the UN would be vital i f a 
permanent Member of the Council violated its obligations in respect of arms embargoes 
and other enforcement measures. 
7.1.1. Applicability? 
Separate to the questions of whether the Council has (or should have) any role in 
adjudicating the responsibility of states and whether it uses enforcement action as a 
method of enforcing states' intemational legal obligations,^^ the issue of the 
international responsibility of states arises in respect of the actual operation of those 
rules. This is the relevant here because the violations of arms embargoes or failures to 
implement resolutions to give effect to the arms embargoes may give rise to 
intemational responsibility, as such violations or failures constitute breach of 
intemational obligations, as defined in Article 1 of the ELC draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.^^ 
7.1.2. Substance 
Under Article 2 of the draft Articles, '[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State 
when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) [i]s attributable to the State under 
intemational law; and (b) [cjonstitutes a breach of an intemational obligation of the 
State. Violations of arms embargoes or failures to implement resolutions clearly breach 
intemational obligations of the state and as long as factual evidence could be produced, 
these acts or omissions would be attributable to the state. In the case of the failure to 
implement an arms embargo, the omission would be clearly imputed to the state as no 
other entity is obligated to take such action. 
Under Article 33 of the draft Articles, the obligations may be owed to 'another State, to 
several States, or to the intemational community as a whole, depending in particular on 
Gowlland-Debbas, V. Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Respomibility 
(1994) 43 I C L Q 55; 'Enforcing Intemational Law' op.cit. (Chapter Two note 86). 
98 
Note, the 2001 draft Articles have not yet been adopted by states and consequently carry no 
binding legal force per se; however see commendations in A/RES/56/83 of 2002 and A/RES/59/35 
of 2004. 
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the character and content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the 
breach.' The circumstances of the breach are less relevant with regard to violations of 
enforcement measures because such a violation is independent of factors which might 
usually affect this aspect.^ ^ The effects of a breach may be more severe in some cases 
than others; however, the obligations are always owed to the international community as 
a whole, because they arise through the collective security mechanism of the Charter, 
which exists for the benefit of all states. The required injury for state responsibility 
might be considered difficult to quantify in respect of the breach of an enforcement 
measure. However, in the case of the breach of an arms embargo, the damage to the 
collective security effort is immediate, as the objective is to prevent weapons crossing 
the determined threshold. 
Under Article 16 of the draft Articles, '[a] State which aids or assists another State in 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for doing so if: (a) [t]hat State does so with knowledge of the circumstances 
of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) [t]he act would be internationally wrongful 
if committed by that State.' This article could be used to find the responsibility of a 
state that willingly assists another state in the active breach of an arms embargo. In the 
cases of diversion of weapons in breach of an embargo, where the exporting state knew 
the original destination to be lawful (and had taken steps to ensure the authenticity of 
relevant end-use and end-user documents), it might be difficult to prove that the state 
had the requisite knowledge of the eventual diversion to an end-user or ultimate 
destination prohibited under international law by the embargo. 
7.2. International humanitarian law 
The breach of an arms embargo does not constitute a violation of IHL per se. The 
effects of the breach may provide the means in which certain violations are carried out. 
However, the conventional weapons under discussion are not subject to IHL concerning 
The Commentary to the draft Articles uses the example of pollution which, under some 
circumstances, may affect only one state and under others, may affect the international community 
as a whole. 
Available at: http://untreatv.un.Org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9 6 2001.pdf at 
p.233 (April-2007). 
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the means and methods of warfare and so there are no specific provisions to prohibit 
states from providing the means for combat. However, states still have an obligation 'to 
respect and to ensure respect for the [Geneva Conventions and Protocol I] in all 
1 on 
circumstances.' It could be argued that such respect and assurance of respect is 
marred by the transfer of armaments to end-users or for end-uses which result in the 
commission of acts contrary to IHL. Although causation in particular cases would be 
very difficult to establish, as many weapons are unmarked and therefore difficult to 
trace, it is the overall principle that is of value. An element of knowledge may be 
required for Article 1 GC to obligated states to desist from such actions (for example, 
undesirable transfers) that may undermine this core principle. The ICRC asserts that the 
'obligation [in Common Article 1] entails a responsibility to consider, when arms are 
made available, whether the intended recipient can be expected to comply with M L , in 
particular the rules concerning the protection of c i v i l i a n s . ' A r m s embargoes can 
therefore provide a direct method that states can use to comply with their obligations 
under IHL. However, under the strict legal understanding of the dichotomy between 
international and internal armed conflicts, this core principle will not apply in internal 
armed conflict situations. 
8. Practical difficulties with regard to Enforcement 
8.1. Practicalities of physical enforcement 
Border control is a major practical i s s u e . P h y s i c a l enforcement of the arms 
embargoes is not an easy task even when border control is well established. When 
consideration is had for the thousands of miles of land and sea borders existing 
throughout the whole of Africa (where most of the arms embargoes exist), the problem 
of how to patrol and physically stop the weapons being brought onto the prohibited soil, 
seems overwhelming. However, the problem should not be one that is impossible to 
overcome, because i f proper legal regulation was introduced, either as part of the arms 
embargo regimes, or on a larger scale, perhaps in line with the ATT proposals, then the 
weapons could be stopped before they leave the exporting country. The biggest 
Article 1 common to the GC's 1949 and Article 1(1) of Geneva Protocol I. 
Website section on 'Small arms availability and international humanitarian law': 
http://www.icrc.orgAVeb/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section ihl arms availabilitv?OpenDocument 
(May-2007) 
See Nathan, L . op cit. 
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apparent problem is diversion, because in the current state of the law, once a state has 
sold and exported to a 'legitimate' recipient that is the end of their legal responsibility. 
If arms embargoes carried a provision detailing the responsibility for failing to prevent 
diversion, it might act as a form of encouragement for states to do as much as is 
practically possible to reduce the risk of diversion. 
9. Conclusion 
The use of arms embargoes raises issues under many areas of international law. Further 
attention should be given to discussions regarding the legal status of the addressees 
targeted in sanction-type arms embargoes, however, this problem does not affect the 
'target-neutral' non-coercive arms embargoes. In addition, the use of arms embargoes 
per se raises few human rights issues, however, the same cannot be said of the 
secondary measures used in support of them. If an arms embargo could be shown to 
exacerbate, rather than mollify, a situation threatening IPS, the Council would be well 
advised to carefully review the benefits and burdens of the measures. The Council has, 
in general, failed to reprimand states for their failure to effectively enforce embargoes. 
Can the UN maintain its authority and integrity in the midst of so many breaches and is 
it a lack of capacity or lack of wil l by the UN which causes this failure? As the 
representative body of the UN, perhaps the GA could have a greater role in this process 
as its power to condemn the failure to avert breaches of arms embargoes would carry 
significant political weight. As the ICJ recalled, there is a 
'fundamental distinction between the existence and binding force of 
obligations arising under international law and the existence of a court or 
tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve disputes about compliance with those 
obligations. The fact that there is not such a court or tribunal does not mean 
that the obligations do not exist. They retain their validity and legal force. 
States are required to fu l f i l their obligadons under international law, 
including [IHL], and they remain responsible for acts contrary to 
international law which are attributable to them.''°^ 
Indeed, as Higgins has said; 'Intemational law is not rules. It is a normative system.' 104 
103 I 
Genocide Judgment 2007' op.cit. at 148, citing Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court 
and Admissibility of the Application, Judgment of 3 February 2006 pp. 52-53, %\21. 
Higgins, Problems and Process, Op.cit at p.l 
CONCLUSIONS 
Arms embargoes have a mixed record of success; not least because it is difficult to 
ascertain with certainty to which objective or objectives they aspire. Arms embargoes 
appear to have been intended to, and in fact do, have normative as well as practical 
value, although any aspects of an ideal framework must bow to the demands of the 
actual situation. Their normative value is important for international law because it 
contributes to the potential for the future regulation of conventional armaments based 
upon the suitability of end-users and end-uses. Their practical value is also important in 
international law because it provides a means with which to contribute to the protection 
of certain rights that are put at risk from the proliferation itself, most importantly, the 
right to life of civilians. 
This thesis has explored the many facets of arms embargoes in an attempt to improve 
comprehension of how these enforcement measures operate and their status in 
international law. The Council has acted in a punitive manner, despite the position held 
by the UN that it does not. The fact that Articles 25 and 48 are invoked when arms 
embargoes are imposed should put beyond dispute their legally binding nature.' This 
thesis has argued that not all arms embargoes should be labelled as 'sanctions' and that 
this misnomer impedes the effectiveness of the measures. Moreover, the economic 
theory of arms embargoes encounters various problems, the most important of which 
with respect to the emergence of overall norms, is the fact that the economic theory 
undermines the logical purpose of arms embargoes. 
Mandatory, multilateral arms embargoes currently operate under the law of collective 
security but for various reasons, they are not achieving their full potential, which would 
be to physically curtail the intensity of armed violence when it has reached a level that 
elevates it beyond the concern of the territory upon which it is occurring. The law of 
collective security (as embodied in the non-sanction types of arms embargoes), IHL and 
arms control law share one fundamental practical purpose: to limit the negative effects 
' In addition, Gill notes ('Limitations' op.cit. at p.130-1) that despite the Council's failures, it had 
succeeded in securing compliance with its measures by most Member states, most of the time. 
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of warfare, so far as is possible, for the sake of humanity. This purpose is, however, 
undermined when arms embargoes are used as coercive sanctions and currently is not 
fully realised when they are used as conflict containment measures. The operation, 
development of and interaction between these areas of law contributes to international 
law in general, by creating and/or maintaining particular standards and norms. As states 
already have obligations under the Geneva conventions, it is convenient to pursue a 
system of regulation of armaments based upon their end-users and end-uses that 
incorporates IHL. The ICRC has 'promoted specific criteria for arms transfers aimed at 
preventing weapons from falling into the hands of those likely to use them to violate 
[IHL]'. In situations where IHL is not applicable, there may still be a threat to the 
peace. Here, collective security law can play a role if the system is invoked by the 
Council. It would be desirable to have another alternative method of regulation, 
dependent not upon achieving the conditions necessary for the application of IHL or 
upon the readiness of the Council to act, but solely on the consent of states. The arms 
control option may not be appropriate for the Council to pursue unilaterally: 
'[T]he [Council] enjoys the competence to enact arms embargoes in 
situations of crisis...[b]ut this does not necessarily include a competence 
to take general measures for the limitation of armaments, or a possibility 
to regard armament by States in itself as a threat to the peace. In 
principle. States are free to decide on their armament, and both the GA 
and the [Council] possess only recommendatory powers with respect to 
the general regulation of armaments.'^  
This admission would suggest that states can use the UN to facilitate the general 
regulation of armaments, but that they must decide upon such means for themselves. 
The current ATT work at the UN is testament to this arrangement. However, one 
difficulty in attempting to use a legal sphere outside of the UN's system of collective 
security to regulate the trafficking of armaments to 'undesirable' end-users or to places 
for 'undesirable' end-uses, is that the circumstances involved are dynamic and the 
armaments in question are not inherently unlawful. Neither of these aspects is likely to 
^ Official statement - 04-04-2007 'The development of an international arms trade treaty' -
http://www.icrc.orgAVeb/eng/siteeng0.nst7html/arms-availabilitv-statement-020407 (May-2007) 
^ Frowein/Krisch in 'Simma' op.cit. at p.726 (Their footnotes omitted). 
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change. The position and status of the various actors involved may vary before, during 
and after a conflict and so any treaty would struggle to provide for the numerous 
possible eventualities. 
It might be possible to have a number of norms operating simultaneously. For example, 
in situations of armed conflict, there could be a norm of IHL, which prohibits the 
trafficking of armaments to actors likely to use them to commit violations of IHL, as the 
ICRC has advocated. In situations that threaten IPS (irrespective of whether an armed 
conflict exists) there could be a norm of collective security law which prohibits the 
trafficking of armaments to those entities and places that could or have threatened IPS. 
However, such a norm would pre-empt future actions of the Council and due to its wide 
discretion in utilising the collective security system, such a position cannot be 
maintained. In all other situations, it would be desirable to have a norm that aspires to 
the prevention of either of the two aforementioned situations from reaching fruition. 
This could be facilitated through international human rights law, which could prohibit 
the trafficking of armaments to those likely to use them to commit human rights 
violations. These norms would persist, even without adequate judicial or executive 
mechanisms to ensure they were respected. 
Arms embargoes contain an inherent, preventative element and in addition to their role 
in conflict containment, there is potential for them to be used as a tool of conflict 
prevention"* under collective security law (perhaps as a provisional measure), human 
rights law or arms control law. As Kofi Annan noted, 'the international community has 
been more willing and able to absorb the enormous costs of conflict than to generate the 
will and foresight to prevent it.'"" Indeed, it seems to be the case that states are more 
concerned with short term liquidation rather than long term prosperity when managing 
international affairs. 
See, e.g. Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., and Strandow, D. Sanctions for Conflict Prevention and 
Peace Building - Lessons Learned from Cote d'lvoire and Liberia (2006) Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research - Uppsala. 
^ A/57/270 
31 July 2002 Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration Report of the Secretary-
General Preventing armed conflict at paragraph 29; 
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In the Council meeting where the arms embargo against Liberia was adopted, the then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government of Liberia, Mr. Matthews, said: 
'We are here because peace is not possible in Liberia unless these belligerent parties are 
divested of the prospect of acquiring additional arms. Peace is not achievable unless 
their capacity to wage war is curtailed.' ^ This highlights two important points; first, the 
most effective ways to curtail such capacity is to limit the flow of new weapons and to 
create mechanisms^ through which old weapons can be destroyed; and second, the 
minister referred to the combatants, that is, the end-users. There is a logical connection 
between arms trafficking to and stockpiling by certain end-users and the beginnings, 
escalation and prolongation of conflict. 
While arms embargoes cannot be seen as tools of conflict resolution, their arms control 
function can affect the nature of a conflict by reducing the intensity of the violence 
thereby creating circumstances more suitable for the advancement of peace. Indeed, 
'[i]t is difficult to see peace, but certainly impossible to see security being achieved 
without arms regulation.'*^ Although the arms control function of arms embargoes is 
subsidiary to the collective security function, it has the potential to be a means to the 
ends protected by the collective security system, namely, the maintenance or restoration 
of international peace and security. 
^ Provisional Verbatim meetitig record of the Council (19/11/1992), S/PV.3138 at p. 18. 
^ E.g. DDR and related programmes (http;//www.unddr.org). 
White, N. The Future of Arms Control Law: An Overview of the Workshop 9(3) JCSL 299-302 
(2004) at p.302 
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Table 1 
Conflict Classifications' 
clxvii 
A E " 
Date of 
imposition 
(Termination) 
Conflict 
type 
Conflict 
duration'" 
Conflict 
intensity at 
time of A E 
imposition/ 
continuation 
Conflict intensity 
in year 
following 
A E 
imposition 
in year 
preceding 
A E 
imposition 
A - Armed Conflicts primarily Internal in character 
S/RES/232 
Southern 
Rhodesia 
16/12/1966 
(21/12/79) Intrastate -
S/RES/418 
South 
Africa 
04/11/1977 
(26/05/94) Intrastate -
S/RES/788 
Liberia 
19/11/1992 
(07/03/01) 
Intrastate 
December 
89- August 
2003 
War Intermediate Intermediate 
S/RES/1343 
Liberia 
07/03/2001 
(22/12/03) Minor Minor Minor 
S/RES/1521 
Liberia 22/12/2003 
Post-Conflict 
(Previously 
'War') 
N/A Minor 
S/RES/841 
Haiti 
16/06/1993 
(29/09/94) Intrastate 
April 
1989-1994 
Officially 
Post-Conflict 
(0-24 battle 
related deaths 
during 1993) 
(Previously 
'Minor') 
N/A N/A 
S/RES/918 
Rwanda 17/05/1994 
Intrastate 
October 
1990-
March 
2002 
Intermediate N/A Intermediate 
S/RES/1556 
Sudan 30/07/2004 Intrastate 
April 2003 
- present War Intermediate War 
S/RES/1572 
Cote 
d'lvoire 
15/11/2004 Intrastate 
September 
2002-
December 
2004 
Intermediate N/A Intermediate 
B - Armed Conflicts primarily International in character 
S/RES/661 
Iraq and 
Kuwait 
06/08/1990 
Interstate 
August 
1990-03 
March 
1991 
Minor 
War (1991) Minor (pre-
1990) 
Intrastate 
with foreign 
involvement 
04 March 
I99I -
present 
War N/A Intermediate 
Interstate 
(US, UK, 
Australia) 
March-
April 2003 War N/A N/A 
S/RES/1298 
Eritrea and 
Ethiopia 
17/05/2000 
(expired 
16/05/01) Interstate 
June 1998 
- June 
2000 
War N/A War 
Table 1 
Conflict Classiflcations' 
clxviii 
A E " 
Date of 
imposition 
(Termination) 
Conflict 
type 
Conflict 
duration'" 
Conflict 
intensity at 
time of A E 
imposition/ 
continuation 
Conflict intensity 
in year 
following 
A E 
imposition 
in year 
preceding 
A E 
imposition 
C - Elements of both international and internal conflicts 
S/RES/713 
Yugoslavia 
25/09/1991 
(01/10/96) Intrastate" 
August-
December 
1991 
War N/A N/A 
S/RES/733 
Somalia 23/01/1992 
Intrastate 
with foreign 
involvement 
April 1978 
- present War Intermediate War 
S/RES/864 
Angola 
15/09/1993 
(09/12/02) 
Intrastate 
with foreign 
involvement 
November 
1975-
April 2002 War War War 
S/RES/1132 
Sierra 
Leone 
08/10/1997 
(05/06/98) Intrastate 
with foreign 
involvement 
April 1991 
November 
2000 
Intermediate War Intermediate 
S/RES/1171 
Sierra 
Leone 
05/06/1998 War War Intermediate 
S/RES/1160 
FRY 
including 
Kosovo 
31/03/1998 
(10/09/01) 
Intrastate 
with foreign 
involvement 
March 
1998-
June 1999 
War War N/A 
S/RES/1333 
Afghanistan 
19/12/2000 
Intrastate 
with foreign 
involvement 
September 
1978-
present 
War War War 
S/RES/1493 
DRC 28/07/2003 
Intrastate 
with foreign 
involvement 
October 
1996-
December 
2001 
Post conflict N/A 
War (2000); 
Intermediate 
(2001) 
S/RES/1701 
Lebanon 11/08/2006 
Intrastate 
(Israel vs. 
Hezbollah) | 
July-
August 
2006 
War N/A N/A 
D - No Armed Conflict 
S/RES/748 
Libya 
31/03/1992 
(12/09/03) -
S/RES/1390 
Usama bin Laden et al. /Taliban 
16/01/2002 
-
' Information on conflict dates and intensity gathered from Uppsala University Conflict Database 
(UCDB): http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php (Information correct as of 31 December 2006) 
The database contained information from 1989-2006. 
" Arms Embargo 
"' Duration is measured from the first time the armed conflict threshold is passed (25+ 'battle-related' 
deaths) and when the threshold is achieved annually thereafter. See 'Definitions' on UCDB website ibid. 
Although this is the only case deemed not to have foreign involvement, it has been argued that this 
conflict had elements of both international and internal armed conflicts. 
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Table 2 - Target Addressees and other information related to the 
imposition of arms embargoes 
Table 2A 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes during internal armed conflict situations 
Resolution 
Number 
Relevant 
Provision Duration 
Arms 
Boycott 
Factor' 
Target Addressee(s) of arms 
embargo 
Affected 
Country 
1 S/RES/232 12(d) Unlimited Complete The de facto authorities - Ian 
Smith's 'illegal racist regime' -
whole territory affected. 
Southern 
Rhodesia 
2 S/RES/418 f2 Unlimited Complete South African Government - whole 
territory affected. 
South 
Africa 
3 S/RES/788 18 Unlimited Complete All parties to the conflict - whole 
territory affected. 
Liberia 
4 S/RES/841 515 Unlimited Complete The 'de facto authorities' - i.e. those 
responsible for the coup. 
Officially - 'any person or body in 
Haiti or to any person or body for 
the purpose of any business carried 
on in or operated from Haiti' 
Haiti 
5 S/RES/918 113 Unlimited Complete All parties to the conflict - whole 
territory affected. 
Rwanda 
6 S/RES/1343 115(a) 14 months Complete Liberian Government - whole 
territory affected. 
Liberia 
7 S/RES/1521 12(a) 12 months Complete Any recipient in Liberia, including 
all NSA's, such as LURD and 
MODEL, and all former and current 
militias and armed groups - whole 
territory affected. 
Liberia 
8 S/RES/1556 17 Unlimited Complete All non-goveriunental entities and 
individuals, including the 
Janjaweed, operating in the states of 
North, South and West Darfur, 
Sudan 
9 S/RES/1572 17 13 months Complete Ivorian Government - whole 
territory affected. 
Cote 
d'lvoire 
clxx 
Table 2 continued... 
Table 2B 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes during mixed armed conflict situations 
Resolution 
Number 
Relevant 
Provision Duration 
Arms 
Boycott 
Factor 
Target Addressee(s) of arms 
embargo 
Affected 
Country 
1 S/RES/713 16 Unlimited Complete All parties to the conflict - whole 
territory affected. 
Yugoslavia 
2 S/RES/733 15 Unhmited Complete All parties to the conflict - whole 
territory affected. 
Somalia 
3 S/RES/864 119 Unlimited Partial UNITA Angola 
4 S/RES/1132 16 Unlimited Complete Government and non-
governmental forces - whole 
territory affected. 
Sierra Leone 
5 S/RES/1160 18 Unlimited Complete The Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and any 
terrorists operating therein (or in 
Kosovo, e.g. the KLA) - whole 
territory affected. 
FRY 
including 
Kosovo 
6 S/RES/1171 12 Unlimited Partial All non-governmental forces 
(i.e. RUF and members of former 
military junta). 
Sierra Leone 
7 S/RES/1333 15(a) 12 months/ 
unlimited 
Complete The de facto authorities - Afghan 
territory under Taliban control 
Afghanistan 
8 S/RES/1493 120 12 months Partial All foreign and Congolese armed 
groups and militias operating in 
the territory of North and South 
Kivu and of Ituri, and groups not 
party to the Global and All-
inclusive agreement, in the DRC. 
DRC 
9 S/RES/1701 115 Unlimited Absent Any entity or individual in 
Lebanon. (Excluding the 
Government) 
Lebanon 
...Table 2 continued. 
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Table 20 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes 
during international armed conflict situations 
Resolution 
Number 
Relevant 
Provision Duration 
Arms 
Boycott 
Factor 
Target Addressee(s) 
of arms embargo 
Affected 
Country/ 
Countries 
01 S/RES/661 Unlimited Complete Iraqi Government -
whole territory 
affected. 
Iraq and Kuwait 
04 S/RES/1298 16(a) 12 months Complete Eritrea and Ethiopia -
whole territory 
affected. 
Eritrea and 
Ethiopia 
Table 2D 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes 
in the absence of an armed conflict situation 
Resolution 
Number 
Relevant 
Provision Duration 
Arms 
Boycott 
Factor 
Target Addressee(s) of arms 
embargo 
Affected 
Country/ 
Countries 
01 S/RES/748 115(a) Unlimited Complete Libyan Government - whole 
territory affected. 
Libyan Arab 
Jamah iriya 
02 S/RES/1390 12(c) Unlimited Complete Usama bin Laden, members of 
the Al-Qaida organisation, the 
TaUban and all associates as 
referred to in the list created 
pursuant to S/RES/1267 and 
S/RES/1333 
None 
Degree of removal of the State's control over weapons imports. 
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Table 3 - Current Status, Objectives and Legal Mandate 
Table 3A 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes during internal armed conflict situations 
Resolution 
Number 
Current 
Status' Stated or Apparent Objectives" Legal Mandate 
1 S/RES/232 Terminated 
by 
f2 S/RES/460 
Type D - To bring an end to the 
rebellion in Soutliern Rhodesia - at the 
time a colony of the UK. 
- Acting in accordance with Articles 
39 and 41 of the UN Charter, 
-11 Determines that the present 
situation in Southern Rhodesia 
constitutes a threat to IPS. 
2 S/RES/418 Terminated 
by 
f \ S/RES/9I9 
Type A - ' . . . the existing arms 
embargo must be strengthened.. .in 
order to prevent a further aggravation 
of the grave simation in South Africa.' 
Considering that the policies and acts 
of the South African Government are 
fraught with danger to IPS. 
- Acting under Chapter VII . . . 
-11 Determines.. .that the acquisition 
of arms and related 
materiel.. .constitutes a threat to the 
maintenance of IPS. 
3 S/RES/788 Terminated 
by 
11 
S/RES/1343 
Type B - '.. .establishing peace and 
stability in Liberia...' until further 
notice. 
Determining that the deterioration of 
the situation in Liberia constitutes a 
threat to IPS, particularly in West 
Africa as a whole. 
4 S/RES/841 Terminated 
by 14 
S/RES/944 
Type D - To coerce agreement to 
reinstate the legitimate Government of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 
Seeking political resolution of the 
crisis (i.e. avoiding military action). 
Determining that, in these unique and 
exceptional circumstances, the 
continuation of this situation threatens 
IPS in the region. 
5 S/RES/918 Active Types A & B - 'Cease hostilities, 
agree to a ceasefire and bring an end 
to the mindless violence and carnage 
that engulfs Rwanda.' 
To stem/halt the armed contribution to 
the Genocide. 
(Preamble) Concerned that the 
continuation of the situation in 
Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace 
and security in the region. Part B 
Determinine that the situation in 
Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace 
and security in the region, Acting 
under Chapter VII . . . 
6 S/RES/1343 Terminated 
by 
V 
S/RES/1521 
Types C & D - P(a) - in force in two 
months unless certain demands are 
met. Aimed to coerce the Govt of 
Liberia to cease its active support for 
RUF in Sierra Leone. 
Determining that the active support 
provided by the Government of 
Liberia for armed rebel groups in 
neighbouring countries, and in 
particular its support for the RUF in 
Sierra Leone, constitutes a threat to 
IPS in the region. 
7 S/RES/1521 Active - Last 
renewed by 
S/RES/1731 
Types A & B - Disarmament to 
assist/facilitate the peace process. 
Determining that the situation in 
Liberia and the proliferation of arms 
and armed NSA's, including 
mercenaries, in the subregion 
continue to constitute a threat to IPS 
in West Africa, in particular to the 
peace process in Liberia. 
8 S/RES/1556 Active Types A & D - To coerce the 
Government of Sudan to comply with 
the demands in ^6 - '.. to disarm the 
Janjaweed militias and apprehend and 
bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and 
their associates...' SC expressed 
intention to consider modification/ 
termination of measures once 
Government fiilfils its commitments in 
16. 
Determining that the situation in 
Sudan constitutes a threat to IPS and 
to stabihty in the region. 
9 S/RES/1572 Active - L^st 
renewed by 
S/RES/1727 
Types B & D - To influence progress 
on the peace and national 
reconciliation process as defined in the 
Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III 
Agreements. 
Detemining that the situation in Cote 
d'lvoire continues to pose a threat to 
IPS in the region. 
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Table 3 continued... 
Table 3B 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes during mixed armed conflict situations 
Resolution 
Number Current Status Stated or Apparent Objectives Legal Mandate 
1 S/KESni3 Terminated by 
12 S/RES/1074 
Type B -'...establishing peace and 
stability in Yugoslavia...' until further 
notice. 
Concerned that the 
continuation of this situation 
constitutes a threat to IPS. 
2 S/RES/733 Active Type B - '...establishing peace and 
stability in Somalia...' until fiarther 
notice. 
Concerned that the 
continuation of this 
situation... constitutes a threat 
to IPS. 
3 S/RES/864 Terminated by 
V- S/RES/1448 
Types B & D - To coerce implementation 
of the 'Acordos de Paz' - AE will come 
into force...unless... 
'.. .with a view to prohibiting all sale or 
supply to UNITA of arms and related 
materiel...' 
Determining that, as a result of 
UNITA's military actions, the 
situation in Angola constitutes 
a threat to IPS. 
4 S/RES/1132 Terminated by 
11 S/RES/1171 
Type D - Restoration of democratically 
Government and a return to constitutional 
order. 
Intention to terminate AE when... [the 
Council's demands are met] 
Determining that the situation 
in Sierra Leone constitutes a 
threat to IPS in the region. 
5 S/RES/1160 Terminated by 
l\ S/RES/1367 
Type B - ' . . . for the purposes of fostering 
peace and stability in Kosovo...' 
None given.' 
6 S/RES/1171 Active Types A & D - To coerce the military 
junta to comply with demands. 
Readiness to terminate measures once 
lawful Sierra Leone Government has 
fully re-established control over all its 
territory and [rebels] are disarmed and 
demobilized. 
Recalls previous resolutions 
but no specific re-
determination of Article 39. 
7 S/RES/1333 Active - Renewed 
by S/RES/1390 
with unlimited 
duration. 
Type C - Punitive measure because 
demands of 1267/99 not met. 
Comprehensive^ attempt to control 
Taliban and force implementation of 
1267/99. 
Determining that the failure of 
the Taliban authorities to 
respond to the demands in 
[llSofS/RES/HK, \2 of 
S/RES/1267] constitutes a 
threat to IPS, 
8 S/RES/1493 Active - Last 
renewed by 
S/RES/1698 
Types A & B - Disarmament to 
assist/facilitate the peace process for the 
ultimate aim of national reconciliation. 
Noting that the situation in the 
DRC continues to constitute a 
threat to IPS in the region. 
9 S/RES/1701 Active Types B & D - To support the call for a 
ceasefire/cessation of hostilities between 
Israel and Lebanon and in pursuit of the 
Taif Accords; and so that only 
Government-authorised weapons may 
enter Lebanon. 
Determining that the situation 
in Lebanon constitutes a threat 
to IPS. 
' "In adopting diis resolution, the Security Council sends an unmistakable message: that by acting under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, the Council considers that the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security in the Balkans region. It says to Belgrade that repression in Kosovo will not be tolerated by the international 
community; and to the Kosovar side, it says that terrorism — in whatever guise and for whatever purpose — is 
unacceptable." Mr Richmond - UK's representative at that SC meeting. S/PV.3868 (My emphasis) 
^ The measures go far beyond conventional arms embargoes, e.g. prohibiting chemical weapons, freezing funds and 
closing Taliban offices/airlines. 
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...Table 3 continued. 
Table 3C 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes 
during international armed conflict situations 
Resolution 
Number 
Current 
Status Stated or Apparent Objectives Legal Mandate 
1 S/RES/661 Active Type C - Punitive measure in response to 
invasion of another sovereign country 
(Kuwait) and failure to comply with 
demands in S/RES/660 
Given in preceding resolution -
S/RES/660 - a breach of IPS. 
2 S/RES/1298 Expired 
on 
16 May 
2001 
Types B & D - To persuade towards a 
peaceful definitive settlement of the 
conflict. 
If settlement reported by the Secretary 
General as conclusion to conflict, the 
arms embargo will be terminated with 
immediate effect. 
Determining that the situation 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region. 
Table 3D 
UNSC Chapter V I I resolutions imposing arms embargoes 
in the absence of an armed conflict situation 
Resolution 
Number 
Current 
Status Stated or Apparent Objectives Legal Mandate 
1 S/RES/748 Terminated 
S/RESI506 
Type C - Punitive measure - Issued because the 
Libyan Government had 'still not provided a full 
and effective response' to the requests in 
S/RES/731. 
Convinced that the 
suppression of acts of 
international terrorism, 
including those in which 
States are directly or 
indirectly involved, is 
essential for the 
maintenance of IPS 
2 S/RES/1390 Active Type C - Prevention of Terrorist acts - part of 
continuing comprehensive sanctions regime. 
Specific reason given: Determining that the 
Taliban have failed to respond to the demands in 
f\3 of S/RES/12I4, f2 of S/RES/1267 and HI, 2 
and 3 of S/RES/1333. 
Reaffirming fiirther that 
acts of international 
terrorism constitute a 
threat to IPS. 
' Measures which were suspended at one point prior to eventual termination are identifiable by the 
italicised text. 
" Types of objective at the time the measures were imposed: 
A = To control arms; B = To promote peace; C = To punish; D = To bargain. 
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Table 5 
UN Document 
Symbol' 
'Parent' 
Resolution 
Number 
Date of Adoption Provisional verbatim 
meeting 
record #^  
Voting record 
(in favour -
against -
abstention) 
Relevant 
Territory/territories 
S/RES/181 Preceded 418 7 August 1963 S/PV.1056 9-0-2 (France, 
UK) 
South Africa 
S/RES/182 Preceded 418 4 December 1963 S/PV.1078 Adopted 
unanimously 
South Africa 
S/RES/I91 Preceded 418 18 June 1964 S/PV.1135 8-0-3 
(Czechoslovakia, 
France, USSR) 
South Africa 
S/RES/232 N/A 16 December 1966 S/PV.1340 11-0-4 (Bulgaria, 
France, Mali, 
USSR) 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/253 232 29 May 1968 S/PV.1428 Adopted 
unanimously 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/277 232 18 March 1970 S/PV.1535 14-0-1 (Spain) Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/282 Preceded 418 23 July 1970 S/PV.1549 12-0-3 (France, 
UK, USA) 
South Africa 
S/RES/288 232 17 November 1970 S/PV.1557 Adopted 
unanimously 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/311 232 4 February 1972 S/PV.1639 14-0-1 (France) South Africa 
S/RES/314 232 28 February 1972 S/PV.1645 13-0-2 (UK, 
USA) 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/318 232 28 July 1972 S/PV,1655 14-0-1 (USA) Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/320 232 29 September 1972 S/PV.1666 13-0-2 (UK, 
USA) 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/326 232 02 February 1973 S/PV.1691 13-0-2 (UK, 
USA) 
Southern I^odesia 
S/RES/333 232 22 May 1973 S/PV.1716 12-0-3 (France, 
UK, USA) 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/411 232 30 June 1977 S/PV.2019 Adopted 
unanimously 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/418 N/A 04 November 1977 S/PV.2046 Adopted 
unanimously 
South Africa 
S/RES/421 418 09 December 1977 S/PV,2052 Adopted 
unanimously 
South Africa 
S/RES/423 232 14 March 1978 S/PV.2067 10-0-5 (Canada, 
France, Germany, 
UK, USA) 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/445 232 8 March 1979 S/PV.2122 12-0-3 (France, 
UK, USA) 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/460 232 21 December 1979 S/PV.2181 13-0-2 
(Czechoslovakia, 
USSR) 
Southern Rhodesia 
S/RES/473 418 13 June 1980 S/PV.2231 Adopted 
unanimously 
South Africa 
S/RES/475 418 27 June 1980 S/PV,2240 12-0-3 (France, 
UK, USA) 
South Africa 
S/RES/558 418 13 December 1984 S/PV.2564 Adopted 
unanimously 
South Africa 
S/RES/591 418 28 November 1986 S/PV.2723 Adopted 'by 
consensus' 
South Africa 
S/RES/660 Preceded 661 2 August 1990 S/PV.2932 14-0-1 
(Yemen) 
Iraq 
S/RES/661 N/A 6 August 1990 S/PV.2933 13-0-2 
(Cuba and 
Yemen) 
Iraq 
S/RES/662 661 9 August 1990 S/PV.2934 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
^ These documents can be accessed via UNBISnet using the browse list search - http://unbisnet.un.org 
^ These citations also correspond with the official UN Document Symbols, similarly accessible via UNBISnel. 
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Table 5 
UN Document 
Symbol' 
'Parent' 
Resolution 
Number 
Date of Adoption Provisional verbatim 
meeting 
record #^  
Voting record 
(in favour -
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abstention) 
Relevant 
Territory/territories 
S/RES/664 661 18 August 1990 S/PV.2937 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/665 661 25 August 1990 S/PV.2938 13-0-2 
(Cuba and 
Yemen) 
Iraq 
S/RES/666 661 13 September 1990 S/PV.2939 13-0-2 
(Cuba and 
Yemen) 
Iraq 
S/RES/667 661 16 September 1990 S/PV.2940 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/669 661 24 September 1990 S/PV.2942 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/670 661 25 September 1990 S/PV.2943 14-0-1 (Cuba) Iraq 
S/RES/674 661 29 October 1990 S/PV.2951 13-0-2 
(Cuba and 
Yemen) 
Iraq 
S/RES/677 661 28 November 1990 S/PV.2962 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/678 661 29 November 1990 S/PV.2963 12-2-1 (Cuba, 
Yemen against; 
China abstaining) 
Iraq 
S/RES/686 661 02 March 1991 S/PV.2978 11-1-3 (Cuba 
against; China, 
India, Yemen 
abstaining) 
Iraq 
S/RES/687 661 03 April 1991 S/PV.2981 12-1-2 (Cuba 
against; Ecuador, 
Yemen 
abstaining) 
Iraq 
S/RES/700 661 17 June 1991 S/PV.2994 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/706 661 15 August 1991 S/PV.3004 13-1-1 (Cuba 
against; Yemen 
abstaining) 
Iraq 
S/RES/712 661 19 September 1991 S/PV.3008 13-1-1 (Cuba 
against; Yemen 
abstaining) 
Iraq 
S/RES/713 N/A 25 September 1991 S/PV.3009 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/721 713 27 November 1991 S/PV.3018 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/724 713 15 December 1991 S/PV.3023 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/727 713 08 January 1992 S/PV.3028 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/733 N/A 23 January 1992 S/PV.3039 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/743 713 21 February 1992 S/PV.3055 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/746 733 17 March 1992 S/PV.3060 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/748 N/A 31 March 1992 S/PV.3063 10-0-5 
(China, Cape 
Verde, India, 
Morocco and 
Zimbabwe) 
Libya 
S/RES/749 713 7 April 1992 S/PV.3066 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/751 733 24 April 1992 S/PV.3069 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/752 713 15 May 1992 S/PV,3075 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
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S/RES/757 713 30 May 1992 S/PV.3082 13-0-2 (China, 
Zimbabwe) 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/758 713 08 June 1992 S/PV.3083 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/761 713 29 June 1992 S/PV.3087 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/762 713 30 June 1992 S/PV.3088 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/764 713 13 July 1992 S/PV.3039 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/767 733 27 July 1992 S/PV.3101 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/770 713 13 August 1992 S/PV.3106 12-0-3 (China, 
India, Zimbabwe) 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/771 Adopted 
unanimously 
S/RES/775 733 28 August 1992 S/PV.3110 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/777 713 19 September 1992 S/PV.3116 12-0-3 (China, 
India, Zimbabwe) 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/780 713 06 October 1992 S/PV.3119 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/781 713 09 October 1992 S/PV.3122 14-0-1 (China) Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/785 Preceded 864 30 October 1992 S/PV.3130 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/786 713 10 November 1992 S/PV.3133 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/787 713 16 November 1992 S/PV.3137 13-0-2 (China, 
Zimbabwe) 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/788 N/A 19 November 1992 S/PV.3138 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/793 Preceded 864 30 November 1992 S/PV.3144 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/794 733 3 December 1992 S/PV.3145 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/804 Preceded 864 29 January 1993 S/PV.3168 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/811 Preceded 864 12 March 1993 S/PV.3182 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/813 788 26 March 1993 S/PV.3187 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/814 733 26 March 1993 S/PV.3188 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/819 713 16 April 1993 S/PV.3199 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/837 733 06 June 1993 S/PV.3229 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/838 713 10 June 1993 S/PV.3234 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/841 N/A 16 June 1993 S/PV.3238 Adopted 
unanimously 
Haiti 
S/RES/851 Preceded 864 15 July 1993 S/PV.3254 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/861 841 27 August 1993 S/PV.3271 Adopted 
unanimously 
Haiti 
S/RES/864 N/A /5 September 1993 S/PV.3277 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/866 788 22 September 1993 S/PV.3281 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/873 841 13 October 1993 S/PV.3291 Adopted 
unanimously 
Haiti 
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S/RES/875 841 16 October 1993 S/PV.3293 Adopted 
unanimously 
Haiti 
S/RES/883 748 11 November 1993 S/PV.3312 11-0-4 (China, 
Djibouti, 
Morocco, 
Pakistan) 
Liberia 
S/RES/886 733 18 November 1993 S/PV.3317 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/890 864 15 December 1993 S/PV.3323 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/897 733 04 February 1994 S/PV.3334 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/917 841 06 May 1994 S/PV.3376 Adopted 
unanimously 
Haid 
S/RES/918 N/A 17 May 1994 S/PV.3377 Part B 14-1-0 
(Rwanda) 
Rwanda 
S/RES/919 418 25 May 1994 S/PV.3379 Adopted 
unanimously 
South Africa 
S/RES/923 733 31 May 1994 S/PV.3385 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/928 918 20 June 1994 S/PV.3391 Adopted 
unanimously 
Rwanda 
S/RES/940 841 31 July 1994 S/PV.3413 12-0-2 (Brazil, 
China) 
Haiti 
S/RES/942 713 23 September 1994 S/PV.3428 14-0-1 (China) Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/944 841 29 September 1994 S/PV.3430 13-0-2 (Brazil, 
Russia) 
Haiti 
S/RES/950 788 21 October 1994 S/PV.3442 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/954 733 04 November 1994 S/PV.3447 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/972 788 13 January 1995 S/PV.3489 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/976 864 08 February 1995 S/PV.3499 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/985 788 13 April 1995 S/PV.3517 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/997 918 9 June 1995 S/PV.3542 Adopted 
unanimously 
Rwanda 
S/RES/1001 788 30 June 1995 S/PV.3549 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1005 918 17 July 1995 S/PV.3555 Adopted 
unanimously 
Rwanda 
S/RES/1011 918 16 August 1995 S/PV.3566 Adopted 
unanimously 
Rwanda 
S/RES/1013 918 07 September 1995 S/PV.3574 Adopted 
unanimously 
Rwanda 
S/RES/1014 788 15 September 1995 S/PV.3577 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1020 788 10 November 1995 S/PV.3592 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1021 713/ 22 November 1995 S/PV.3595 14-0-1 (Russia) Former 
S/RES/1022 Preceded 
1160 
Adopted 
unanimously 
Yugoslavia/Kosovo 
S/RES/1031 713 15 December 1995 S/PV.3607 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/I041 788 29 January 1996 S/PV,3624 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/I053 918 23 April 1996 S/PV.3656 Adopted 
unanimously 
Rwanda 
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S/RES/1059 788 31 May 1996 S/PV.3671 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1071 788 30 August 1995 S/PV.3654 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1074 713 1 October 1996 S/PV.3700 Adopted 
unanimously 
Former Yugoslavia 
S/RES/1076 Preceded 
1333 
22 Oct 1996 S/PV.3706 Adopted 
unanimously 
Afghanistan 
S/RES/1083 788 27 November 1996 S/PV.3717 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1100 788 27 March 1997 S/PV.3757 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1116 788 27 June 1997 S/PV.3793 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1127 864 28 August 1997 S/PV.3814 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1132 N/A 8 October 1997 S/PV.3822 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1156 1132 16 March 1998 S/PV.3861 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1I60 N/A 31 March 1998 S/PV.3868 14-0-1 (China) Kosovo 
S/RES/1161 918 09 April 1998 S/PV.3870 Adopted 
unanimously 
Rwanda 
S/RES/1171 N/A 5 June 1998 S/PV.3889 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1173 864 12 June 1998 S/PV.3891 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1181 1171 13 July 1998 S/PV.3902 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1192 748 27 August 1998 S/PV.3920 Adopted 
unanimously 
Libya 
S/RES/1196 N/A 16 September 1998 S/PV.3927 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sanctions/Arms 
Embargoes 
S/RES/1199 1160 23 September 1998 S/PV.3930 14-0-1 (China) Kosovo 
S/RES/1203 1160 24 October 1998 S/PV.3937 13-0-2 (China, 
Russia) 
Kosovo 
S/RES/1209 N/A 19 November 1998 S/PV.3945 Adopted 
unanimously 
Africa/Arms control 
S/RES/1214 Preceded 
1333 
08 December 1998 S/PV.3952 Adopted 
unanimously 
Afghanistan 
S/RES/1220 1132/1171 12 January 1999 S/PV.3964 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1221 864 12 January 1999 S/PV.3965 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1227 Preceded 
1298 
10 February 1999 S/PV.3975 Adopted 
unanimously 
Eritrea/Ethiopia 
S/RES/1229 864 26 February 1999 S/PV.3983 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1231 1132/1171 11 March 1999 S/PV.3986 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1237 864 07 May 1999 S/PV.3999 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/I244 1160 10 June 1999 S/PV.4011 14-0-1 (China) Kosovo 
S/RES/1267 Preceded 
1333 
15 October 1999 S/PV.4051 Adopted 
unanimously 
Afghanistan 
S/RES/1268 864 15 October 1999 S/PV.4052 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1294 864 13 April 2000 S/PV.4126 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1295 864 18 April 2000 S/PV,4129 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
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S/RES/1298 N/A 17 May 2000 S/PV.4144 Adopted 
unanimously 
Eritrea & Ethiopia 
S/RES/1299 1132/1171 19 May 2000 S/PV.4145 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1306 1132/1171 5 July 2000 S/PV.4168 14-0-1 (Mali) Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1333 N/A 
19 December 2000 
S/PV.425] 13-0-2 (China, 
Malaysia) 
Afghanistan 
S/RES/1336 864 2001 S/PV.4263 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1343 N/A 7 March 2001 S/PV.4287 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia/Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1344 1298 15 March 2001 S/PV,4294 Adopted 
unanimously 
Eritrea & Ethiopia 
S/RES/1356 733 19 June 2001 S/PV.4332 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1363 1333 30 July 2001 S/PV.4352 Adopted 
unanimously 
Afghanistan 
S/RES/1367 1160 10 September 2001 S/PV.4366 Adopted 
unanimously 
Kosovo 
S/RES/1369 1298 14 September 2001 S/PV.4372 Adopted 
unanimously 
Eritrea & Ethiopia 
S/RES/1390 N/A 16 January 2002 S/PV.4452 Adopted 
unanimously 
Terrorism 
S/RES/1407 733 03 May 2002 S/PV.4524 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1408 1132/1171 06 May 2002 S/PV.4526 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1409 661 14 May 2002 S/PV.4531 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/1425 733 22 July 2002 S/PV.4580 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1436 1171 24 September 2002 S/PV.4615 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1439 864 18 October 2002 S/PV.4628 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1448 864 09 December 2002 S/PV.4657 Adopted 
unanimously 
Angola 
S/RES/1452 1333/1390 20 December 2002 S/PV.4678 Adopted 
unanimously 
Terrorism 
S/RES/1455 1333/1390 17 January 2003 S/PV.4686 Adopted 
unanimously 
Terrorism 
S/RES/1470 1171 28 March 2003 S/PV.4729 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1474 733 08 April 2003 S/PV.4737 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1478 1132/1171 06 May 2003 S/PV.4751 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sierra Leone 
S/RES/1483 661 22 May 2003 S/PV.476I 14-0-0 
(The Syrian Arab 
Republic did not 
participate in the 
voting.) 
Iraq 
S/RES/1493 N/A 28 July 2003 S/PV.4797 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1506 748 12 September 2003 S/PV4820 
(Part II) 
13-0-2 (France, 
USA) 
Libya 
S/RES/1511 661 16 October 2003 S/PV.4844 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/1518 661 24 November 2003 S/PV.4872 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
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S/RES/1519 733 16 December 2003 S/PV.4885 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/J521 N/A 22 December 2003 S/PV.4890 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1526 N/A 30 January 2004 S/PV.4908 Adopted 
unanimously 
Terrorism 
S/RES/1533 1493 12 March 2004 S/PV.4926 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1546 661 08 June 2004 S/PV.4987 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq 
S/RES/1552 1493 27 July 2004 S/PV.5011 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1556 N/A 30 July 2004 S/PV.5015 13-0-2 (China, 
Pakistan) 
Sudan 
S/RES/1558 733 17 August 2004 S/PV.5022 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1564 1556 18 September 2004 S/PV.5040 11-0-4 (Algeria, 
China, Pakistan, 
Russia) 
Sudan 
S/RES/1572 N/A 15 November 2004 S/PV.5078 Adopted 
unanimously 
Cote d'lvoire 
S/RES/1574 1556 19 November 2004 S/PV.5082 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1579 1521 21 December 2004 S/PV.5105 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1584 1572 01 February 2005 S/PV.5118 Adopted 
unanimously 
Cote d'lvoire 
S/RES/1585 1556 10 March 2005 S/PV.5137 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1587 733 15 March 2005 S/PV.5142 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1588 1556 17 March 2005 S/PV.5143 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1590 1556 24 March 2005 S/PV.5151 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1591 1556 29 March 2005 S/PV.5153 12-0-3 (Algeria, 
China, Russia) 
Sudan 
S/RES/1592 1493 30 March 2005 S/PV.5155 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1596 1493 18 April 2005 S/PV.5163 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1607 1521 21 June 2005 S/PV.5208 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1609 1521 24 June 2005 S/PV.5213 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1616 1493 29 July 2005 S/PV.5243 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1617 1333/1390 29 July 2005 S/PV.5244 Adopted 
unanimously 
Terrorism 
S/RES/1618 661/1333/13 
90 
04 August 2005 S/PV.5246 Adopted 
unanimously 
Iraq/Terrorism 
S/RES/1627 1556 23 September 2005 S/PV.5269 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1630 733 14 October 20Q5 S/PV.5280 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1633 1572 21 October 2005 S/PV.5288 Adopted 
unanimously 
C6te d'lvoire 
S/RES/1643 1572 15 December 2005 S/PV.5327 Adopted 
unanimously 
Cote d'lvoire 
S/RES/1647 1521 20 December 2005 S/PV,5336 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
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S/RES/1649 1493 21 December 2005 S/PV.5340 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1651 1556 21 December 2005 S/PV.5342 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/I653 1493 27 January 2006 S/PV.5359 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1654 1493 31 January 2006 S/PV.5360 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1663 1556 24 March 2006 S/PV.5396 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1665 1556 29 March 2006 S/PV.5402 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1672 1556 25 April 2006 S/PV.5423 12-0-3 (China, 
Qatar, Russia) 
Sudan 
S/RES/1674 N/A 28 April 2006 S/PV.5430 Adopted 
unanimously 
SALW/Armed 
Conflict 
S/RES/I676 733 10 May 2006 S/PV.5435 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1679 1556 15 May 2006 S/PV.5437 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sudan 
S/RES/1683 1521 16 May 2006 S/PV.5454 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1698 1493 13 June 2006 S/PV.5502 Adopted 
unanimously 
DRC 
S/RES/1699 N/A 31 July 2006 S/PV.5507 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sanctions 
Committees/Interpol 
S/RES/1701 N/A 11 August 2006 S/PV.5511 Adopted 
unanimously 
Lebanon 
S/RES/1706 1556 31 August 2006 S/PV.5519 12-0-3 (China, 
Qatar, Russia) 
Sudan 
S/RES/1708 1572 14 September 2006 S/PV.5524 Adopted 
unanimously 
Cote d'lvoire 
S/RES/1721 1572 01 November 2006 S/PV.5561 Adopted 
unanimously 
Cote d'lvoire 
S/RES/1724 733 29 November 2006 S/PV.5575 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1725 733 06 December 2006 S/PV.5579 Adopted 
unanimously 
Somalia 
S/RES/1727 1572 15 December 2006 S/PV.5592 Adopted 
unanimously 
Cote d'lvoire 
S/RES/1730 N/A 19 December 2006 S/PV.5599 Adopted 
unanimously 
Sanctions/Arms 
Embargoes 
S/RES/1731 1521 20 December 2006 S/PV.5602 Adopted 
unanimously 
Liberia 
S/RES/1735 1333/1390 22 December 2006 S/PV.5609 Adopted 
unanimously 
Terrorism 
S/RES/1739 1572 10 January 2007 S/PV.5617 Adopted 
unanimously 
Cote d'lvoire 
Other UNSC documents 
S/PRST/2001/14 1 1298 1 15 May 2001 S/PV.4320 - Eritrea and Ethiopia 
' Any omissions are the sole responsibility o f the present author. Those in italics represent the 22 
resolutions which imposed arms embargoes. 
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